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From Indifference 
to Entrapment
N O R B E R T  B O T H
The Netherlands 
and the Yugoslav Crisis
1990-1995
A M S T E R D A M  U N I V E R S I T Y  P R E S SA M S T E R D A M  U N I V E R S I T Y  P R E S S
The Yugoslav crisis represents a formidable foreign policy challenge to many Western and
Islamic government bureaucracies. From Indifference to Entrapment deals with the
question of how the Netherlands faced up to this challenge during the years 1990-1995. It
was during this period that the crisis erupted into armed conflict and the single worst war
crime in Europe since the end of World War II took place in the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica.
The role of the Netherlands is particularly interesting, as the country held the EC/EU
Presidency during the recognition debate in 1991 and supplied the peacekeeping presence
in Srebrenica.
The questions addressed in this book include: Did early warning work? What role did
the Dutch Presidency (July-December 1991) play in the recognition debate? What motiv-
ated the Dutch opposition to the Vance-Owen Peace Plan? Why did the Netherlands become
entrapped, as symbolised through its isolated peacekeeping commitment to Srebrenica?
Finally, what can this story tell us about the ability of small and medium powers to in-
fluence international affairs?
This study is based on interviews with key players, including former Cabinet Minis-
ters, and on documents from the Netherlands Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, made available under the Dutch
‘freedom of information act’.
Dr. Norbert Both, formerly a research assistant
for David Owen, now works at the Netherlands
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
‘This is a stunning, even brilliant book.’ – William
Shawcross, in The Sunday Times on Norbert
Both and Jan Willem Honig: Srebrenica; Record
of a War Crime (Penguin, 1996).
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Preface
This book is based on my PhD thesis from the University of Sheffield,
which I successfully defended in May. As I have been employed by the
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs since October 1998, it was ar-
ranged that I should offer a copy of the thesis to two separate official
investigations that were being conducted in the Netherlands. One of
them was the Commissie Bakker, or the Tijdelijke Commissie Besluitvor-
ming Uitzendingen TCBU, a Parliamentary investigation committee set
up to assess the domestic decision-making process regarding the deploy-
ment of Dutch forces in a number of peacekeeping operations in e.g. for-
mer Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Angola and Cyprus (on May 19, 2000). The
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), charged with an
independent analysis of the events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica,
received a copy on May 29, 2000 as well.
The theoretical component of the thesis is represented in the introduc-
tion to this book. It covers three sets of literature. The first one deals with
the international handling of the Yugoslav crisis. The second represents
the contrasting views on the nature of the international system and the
role of small states within it, while the third focuses on the foreign policy
of the Netherlands. In assembling the empirical component of this book,
I used various methodological approaches, including the study of unpub-
lished and public documents, memoirs, interviews, secondary literature
and press articles. I would be reluctant to claim that participant observa-
tion played an important role, although my perspective on the events
covered in this book was inevitably coloured by my time spent as a research
assistant for David Lord Owen and my work in the European Affairs
Department of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry.

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The core of the primary source material consists of official documents
from the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The references to the
Foreign Ministry’s documents have been deleted, given that they only
mentioned the files in which they had been found. A full list of the files
that were studied is provided in the bibliography. In addition, I was
granted access to former Minister of Defence Relus ter Beek’s personal
papers. While Ter Beek did make use of these papers for his own mem-
oirs, the Foreign Ministry’s documents referred to in this thesis are not in
most cases available in the public domain. The reasons for not extending
my research of the Foreign Ministry’s documents to include the (months
before the) actual fall of Srebrenica are discussed in the introduction. I
am aware I have not seen all the relevant government documents cover-
ing the period under discussion (notably Cabinet minutes), but I feel that
I have seen sufficient material to be able to provide a well-informed inter-
pretation of Dutch Yugoslavia policy during the period under discussion.
An additional primary source is David Owen’s Balkan Odyssey CD-
ROM, which includes several references to Dutch Yugoslavia policy dur-
ing the period discussed in this book, including a report of a meeting in
1993 between the ICFY co-chairmen and Dutch Foreign Minister Pieter
Kooijmans. Use was made too of official letters to Parliament and parlia-
mentary records, as well as some official reports by various institutes,
including the UN Secretary General’s ‘Srebrenica Report’. This book also
draws on the growing number of personal memoirs covering the
Yugoslav crisis. I also used the statements made by key players during the
Public Hearings of the TCBU in the Hague during the period 22 May - 8
June 2000.
On-the-record as well as some off-the-record interviews were conducted
with key players. Use was also made of the knowledge gained through the
numerous interviews conducted together with Dr Jan Willem Honig for
our book Srebrenica, Record of a War Crime. In some cases I received let-
ters from key players explaining their views on particular instances relat-
ed to the period in which the Netherlands held the EC Presidency in
1991. The opinion polls conducted under the aegis of the Stichting Krijgs-
macht en Maatschappij testify to the pro-interventionist domestic mood
in which the Dutch decision-making process regarding the military con-
tributions to UNPROFOR took place.
 
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I dealt with the problem of how to draw a line between knowledge gained
as an academic researcher and knowledge gained as a Foreign Ministry
official as follows. Upon my arrival in the European Affairs Department,
in October 1998, I presented my draft-thesis to the people responsible for
the Dutch version of the ‘Freedom of Information Act’, de Wet Open-
baarheid Bestuur. Since then, no new references to unpublished docu-
ments have been added to this book.
There are numerous people without whose encouragement and advice
this book would not have come about. First of all, I would like to thank
Dr Ian Kearns and Professor Stephen George from the Department of
Politics of the University of Sheffield. They helped me to channel my
enthusiasm for international relations into a successful year (1993-1994)
as an MA student and continued to encourage me from then on. I would
also like to express my gratitude to the University of Sheffield for provid-
ing me with a three-year scholarship from the Basil Hicks Lecture
Endowment. I would like to thank Dr John Hawthorne as well as Sue Kelk
and Sarah Cooke for their help over the past years.
Between October 1994 and November 1995, I worked for Lord Owen as a
research assistant. Apart from Lord Owen himself, I would like to thank
Maggie Smart for her warm support during this phase. In London I also
met Dr Jan Willem Honig and Dr James Gow, who willingly shared their
knowledge about military strategy in general and the Yugoslav war of dis-
solution in particular, and encouraged me to go on when the road ahead
seemed too long to travel. It required the hospitality of Andrew and
Bryan Crick, as well as Peter and Ruth Martin, for me to be able to live in
London during this period.
Over the years I have had many formal and informal conversations about
Western policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis with people from various
backgrounds. While I thank them all for their insights, I will only men-
tion by name those with whom I communicated in the specific context of
this thesis and who did not pose the condition of anonymity: Commis-
sioner of the Queen Relus ter Beek, Ellen Berends, Ambassador Dr Niek
Biegman, Hans van den Broek, Peter Lord Carrington, Ambassador Jan
Fietelaars, Harm J. Hazewinkel, Jan Hoekema MP, Bert Kreemers, Major-
General Ton Kolsteren, Professor Pieter Kooijmans, Maarten Lak, Prof.
Ruud Lubbers, Frank Majoor, Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey, Herman

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Schaper, General Arie van der Vlis, Dr Joris Voorhoeve, Ambassador Peter
van Walsum, and Hanno Würzner. I benefited from conversations with
Professor Maarten Brands, who backed up my request for access to the
Foreign Ministry’s records, and with Dr Bram Boxhoorn, Professor Koen
Koch, Dr Dick Leurdijk and Rob Meines.
I would like to thank Peter van Velzen, Ton van Zeeland and the staff of
the Foreign Ministry’s library for responding with such flexibility to my
requests for documentation. Yvonne van Gog of the Rijksvoorlichtings-
dienst was kind enough to provide me with compiled sets of press articles.
Jacques Leuven, the documentation specialist in the Foreign Ministry’s
European Affairs Department, deserves thanks for helping to streamline a
number of footnotes. I greatly appreciate the fact that my hard-pressed
but ever-cheerful colleagues in the European Affairs Department showed
interest in what I was doing and enabled me to take some time off during
the final stages of writing.
In my immediate surroundings, I am indebted to my grandfather Willem
Polderman, who lent me the funds I needed to enroll as an official MA
student at the University of Sheffield. My wife Graciella had to cope with
the various downsides of years of PhD work, and I greatly admire her for
having consistently encouraged me not to give up. Philippe, many thanks
for letting me use your office during the final stages of work. Peter, thanks
for applying your whiz-kid talents to solving problems with my ‘tupper-
ware computer’. I may have omitted names of people who in reality
played an important role in the coming about of this thesis. I apologise
and am grateful for their contribution.
 
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Abbreviations
CDA Christen Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democrat 
Party)
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAB Directie Algemene Beleidszaken, Ministry of Defence
DAV Directie Atlantische Samenwerking en Veiligheidszaken,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DGES Directoraat-Generaal Europese Samenwerking, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs
DGIS Directoraat-Generaal Internationale Samenwerking,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
DGPZ Directoraat-Generaal Politieke Zaken, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
DVB Directie Veiligheidsbeleid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
D’66 Democraten ‘66 (Liberal Democrat Party)
EC European Community
ECMM European Community Monitoring Mission
EPC European Political Cooperation
EU European Union
FRY Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GAC General Affairs Council: meetings of EC/EU Foreign 
Ministers
HTK Handelingen Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal
ICFY International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia
JAP Joint Action Programme, Washington, May 1993

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JNA Yugoslav People’s Army (under SFRY)
MP Member of Parliament
NAC North Atlantic Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIOD Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party)
QMV Qualified Majority Voting (in the EU’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy)
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
VOPP Vance-Owen Peace Plan
VJ Yugoslav Army
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Conservative 
Liberal Party)
WEU Western European Union
 
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Chronology
1990
23 July Ambassador Albert Nooij warns that Yugoslavia’s future
as a multinational state is doubtful.
27-28 August Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos visits 
Yugoslavia.
3 October Ambassador Jan Fietelaars succeeds Nooij as 
Ambassador to Yugoslavia.
22 October GAC instructs Political Committee to ‘make recom-
mendations with regard to the appropriate means to 
encourage the maintenance of [Yugoslavia’s] unity in a 
frame work of democracy.’
1991
12-13 February Slovene Prime Minister Lojze Peterle and Foreign 
Minister Dimitrij Rupel visit The Hague.
27 February US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European and Canadian Affairs, James Dobbins, visits 
The Hague as part of a European tour.
21 March EPC (European Political Cooperation) Troika at level 
of Political Directors, including Peter van Walsum,
visits Washington.
15 May Serbia announces that it will block the rotation of the 
Yugoslav federal Presidency to the Croat Stipe Mesic.
19-20 June CSCE summit, Berlin.

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20 June US Secretary of State James Baker consults with parties 
to the conflict, Belgrade.
25 June Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence.
28 June Ministerial EPC Troika, including Hans van den Broek,
leaves for mediation attempt in Belgrade and Zagreb.
28-29 June European Council, Luxembourg.
30 June - 1 July Renewed mediation attempt by ministerial Troika.
1 July Netherlands takes on EC Presidency.
2 July Van den Broek and Van Walsum visit Washington for 
meetings with National Security Adviser Brent Scow-
croft and Secretary of State James Baker.
3 July Embassy in Belgrade warns of departure from Belgrade 
by Yugoslav Army unit at brigadestrength, with Croatian
border town Vukovar as possible area of operations.
7 July Brioni declaration.
13 July Dutch border changes proposal distributed to EC 
partners; rejected out of hand.
25 July France proposes deployment of WEU ‘interposition’
force.
27-28 August EC Foreign Ministers condemn Serbian ‘fait-accompli
policy’.
7 September First session of EC Peace Conference, chaired by former
British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, The Hague.
14 September Van den Broek receives Croatian Foreign Minister 
Zvonimir Separovic.
15 September Bilateral German-Italian meeting, Venice.
17 September Netherlands proposes ‘lightly armed’ WEU force.
4 October Meeting of Lord Carrington, Van den Broek, Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman, Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic and JNA Commander Veljko Kadijevic 
produces acceptance of principle of recognition of
individual Yugoslav republics as possible outcome of
negotiations, The Hague.
5-6 October EC Foreign Ministers applaud agreement of October 4,
Haarzuilens Castle, Netherlands.
10 October Van den Broek introduces two-month deadline to 
negotiations.
18 October Milosevic refuses Carrington’s ‘Arrangements for a 
General Settlement’.
 
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28 October EC Foreign Ministers threaten ‘non-cooperating 
parties’ with ‘restrictive measures’.
8 November EC Foreign Ministers announce restrictive measures.
18 November Serbian forces take Vukovar.
19 November Memorandum by Director-General for Political Affairs 
Van Walsum to Van den Broek proposes formal Dutch 
policy of anti-Serbian selectiveness.
26 November European Christian-Democrat government leaders 
reach informal consensus on recognition, Stuyvenberg 
Castle, Belgium.
2 December EC Foreign Ministers introduce ‘positive compensatory 
measures’, for Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and (Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia.
4 December German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher 
confirms seriousness of two-month deadline to WEU
assembly.
9-10 December Intergovernmental Conference, Maastricht,
Netherlands.
16-17 December EC Foreign Ministers decide to go ahead with 
recognition of independence of individual republics,
to take place on January 15, 1992.
18 December Germany announces decision to recognise Croatia and 
Slovenia.
1992
21 February Security Council adopts resolution 743, establishing 
UNPROFOR (intended for Croatia only).
Early April Sporadic fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina turns into 
open war.
6 April European Community and its member states recognise 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent state.
7 April USA recognises Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent 
state.
8 June Security Council adopts resolution 758, extending 
UNPROFOR’s mandate to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
6 August ITN broadcasts images of emaciated Muslim prisoners 
in Serb-run camps.

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11 August Clingendael foreign policy analysts Joris Voorhoeve and
Theo van den Doel advocate military intervention in 
International Herald Tribune.
22 August Minister for Development Cooperation Jan Pronk 
advocates military intervention in Trouw.
26-27 August London Conference, co-chaired by British EC-
Presidency and the United Nations; agrees principles 
for settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina and turns EC 
Peace Conference into permanent joint EC/UN 
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY).
1993
2 January Professor Pieter Kooijmans succeeds Van den Broek as 
Foreign Minister.
2 January ICFY presents ‘Vance-Owen Peace Plan’ (VOPP).
20 January Bill Clinton inaugurated as US President.
10 February US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announces 
six US steps to help solve the Bosnian conflict.
26 February Ministerial NATO gathering.
17 March Chief of the Defence Staff, General Arie van der Vlis,
produces list of deployment options.
16 April Security Council adopts resolution 819, demanding 
for Srebrenica and its immediate surroundings to be 
treated as a ‘safe area’.
26 April Kooijmans advocates safe areas at GAC, Copenhagen.
2 May Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic accepts VOPP,
Athens.
6 May Bosnian Serb ‘Assembly’ rejects VOPP (subsequently 
confirmed in a ‘referendum’ held on May 15-16).
6 May Security Council adopts resolution 824, expanding the 
safe area policy to include a total of six Bosnian towns.
7 May Meeting Kooijmans-Christopher at Netherlands 
Embassy in Bonn, Germany.
19 May PvdA/CDA parliamentary motion calling upon the 
government to prepare the airmobile brigade for 
operations in Bosnia.
22 May Joint Action Programme (JAP), announced by the USA,
UK, France, Russia and Spain, Washington D.C.
 
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4 June Security Council adopts resolution 836, mandating 
UNPROFOR to deter attacks against the safe areas.
18 June Security Council adopts resolution 844, authorising 
additional deployment of 7600 troops under the ‘light 
option’.
22 June European Council summit, at which Netherlands 
pledges a logistical battalion in support of the Security 
Council’s safe area policy, Copenhagen.
29 July Kooijmans protests against ICFY Plan for a Union of
Three Republics (‘Owen-Stoltenberg plan’) in letter to 
Belgian EC Presidency.
9 August Germany lets it be known that it has reservations about
the plan for a Union of Three Republics.
10 August Defence Ministry is informed that UN assignment for 
logistical battalion is maintenance of former East-
German equipment to be used by Pakistani UNPRO-
FOR battalion.
17 August Minister of Defence, Relus ter Beek, is advised to 
‘switch’ offer of logistical battalion to airmobile 
battalion.
25 August ICFY co-chairmen pay separate visits to German 
Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and Kooijmans.
2 September Dutch official tells Under-Secretary-General for Peace-
keeping Operations Kofi Annan that the Netherlands 
remains prepared to participate in safe area operation 
with battalion of airmobile brigade, UN HQ, New York.
7 September Ter Beek formally commits battalion of airmobile 
brigade in meeting with UN Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali, UN HQ, New York; meets members of
US administration, Washington.
7 November Kinkel and French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé launch
‘EU Action Plan’ in letter to Belgian Presidency 
9 November Ter Beek and Commander of Land Forces, Lt. General 
Hans Couzy, join advance party of Netherlands 
Defence Ministry in Zagreb, Croatia, where options for 
deployment of airmobile battalion are discussed with 
UNPROFOR commanders.
12 November Cabinet formally decides to deploy airmobile battalion.

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22 November Kooijmans tells EU colleagues that he accepts that 
principles agreed at 1992 London Conference have
‘disappeared from sight’.
30 November Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic tells Kooijmans 
that Bosnian government is prepared to fall back on a 
settlement that awards it one third of the territory of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1-2 December Army’s Director of Operations, Lt. General Ruurd 
Reitsma, faxes from Zagreb report and recommenda
tion on Srebrenica mission to Lt. General Couzy, who 
forwards it to Defence Staff.
6 December Netherlands expresses its ‘concern’ to EU partners 
about the wish of the Bosnian government to draw in 
the east-Bosnian enclaves into its future republic.
9 December Minister of Defence Ter Beek meets with US Secretary 
of Defence Les Aspin in margins of NATO Defence 
Planning Council.
11 December EU Foreign Ministers declare they regard as legitimate 
the Bosnian government’s demands for one-third of the
country and access to the sea.
29 December Kooijmans and Kinkel send a joint letter to Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegovic, urging Bosnian Muslim 
forces to refrain from attacks against Bosnian Croat 
settlements.
1994
19 January Boutros-Ghali received by Prime Minister Ruud 
Lubbers and other Cabinet members, The Hague.
27 January Dutch units depart for Srebrenica
1 February The Second Chamber’s permanent committees for 
Foreign Affairs and defence reconfirm their consent to 
deployment of the airmobile battalion.
April Five Dutch military observers taken hostage by the 
Serbs in retaliation for the use of NATO air power over 
the safe area of Gorazde.
12 May Ter Beek visits Srebrenica.
22 August Ter Beek’s successor as Defence Minister, former 
Clingendael analyst Joris Voorhoeve, visits Srebrenica.
 
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18 October Second Chamber’s Permanent Committees for Foreign 
Affairs and Defence are briefed by the army’s Deputy-
Director of Operations, Brigade-General Ton Kolsteren,
about the limited possibilities for evacuating Dutch 
soldiers from Srebrenica if the need were to arise.
1995
25 May Air strikes against Pale ammunition dumps in reaction 
to violations of Total Exclusion Zone around Sarajevo 
(Bosnian Serb heavy weapons were supposed to have 
been withdrawn to a distance of at least 20 km from the
centre of Sarajevo, or be placed in Weapons Collection 
Points monitored by UNPROFOR).
26 May 400 UN personnel taken hostage by Serb forces in 
retaliation for air strikes against Pale ammunition 
dumps.
3 June Bosnian Serbs take OP Echo (Dutch observation post 
on the southern perimeter of the Srebrenica safe area).
18 June Last UNPROFOR hostages released by Serbs.
11 July Fall of Srebrenica, followed by mass killings of Muslim 
men by (Bosnian) Serb forces.
28 August Last British troops withdrawn from the Gorazde safe 
area; Dutch Cabinet said to be considering a Dutch 
troop deployment as replacement.

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Introduction
‘Srebrenica’ will long remain a symbol for the mismatch between the
great ambitions and limited margins of Dutch foreign policy with regard
to the Yugoslav crisis between July 1990 and July 1995. In July 1995
(Bosnian) Serb forces attacked the enclave which had been declared a
‘safe area’ by the United Nations Security Council and overran the Dutch
peacekeepers who had been stationed there precisely to deter such at-
tacks. Subsequently, Serb soldiers and paramilitaries murdered some
seven thousand Muslim men. For the Netherlands, the fall of Srebrenica
and the subsequent massacre and, in particular, the feeling of impotence
that had accompanied the events as they unfolded, constituted the nadir
in five years of involvement in the Yugoslav crisis.
This book is not so much concerned with the fall of Srebrenica itself.
There are three reasons for this. First, a substantial body of literature on
the fall of Srebrenica is now available (and more is being produced),
including a book authored by Jan Willem Honig and myself to which this
book would have little to add.1 Second, I am employed in the Dutch For-
eign Ministry’s European Affairs Department as a desk officer with re-
sponsibilities covering a wide range of issues regarding the former Yugo-
slavia. Given the need for a clear demarcation line between knowledge
obtained as an academic and the knowledge acquired as an official, it
seemed wise to limit the period covered by this book to a period well
before my entry into the Foreign Ministry, thus excluding e.g. the 1999
Kosovo crisis. The third reason for confining the period covered by this
book to the years 1990-1995 involved the perceived need for consistency
in the use of primary source material. The Netherlands Ministry of For-
eign Affairs was kind enough to allow me to study its official records
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covering the period of 1990 until well into 1994, by which time the para-
meters for the Dutch involvement in the events of July 1995 had been
firmly set. The documents covering the actual fall of Srebrenica had
already been claimed by the official Srebrenica investigation by the
Netherlands Institute for War Documentation (NIOD), whose work I did
not seek to interfere with. Fortunately, former Minister of Defence Relus
ter Beek gave me access to his personal archives, which meant that I could
also study the Defence Ministry’s perspective on the decision-making
regarding the Dutch deployment in Srebrenica. Access to these archives,
numerous interviews and a year of research carried out on behalf of
David Lord Owen in 1994 and 1995 helped me to give substance to this
work.
Dutch readers in particular may feel that the absence of a discussion of
the domestic debate in the Netherlands following the fall of Srebrenica is
an omission. This debate in my view constitutes a research topic in itself,
perhaps primarily for social historians and social psychologists. ‘Srebreni-
ca’ was a formative experience, one that will influence Dutch foreign and
defence policy for years to come. A comparative study of pre-Srebrenica
Dutch foreign policy and post-Srebrenica foreign policy might, therefore,
be interesting. However, it is with a great sense of relief that I leave such
ambitious tasks to the NIOD and the parliamentary commission investi-
gating the Dutch contributions to recent peacekeeping operations.
While this book does not shed a new light on the actual fall of Srebrenica
or its impact on Dutch society, it is very much concerned with the road
that led the Netherlands to become a player in this event. It retraces the
steps taken by the Netherlands in response to the Yugoslav crisis from a
year before armed conflict erupted until the fall of Srebrenica in July
1995. It provides an analysis of the intentions and the substance of Dutch
Yugoslavia policy and examines whether specific outcomes of the inter-
national community’s policy towards this crisis can be attributed to the
Dutch foreign policy process. The answer to this last question has impli-
cations for the answer to a much broader one, namely whether a non-
great power like the Netherlands can exert influence on international
affairs, as this book argues is indeed the case.
Before going on to the question of small-state influence, let us briefly dis-
cuss why one would treat the Netherlands as a smaller state in the first
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place. After all, the divide between great powers and small powers, which
seems so clear-cut in theory, is difficult to define in reality. As one writer
on small states puts it: ‘Until now there have been as many definitions as
authors.’2 There is no point in denying, however, that in the arena of the
Yugoslav crisis between 1990 and 1995, there was an obvious difference
between what the USA and the Netherlands each could have achieved had
the two countries’ ambitions been exactly the same. If we define small
states, as Robert Keohane has done, by what it is that they cannot achieve
– but what great powers can – then the theoretical implications of this
study become relevant for the analysis of the foreign policies of the great
majority of states currently operating in the international system.3 Keo-
hane defines a great power as a ‘state whose leaders consider that it can
alone exercise a large, perhaps decisive impact on the international sys-
tem.’4 States whose leaders recognise that they cannot exercise such an
impact single-handedly, or not at all, are ‘secondary’, ‘middle’, or ‘small’
powers. On this basis, the Netherlands ranks as something between a
small power and a secondary power, or as former Dutch Defence Minister
Joris Voorhoeve once put it, as a ‘pocket-sized medium power’.5 This
brings us back to the question of whether and, if so, how small states can
influence international affairs.
There is a mainstream position in the academic field of international
relations (IR), called Realism, that sees no real role for smaller states.
‘Realists’ regard the international system as an ‘unregulated competition
of states’, in which power is the main differential.6 In the absence of a cen-
tral arbitrator, powerful states are better placed than smaller states to
acquire power. As the father of ‘Structural Realism’, Kenneth Waltz, puts
it: ‘In international politics, as in any self-help system, the units of great-
est capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves.’7
In other words, smaller states are in the undesirable position of being
compelled by the external environment to make foreign policy in the
same way as great powers, i.e. on the basis of rational calculations of
interest, despite lacking the intrinsic weight to exert a substantial influ-
ence on the international system. However, there are at least four sets of
literature, relevant to this book’s topic, that question these mainstream
Realist premises, the first and second of which leave room for small-state
influence in international relations. The third and fourth stress the im-
portance of domestic influences on foreign policy, suggesting that the
international system does not by definition compel states to act similarly.
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First, there is a small body of literature which accepts the Realist world
view of a competitive international system and the rationality of the state,
but argues that small states can be influential nevertheless. This ‘dissident’
Realist literature argues that small states must ‘learn to operate success-
fully within the arena of Great Power conflicts.’8 In essence, there are two
ways for small states to do this. First, they can mobilise their internal
power resources in order to project an image of relative power and
exploit the notorious difficulty of defining ‘power’: the sum of material
(military, economic and technological) and immaterial (e.g. morale, ide-
ology) resources, in which case it is quantifiable to an extent, or ‘the abili-
ty to influence others’ behavior.’9 Secondly, small states may seek to
mobilise the power of others. As Michael Handel puts it: ‘The diplomatic
art of the weak states is to obtain, commit and manipulate, as far as possi-
ble, the power of other, more powerful states in their own interests.’10
A second, more fundamental challenge to the Realist perspective on small
states is posed by the Liberal world view that stipulates that the interna-
tional system can be made more benign through human progress, inter-
national cooperation and scientific modernisation.11 Liberals believe in
the possibility, even logic, of international cooperation on the basis of
shared interests, rules, norms, values and ideas.12 While they do not focus
especially on the role of small states, Liberals are by definition more sym-
pathetic than Realists to the idea that a smaller state like the Netherlands
may be ‘small yet influential’.13
Within the Liberal strand, Neoliberals focus on international cooperation
through international ‘regimes’. International regimes were defined by the
contributors to a special edition of International Organisation in 1982 as
‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of
international relations’.14 Regimes may enhance the influence of smaller
states in two ways. First, regimes enable individual members to pursue
their foreign-policy aims collectively. Second, through their common
rules, procedures and norms, regimes can level out some of the differ-
ences between the bigger and smaller regime-members. Helpful in under-
standing the impact of regimes on individual states is a description given
by The Economist of the international constraints exercised on the UK, in
particular by the EU: ‘It remains true that the EU has a much wider and
deeper authority than any of the other international bodies Britain is a
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member of. NATO confines itself to security; it has no court and issues no
laws. The WTO [World Trade Organisation] can overrule government
policy, but its competence is limited to trade. By contrast, European law
already affects a wide range of activities from agriculture to employment
legislation to the environment. By acceding to the EU, Britain accepted
that European law outranks British law.’15
The third and fourth approaches challenge Realism’s assumptions that
the external environment is the most important determinant of a state’s
foreign policy and that the state is a ‘rational actor’ operating on the basis
of carefully calculated national interests. Instead, it is argued that domes-
tic and ‘irrational’ factors play a vital role in the making of foreign policy.
The ‘bureaucratic politics’ model as sketched by American authors like
Herbert Simon, Morton Halperin (currently a senior official in the US
State Department) and Graham Allison stresses the disaggregated nature
of the state. What seem to be the strategies of a state are in fact the out-
comes of bargaining processes involving many formal and informal par-
ticipants. ‘The participants, while sharing some images of the internation-
al scene, see the world in very different ways. Each wants the government
to do different things, and each struggles to secure the decisions and
actions he thinks best.’16 From this perspective the government is neither a
unitary nor a rational actor. Rather, policy is determined by the conflicts
fought, the compromises struck and the coalitions built among bureau-
cracies, officials, as well as non-governmental pressure groups.
From the bureaucratic-political perspective it is only natural that actual
foreign policy does not match the preferred option of any of the individ-
ual actors involved in the policy-making process. Moreover, there is a risk
that the foreign policy agreed upon by the participants involved is not
just different, but is actually more ambitious than any of the participants
had intended it to be. This phenomenon has been termed ‘coalition log-
rolling’.17 Instead of the various interests being bargained into a compro-
mise, they coagulate. Participants agree to go along with a policy that is
being pushed by another participant on the condition that their own core
interests and views are also included in the proposed policy.
When a policy has finally been agreed, its implementation often looks
different from what either supporters or opponents of the policy had
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expected. The difference between the policy as formulated and the policy
as implemented is known as ‘slippage’. In their enthusiasm, supporters
‘may go beyond the spirit if not the letter of the decision’, while the oppo-
nents ‘will manoeuvre to delay implementation, to limit implementation
to the letter but not the spirit, and even to have the decision disobeyed’.18
A fourth approach focuses on domestic agreement, rather than disagree-
ment. Such agreement may occur as a result of shared ideas and beliefs.
At the most fundamental level of such ideas and beliefs, Judith Goldstein
and Robert Keohane identify world views, or ‘conceptions of possibil-
ity’.19 Religions may provide world views, as may ideologies. In the broad
context of these world views, one can find ‘principled beliefs’ or ‘norma-
tive ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and
just from unjust. The views that “slavery is wrong”, that “abortion is mur-
der”, and that human beings have the “right of free speech” are principled
beliefs.’20 Ideas and beliefs, if they are shared by the foreign-policy élite,
serve to limit the number of viable policy options, even if the policy-
makers attempt to ground policy in calculations of the national interest.
The reason is that ideas, beliefs, principles and values limit the concep-
tions of what is rational and in the interest of the state. A policy that
would have been chosen, for example, had a mathematically ‘objective’
calculation of interest been made may be rejected because of a shared
notion of a state’s historical tradition. It is, moreover, conceivable that the
dominant culture prescribes that policy should not even be interest-based
but seek to further the promotion of certain ideals.
Against the background sketched above, this book sets out to test the fol-
lowing hypothesis regarding Dutch Yugoslavia policy during the period
1990-1995: the Netherlands, initially disinterested, was at times a strik-
ingly influential player that, however, ultimately failed to avoid entrap-
ment in the Bosnian war. Entrapment, in turn, was caused by the com-
bination of an increasingly competitive external environment and a
domestic policy process that was ill suited to such an environment, given
that it was driven by moral concerns and hampered by bureaucratic-
political conflict.
The main hypothesis can be subdivided into four simplified arguments.
Firstly, during the entire period under discussion, the Netherlands exer-
cised more influence on the international environment than Realists
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would think possible. Secondly, Dutch foreign policy was even more
influential during periods when the international environment sur-
rounding the Yugoslav crisis was marked by a shared desire for coopera-
tion, along the lines of the (Neo)Liberal world view sketched above.
Thirdly, a thorough understanding of the Dutch role must address
domestic factors, given that these were sometimes more important deter-
minants than the external environment. Finally, underlining that ‘influ-
ence’ and ‘success’ do not always go hand in hand, it is argued that the
Netherlands increasingly ‘entrapped’ itself in the Bosnian war and the
Yugoslav crisis, as symbolised and exacerbated by the static presence of
Dutch troops in the isolated Srebrenica enclave in eastern Bosnia during
1994 and 1995.
Given that the term ‘entrapment’ is not usually taken to mean ‘self-
entrapment’, a brief explanation of the term as it is used in this book may
be useful. In his famous article on alliance politics, Glenn Snyder defined
‘entrapment’ as ‘being dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interest that
one does not share, or shares only partially’.21 For Snyder, entrapment is
one of the ‘principal bads’ of alliance-membership. (‘Abandonment’ is the
other principal bad, which occurs for instance when an ally realigns with
the alliance’s opponent, dealigns or fails to give support when the other
allies most need it.) The words ‘being dragged into’ show that Snyder sees
entrapment as a third party tactic, even though this party is an ally and
not an outright military opponent.
In the case of the Dutch involvement in the Yugoslav crisis, we will adapt
and expand Snyder’s concept of entrapment. The idea is to take into
account domestic politics and to encompass non-military aspects of
entrapment. First, I shall introduce the variant of ‘self-entrapment’, or
entrapment as the product of one’s own policy. This is not to suggest that
an actor will actively and consciously seek his own entrapment, but it
does mean that a strongly committed or highly ambitious actor by the
very nature of his own behaviour risks finding himself trying to cross a
bridge too far. In this sense, entrapment encompasses such notions as
‘overstretch’ and ‘overcommitment’.
Entrapment does not need to be understood in a literal military sense
only. In the context of Dutch foreign policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis,
I would like to introduce the notions of ‘moral entrapment’ and ‘political
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entrapment’, which refer to commitments which could neither be kept
nor withdrawn. ‘Moral entrapment’ refers to instances where an actor
commits himself rhetorically to certain moral values and principles at
stake, only to discover that he must either moderate the rhetoric and risk
losing his reputation for moral virtue, or maintain the rhetoric and thus
further raise the expectations. Moral entrapment may develop into, or be
augmented by, ‘political entrapment’ when an actor builds upon his
rhetorical concern by making material commitments that cannot be
withdrawn without an unacceptable loss of face, nor be kept if interna-
tional support is not forthcoming. If an attempt is subsequently made to
honour the commitment despite the absence of concrete international
backing, one risks becoming overstretched and isolated. When the politi-
cal commitment includes a military component, military entrapment
lurks in the shadows of the initial, home-made moral and political
entrapment.
Translating theory into reality, the literature on the Yugoslav conflict
seems to suggest that the environment in which international policy was
made between July 1990 and July 1995 was initially predominantly co-
operative in nature, but became increasingly competitive. British military
analyst and Balkans expert James Gow speaks of ‘a cooperative approach
to dealing with problems of international security’ at the end of the Cold
War. In that context, ‘Yugoslavia became a laboratory rat in experiments
of collective international diplomacy.’22 On the other hand, each of the
multilateral bodies at work in the management of the Yugoslav crisis was
‘essentially subject to the will of its member states, or at least of the most
powerful and influential ones’. Also, despite an ‘aspiration to work multi-
laterally’, there were at times ‘strikingly different attitudes and views on
certain crucial issues’, which ‘occasioned bitter disputes at certain
points’.23 Given that the external environment influences individual
states’ foreign policies, it is important to recognise that the environment
in which the Netherlands tried to play a role in the management of the
Yugoslav conflict during the years 1990-1995 was not constant.
From the perspective of a smaller member state of the EC – European
Union following ratification of the Treaty on European Union by all
member states in November 1993 – the environment of 1990 and 1991
was comparatively cooperative and benign. During this period the Euro-
peans were working, as Gow puts it, ‘in the spirit of European Political
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Cooperation, in which, as far as possible, the member states of the EC co-
ordinated their foreign policies’.24 Gow’s argument is supported by his
French Counterpart, Olivier Lepick, who explains that in this ‘first phase’
France ‘tried to promote its objectives through international organisa-
tions such as the EC and then the UN, hoping to reach a “legal” solution
to the crisis.’25 However, by mid-1993, as patience with multilateral diplo-
macy was wearing thin, multilateral cooperation through the EC and the
UN increasingly had to make way for inter-state competition and ad-hoc
alliances such as the Joint Action Programme and the Contact Group. In
May 1993 five countries came together on an ad-hoc basis and formulat-
ed the ‘Joint Action Programme’ which involved the creation of ‘safe
areas’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Three of the programme’s signatories,
France, Britain and Spain, were member states of the EC. Nevertheless,
the remaining nine member states had been left out of the initiative and
were presented with a fait accompli. According to David Owen, the EC
representative and co-chairman of the ICFY, ‘it was galling for other EC
nations to have these crucial issues pre-empted; yet sometimes the need
for quiet decisive action and secrecy will necessitate a smaller group of EC
countries taking their responsibilities on national shoulders.’26 This view
was echoed by Lepick, who argued that the international diplomacy sur-
rounding the Yugoslav crisis entered a ‘second phase’ when ‘multilateral
approaches seemed hopeless’, and France ‘favoured an opportunistic
coalition with its traditional partners in order to end the violence in the
region, an orientation leading to the creation of the so-called “Contact
Group” of five countries.’27
Judging by the number of substantive comments made in the literature
regarding the role of the Netherlands, it would seem that the impact of
Dutch foreign policy was greater in the early cooperative environment
than in the subsequent competitive environment. Regarding the Dutch
EC Presidency of July-December 1991, Gow quotes a British official as
saying that it was the ‘strong Dutch Presidency that made things happen’.
Gow explains that the Dutch Presidency was in some respects ‘extremely
important’ and constituted a ‘leading element in galvanising EC efforts’.28
Viktor Meier, whose editorials in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung were
important catalysts in shaping German public opinion during the early
phase of the Yugoslav crisis, echoes Gow's view to some extent. According
to Meier, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek dominated negoti-
ations in July 1991 between the Troika of EC Foreign Ministers and the
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various Yugoslav parties (the Troika consists of the Foreign Ministers of
the preceding, current and incoming EC/EU Presidencies). Meier even
goes so far as to question ‘to what extent Van den Broek, who was in the
lead here, thereby operated in harmony with the opinion of the assem-
bled EC-states’.29 Laura Silber and Allan Little confirm that Van den Broek
was a ‘domineering’ figure in the EC-chaired negotiations of July 1991.30
While these authors all argue that the Dutch EC Presidency played an
important role in 1991, other comments seem to indicate that the impact
of Dutch policy was strong partly because it represented the interests of a
greater number of actors than just the Netherlands. Meier argues that the
‘Dutch Foreign Minister acted as the representative of that group of states
that from that moment on consequently tried to monopolise Western
Yugoslavia policy and whose primary political goal was the reconstruc-
tion of Yugoslavia and then to a certain degree the protection of Serbia, as
the successor to the lost Yugoslavia, so to speak.’31 Susan Woodward, in
turn, agrees that Dutch Yugoslavia policy cannot be understood in isola-
tion from the wider institutional context and argues that it was coloured
by the Netherlands being an ‘adamant’ supporter of NATO.32
Much less attention is paid to the role of the Netherlands and its Foreign
Minister(s) after the end of the EC Presidency of 1991. For the most, part
the literature focuses on a small number of so-called countries of signifi-
cance: the USA, the Russian Federation, Britain, France and Germany
(the members of the Contact Group set up in 1994). One of the few sub-
stantive references regarding Dutch policy concerns the role of the Dutch
delegation at the UN EC-hosted London Conference of August 1992
where, according to Silber and Little, it was at the insistence of the Dutch
that the EC drafted a tough anti-Serbian declaration. It appears the dele-
gation had threatened it ‘would walk out’ of the Conference together with
the Bosnian delegation if such a declaration were not proposed by the
EC.33 With regard to the period of 1993-1995, the Netherlands only crops
up in the literature in lists of troop contributing countries and similar
statistics, but Dutch policy as such is no longer a subject worth mention-
ing, let alone analysing. While the fall of Srebrenica briefly shifts the focus
of the literature back onto the Netherlands, the perceived role of the
country is essentially a passive one, with the presence of Dutch peace-
keepers in the enclave presented almost as if it were an accident of histo-
ry, not the outcome, at least in part, of Dutch foreign policy. Not Gow or
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Woodward, nor Silber and Little, for instance, devote any attention to the
question of why it was Dutch troops, and not the troops of another coun-
try, that were deployed in this UN Security Council-declared safe area.
Apparently, the constraints exercised by the competitive environment
between 1993 and 1995 are perceived to have been so tight that the for-
eign policy of the Netherlands as a smaller state is no longer worth
analysing. The literature also seems to indicate that the growing competi-
tiveness of the international environment was the determining cause of
the decline in Dutch influence. A probable additional factor was the loss
of what one could term the ‘position power’ inherent in holding the EC
Presidency. However, the problem with addressing Dutch Yugoslavia
policy as a mere reflection of the demands imposed upon the country by
the international environment is that it easily becomes a self-fulfilling
prophecy: the Netherlands lacked impact because the environment was
great-power oriented and the Netherlands is not a great power. It over-
looks the possibility that even in a competitive environment a non-great
power may know very well how to promote its interests and views. In
addition, such an approach all too easily denies responsibility for policy-
failures by smaller powers by explaining them as instances where (per-
ceived) great powers did not exercise leadership. In the specific case of
Dutch Yugoslavia policy, a top-down, environment-oriented approach
certainly cannot help us to understand how and why the Netherlands
became entrapped through its military presence in Srebrenica. By treat-
ing smaller states as helpless pawns, the general literature seems to have
over-generalised international diplomacy regarding the Yugoslav crisis
during the years 1993-1995 and overlooked the possibility for small states
to have an impact on international affairs. This raises the question, final-
ly, of which strategies are available for smaller states to exert influence in
international affairs.
To speak of foreign policy strategies suggests two things. First, that gov-
ernments try to act in the conscious pursuit of certain foreign policy
goals (despite the objections raised by the bureaucratic politics approach)
and, second, that foreign policy is more than just a ‘reflection’ or ‘deriva-
tive’ of the demands imposed upon a country by the international sys-
tem. Rather, it constitutes both a state’s adaptations to the international
system and its attempt to shape the structure of that system according to
its own interests and values.34 It is said that smaller states not only share
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the ambition of the great powers to shape the international system, but
possess a certain ability to do so.
The literature on small states identifies two ‘kinds’ of strategies which
small states may apply in order to influence international relations. The
first are best described as Realist or competitive strategies, the second as
Liberal or cooperative strategies. It is important to note that the distinc-
tion between the two kinds of strategies does not concern the concept of
self-interest. Neoliberalism incorporates the idea that self-interest is an
important motivation for cooperation. From a Liberal perspective there
is a sound rationale for smaller or weaker states to be progressive in their
foreign policy. Since they cannot, ultimately, win in an adversarial inter-
national system, it is in their interest to ‘depoliticise’ international rela-
tions by setting moral examples, promoting international interdepen-
dence and the rule of law.35 The main distinction between small state
Realists and small state Liberals, therefore, concerns a difference in inter-
pretation of what is in the interest of the small state, namely whether to
accept the adversarial international system as a given and compete in it or
to promote the creation of a more benign one.
Small states might compete in the existing system by mobilising their
domestic resources in order to project an image of relative power or an
image of usefulness as a host to economic, cultural, or political activities
that are of international interest. Particularly the ‘development of their
own military power enables them, under certain conditions, to improve
their bargaining position’.36 Furthermore, power is often ‘issue-specific’,
which may be an important advantage to a small state with regard to situ-
ations where it deems an issue very important while a great power does
not. Under these circumstances the small state may be more focused, bet-
ter prepared and more determined than the great power to achieve a par-
ticular outcome and may therefore more successfully translate domestic
power into ‘behavioural’ power and come out as the ‘winner’ in a conflict
or in a negotiation with a greater power.37
Although ‘weak states can achieve much in the conduct of foreign policy
through the mobilisation of internal sources, their relatively low strength
potential clearly limits their manoeuvrability.’38 Small states ‘rely much
more heavily on external strength’.39 The most important strategy in 
a competitive system, therefore, is alliance-membership. Subsequently,
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various strategies are available for the smaller allies to mobilise the most
powerful states within alliances.40 Essentially, the choice is between a posi-
tive and a negative approach. In the first case one adopts a ‘loyal ally’
strategy. Alternatively, one adopts a ‘critical ally’ strategy.
The loyal ally seeks to gain influence by supporting the great power
morally, politically and militarily at important moments. Having thereby
confirmed one’s (self-)image of loyalty, the small state will seek a reward,
for instance the right to have its policy preferences taken into considera-
tion by the great power. Sometimes a loyal ally is seen as ‘superloyal’. In
this case ‘a small state allied with, or otherwise oriented towards, one or
the other of the superpowers clearly demonstrates that it will go along
with any of the Superpower’s values, wishes and actions (and often go
even further)… being more religious than the Pope.’41 Particularly during
the 1960s, Dutch academics argue, the Netherlands was a superloyal ally
of the USA.42
Alternatively, the small ally may seek influence by being a nuisance. It can
criticise, obstruct, or even try to blackmail the great power. One impor-
tant reason for adopting this kind of approach is what one might call the
risk of influence-inflation through consistent loyalty. To be perceived as a
great power’s client may seriously restrict a small state’s freedom to
manoeuvre in relations with other states. Some Dutch authors argue that
the Netherlands by being critical of America’s foreign policy regarding
South-East Asia, Southern Africa and Central America in the 1970s
gained, rather than lost, influence.43 The critical ally may go beyond mere
criticism of the great power’s policy and become an ‘unreliable’ ally.
Through an unreliable ally strategy, a (small) state hopes to gain influence
through what are essentially blackmailing tactics. It can demand compen-
sation, either for supporting the great power’s policy or for refraining
from actions that would run counter to the interest of the great power.44
In the extreme case, the unreliable ally could threaten dealignment or
even realignment in order to make the great power meet its demands.
Another type of ally that tries to gain primarily by demanding conces-
sions from the alliance is the ‘impotent’ ally. This strategy best shows the
potential power that flows from weakness. Ultimately, by threatening to
collapse if the great power does not give greater support, the great power
may be forced to come to the aid of the small ally, even if it is fearful of
an entrapment exercise.45 (Not to help the small ally may have serious
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consequences for the credibility of the great power’s leadership.) The
‘aggressive’ ally, finally, seeks influence by playing up ‘its ability to start a
conflict’.46 The aggressive ally will threaten or actually attempt to ‘entrap’
the great power into a conflict for interests that are not necessarily those
of the other allies.
According to the Liberal world view, a small state may apply various
strategies to promote the creation of an international system that is less
competitive than the present one. Through ‘normative strategies’, a small
state may strive for new, ‘generally accepted moral codes in order to con-
tain the role of violence or the threat of it’.47 In other words, the small
state seeks a qualitative change of the international system by promoting
wide acceptance of higher moral standards that make armed conflict
morally unacceptable. Alternatively, a small state can apply ‘strategies of
law and order’. With this kind of strategy, the small state seeks to contain,
rather than eliminate, the roots of armed conflict. By promoting as wide-
spread an adoption as possible of international legal standards or obli-
gations associated with membership of international organisations, the
small state attempts to raise the cost of initiating armed conflict by
making it illegal and therefore punishable.48 In short, while normative
strategies are geared towards broadening international ‘moral codifica-
tion’, strategies of law and order promote wider legal codification.
‘Demonstration politics’ is recognised as an important normative strate-
gy. This is ‘the demonstrative announcement by a state that it wishes a
particular principle to be adhered to. With this demonstrative announce-
ment the small state wants to highlight norms that it wishes to be includ-
ed in the common body of norms that are followed in the decision-
making on international questions.’49 Respect for human rights by 
governments in their relationships with their own populations, long con-
sidered an internal affair, is an example of an area where norm-setting has
been taking place for some time.
Through a strategy of ‘moral guidance’ the small state may seek to set
moral examples. Exemplary moral behaviour enhances, it is thought, the
reputation and authority of the small state. The author of the constitu-
tion of the Netherlands and leading Dutch statesman of the nineteenth
century, J.R. Thorbecke (1798-1872), emphasised the special role a small
state could play at the international level by setting moral examples. ‘The
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Netherlands does not take part in the envy and enmity of the great states.
Therefore, in the long run, it will be less blinded and misled by a particu-
lar enmity in advocating the general law and interest… Dutch statecraft,
itself free of the lust for power, is the fairest judge over the ambitions of
others.’50 In the late 1970s Joris Voorhoeve – whose career was to become
strangely intertwined with the Dutch involvement in the Yugoslav crisis,
first as director of the Clingendael Institute for International Relations
and subsequently as Minister of Defence – seemed to believe that there
was still an element of truth in such thinking, arguing: ‘The freedom of
speech which many Small Powers enjoy in international affairs gives them
valuable opportunities for good initiatives in multilateral affairs and in
mobilising foreign public opinion for humanitarian goals.’51
A third normative strategy, similar to demonstration politics, is that of
‘public criticism’. The immediate goal of public criticism is to inform
international public opinion of the fact that an important international
principle or norm is being violated and to rally support for a policy of
restoring the international moral and legal order. At the same time the
criticism serves to underline the moral quality of the small state itself, as
Ole Elgström points out: ‘Criticism and the formation of opinion are pri-
marily to be understood as instruments for achieving value promotive
goals.’52 Public criticism may also contain a preventive element, particu-
larly where other small states are harmed by the violation of international
norms. ‘A passive attitude to the fates of others brings disaster to one’s
own state in the long run.’53
Strategies of law and order flow from the belief that shared rules and
common obligations help to reduce anarchy and increase order in the
international system. As E.H. Carr once put it: ‘We are exhorted to estab-
lish “the rule of law”, to maintain “international law and order” or to
“defend international law”; and the assumption is made that, by doing so,
we shall transfer our differences from the turbulent political atmosphere
of self-interest to the purer, serener air of impartial justice.’54 The irony in
Carr’s remark diverts attention from the fact that the search for an inter-
national legal order is not solely motivated by naive idealism. There is lit-
tle doubt that self-interest too motivates small states to promote it, if only
because it is a tool that serves to limit the freedom of greater powers to
make war. International acceptance of such limitations is promoted by
making as many states as possible accountable for their actions in the
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context of internationally agreed law and by the formulation of sanctions
as a disincentive for states to deviate from international standards of be-
haviour. Thus, the Charter of the United Nations tasks the UN General
Assembly to encourage ‘the progressive development of international law
and its codification.’ Whatever the precise mixture of altruism and self-
interest as motives for individual states to take this task seriously, the con-
stitution of the Netherlands unequivocally defines international legal
codification as one of the central aims of Dutch foreign policy: ‘The gov-
ernment promotes the development of the international legal order.’55
Another way of promoting law and order is the building of international
forms of organisation. In an international system that is power-based and
adversarial, small states run the risk of being affected by decisions over
which they have had no influence. In order to realise ‘optimal decision-
making’, that is involvement in the making of decisions whose external
effects affect the small state, a small state will seek to promote the creation
of formal decision-making structures in which it can voice its opinions
and perhaps influence decision-making.56 Small states therefore often
promote the creation of international organisations and the building of
supranational institutions with formalised decision making procedures.
This book begins with a background sketch of the Netherlands and its
foreign policy system, presenting the actors involved, their formal and
informal roles, and the action channels through which they can influence
the decision-making process.
Chapter two analyses the Dutch response to the Yugoslav crisis in its ear-
liest phase from July 1990 until June 1991. It deals with the question of
whether the Foreign Ministry received timely warnings and, if so, what
response such warnings triggered. It argues that Dutch policy during this
crucial phase in the Yugoslav crisis was highly conditioned by the external
constraints of regime-membership and marked, moreover, by indiffer-
ence.
Chapter three deals with the Dutch Presidency of the European Commu-
nity from July until December 1991.57 It sketches the attempt made by the
Netherlands to combine the institutional responsibilities of the EC Presi-
dency with the need for an effective response by the European Commu-
nity towards the Yugoslav crisis. It argues that Dutch policy during this
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period, which gradually developed from ‘even-handedness’ into ‘selective-
ness’, was influential and successful. Dutch influence to an important
degree derived from the prominent position which the Netherlands occu-
pied in the EC. In addition, Dutch institutional interests regarding Euro-
pean integration functioned as a veritable corset on Dutch Yugoslavia
policy, keeping any potential tendencies to abandon the European main-
stream in check.
Chapter four is concerned with the Dutch response to the peace plans for
Bosnia-Herzegovina drawn up by the International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) between late 1992 and early 1994. While the
external environment became more competitive, Dutch policy became
increasingly driven by domestic moral concerns. It argues that while the
Netherlands was influential and, in the short term, successful, Dutch poli-
cy ultimately proved counter-productive. It was during this period that
the Netherlands entrapped itself ever more deeply in a moral and politi-
cal sense, paving the way for a subsequent military entrapment.
Chapter five, finally, analyses the development from moral and political
entrapment into military entrapment. It argues that the political and
moral parameters set by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Parliament and
public opinion greatly reduced the freedom of the Dutch Ministry of
Defence to apply ‘objective’ military criteria to the Dutch military
involvement in the UN intervention in former Yugoslavia. It also argues
that the application of such military-operational considerations was fur-
ther hampered by the desire on the part of the Army leadership to secure
a number of bureaucratic-political interests through deployment of the
first ready batallion of the airmobile brigade. This combination of
domestic factors made it impossible for the Netherlands to adapt its for-
eign policy behaviour to a more competitive international environment
and stave off military entrapment.
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1 The Netherlands and its Foreign 
Policy System 
Located in Northwestern Europe, the Netherlands has a population of
around 16 million people, squeezed into a territory of only 41,526 square
kilometres. The country’s origins as a political entity can be found in the
sixteenth century. In 1568 a revolt led by William of Orange started in the
‘Low Countries’ against Habsburg Spain, which, after an eighty year war
resulted in the recognition of the independence of the Northern part as
the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands at the Treaty of Westphalia.
The Southern part (presentday Belgium) remained under Habsburg rule.
These seven provinces, with Holland and Zeeland as the predominant
powers, had by then become a formidable maritime power with strong-
holds in, for instance, modern-day Indonesia, South India, South
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Brazil, New York as well as dominating
trade on the Baltic sea.1 The seventeenth century is known as the ‘golden
age’ of Dutch history, famous for its cultural achievements and economic
prosperity.2 The eighteenth century was a period of stagnation for the
Netherlands, as well as being under French influence from 1795 to 1813.
Meanwhile, the colonial empire was taken over by the British and only
partly restored after 1813. After Napoleon was defeated, the House of
Orange was restored and the Northern and Southern Netherlands (Bel-
gium) were united in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Belgian revo-
lution of 1830 brought a quick end to this new state and resulted in the
formation of the Kingdom of Belgium in 1831. During the First World
War, the Netherlands’ neutral status was respected. At the beginning of
the Second World War, the Netherlands again declared itself neutral, but
this time it was not respected. In May 1940, the country was overrun by
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Nazi Germany in five days. The defeat was followed by five years of occu-
pation that saw most of the Dutch Jewish population exterminated in
concentration camps.
The Nazi occupation together with the extermination of the Jewish popu-
lation still constitutes one of the two most influential experiences for con-
temporary Dutch society. The other one was the ‘loss’ of Indonesia. Much
of post-war Dutch foreign policy can be understood as a quest for com-
pensation for the loss of status as a maritime and colonial power.3 The
decolonisation of Indonesia was contested by the so-called police actions
of the Dutch army during the second half of the 1940s, which left over
6,100 Dutch soldiers dead, a higher proportion of the population (some 9
million at the time) than American casualties in Vietnam. Compensation
for this ultimate loss of status as a maritime power was sought in a ma-
terial sense, for instance through its membership of NATO and through
its maintaining a relatively large navy. Compensation was also sought in a
psychological sense, though not necessarily by the same elements in
Dutch society, through an emphasis on morality and international law, as
well as a relatively large development aid budget as instruments of foreign
policy. Thus, Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel told Parliament in 1977
‘that the Netherlands must sometimes regard as one of its tasks the airing
of a principled voice, even if this harms the interest of the [Netherlands as
a] merchant.’4 According to Paul Scheffer, a columnist for the NRC Han-
delsblad, the Dutch emphasis on morality in foreign policy sometimes
even turned into a ‘kind of moral imperialism.’ He states: ‘Although an
emphasis on moral codification is a rational attitude for a small country, it
has degenerated more than once into a misplaced sense of superiority and
a moralisation of essentially pragmatic conflicts between nations.’5
The search for compensation in terms of status was hampered by an
increasingly negative self-image among the first post-war generation in
the 1960s and 1970s. During the first two decades after the Second World
War, the fundamental consensus about good and bad had been a binding
element in Dutch society and Dutch foreign policy. This dichotomy was
easily applied to various developments in the real world. Nazi Germany
represented evil during the war, but after the war the atheistic, totalitari-
an, and Communist Soviet Union, came to epitomise the real evil empire.
During the Cold War, the USA and its allies, on the other hand, represent-
ed the forces of good. With this world view came the principled belief
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that Dutch ‘foreign policy behaviour needs to be (and, in the case of the
Netherlands, is) founded on an active choice for good against evil’.6
During the 1970s, the good-bad dichotomy was modified to include the
belief that the Netherlands did not by definition represent the forces of
good. Many people who had been born after the Second World War
found it difficult to reconcile the self-image of moral virtue prevalent in
Dutch society with their knowledge of recent Dutch history. A compara-
tively large number of Dutch Jews had been put to death in the Nazi con-
centration camps. Seventy-five per cent of Dutch Jews were killed, in
comparison with forty per cent of Norwegian and Belgian Jews, twenty-
five per cent of French Jews, while virtually all of the Danish Jews escaped
unscathed.7 This implied that Dutch society carried a greater degree of
moral ‘guilt’ than parents and grandparents usually admitted. Another
burning question was how one could reconcile the supposed Dutch
moral virtue with the military campaigns in Indonesia, which in retro-
spect so obviously violated the principles of self-determination and
human rights. Finally, Watergate, US policy in Latin America, and the war
in Vietnam destroyed much of the young’s faith in the USA and the West
as a whole. Instead, in the battle between good and evil, it was the newly
independent countries or independence movements in the Third World
who were fighting the good fight. During the 1970s, the ‘public aversion
to NATO was primarily related to the fact that NATO was seen by many as
a suppressive institution in the Third World.’8
While this essentially negative self-image became a powerful social force
from the mid-1960s onwards, it was the Labour/Christian Democrat
Cabinet (installed in 1973), which translated it into formal Dutch foreign
policy. The ‘mundialist’ foreign policy of this coalition was rooted in the
Labour Party’s 1972 election manifesto ‘Keerpunt’, which stated: ‘Solidari-
ty with oppressed groups, wherever they are found in the world, shall
replace allied obedience.’9 Indeed, the Dutch Labour/Christian Democrat
coalition showed courage, as one commentator put it, ‘by linking up, as a
Western government, with the attempt of others to push back Western
dominance’.10
According to some, it took the Netherlands until the 1980s to come to
terms with its position in the international system. In retrospect, the
1990s may be said to have witnessed the completion of this process of
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‘normalisation’. Although ‘Srebrenica’ constituted a blow to the Dutch
self-image, it was also a sobering experience and was one of the factors
that served to further ‘pragmatise’ Dutch foreign policy. The Dutch
armed forces, in turn, played a constructive role as part of the Rapid
Reaction Force in Bosnia in 1995 in the NATO air operations over Bosnia
during that same period, and as one of the three largest contributors to
the NATO air operations over Kosovo.11 Within the EU, the Netherlands
became a successful bilateral deal maker. In addition, the economic aus-
terity measures (wage moderation and restraint in public spending)
taken by successive governments since the early 1980s began to pay off in
the second half of the 1990s. The Dutch ‘polder model’ gained interna-
tional fame as the country managed to combine strong economic growth
and social stability.12
The Foreign Policy System: General Characteristics
The Netherlands is a constitutional, parliamentary monarchy. The consti-
tution, which dates back to 1814, has been amended several times, mainly
to increase the powers and responsibilities of the Cabinet and Parlia-
ment.13 Given that elections are held on the basis of proportional repre-
sentation, Cabinets are usually comprised of coalitions of two or more
political parties. Before they take up office, the coalition partners must
draw up a detailed governing agreement, which serves as the basis of the
coalition’s policy during its four-year term in office. Between 1990 and
1994, the CDA (Christian Democrats) and the PvdA (Labour) constitut-
ed the ruling coalition. In 1994, the so-called purple coalition, consisting
of the PvdA, the VVD (Conservative Liberals), and D66 (Liberals) was
voted into power.
The Cabinet is accountable to Parliament, or the States General, which in
turn consists of a Lower or Second Chamber and an Upper or First
Chamber. The Second Chamber of Parliament is the more important: it
consists of 150 parliamentarians who are nominated by political parties
and elected on the basis of proportional representation by the entire elec-
torate. The First Chamber constitutes a veritable Chambre de reflection,
checking whether procedures have been followed and whether laws are
clear and not open to conflicting interpretations. Its role in foreign policy
is limited. Parliamentarians who become Cabinet Ministers must give up
their parliamentary seat.
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The most important means by which Parliament can influence foreign
policy is the ‘motion’. Parliament may pass motions to reflect the specific
requests or opinions of a parliamentary majority. However, as Philippe
Everts points out, ‘the government is not obliged to carry them out’ and
Ministers have ‘repeatedly refused to act according to the expressed will of
the Second Chamber’.14 Through a motion of ‘no confidence’, Parliament
may ultimately force a particular Minister or the entire Cabinet to resign.
This means that a Foreign Minister and Defence Minister will most likely
try to find as broad a base of support as possible in Parliament and with-
in their own party for their policies.
While formally possessing only limited powers, in practice the Second
Chamber’s voice in defence matters was greatly enhanced by one unique
means of parliamentary control over Dutch foreign and security policy.
The origin of this means occurred in 1979, when the Dutch government
irritated the Second Chamber by announcing the decision to commit sol-
diers to the UN operation in South Lebanon (UNIFIL) without prior con-
sultation.15 The Second Chamber responded by passing two motions,
which stated that its consent would depend on the fulfilment of two condi-
tions. In the first motion, Parliament demanded that conscripts could not
be deployed outside of the NATO area against their will. In the second
motion, Parliament requested that ‘the Government, in the future not
make decisions regarding the participation of the Netherlands in a UN-
peacekeeping force until it had consulted with the [Second] Chamber.’16 In
practice, this meant that although the Second Chamber did not possess the
power of co-decision making, the government became obliged to consult it
before an actual military deployment was begun.17 Although the motion
was intended to serve as a brake on the enthusiasm of governments to send
troops abroad, during the early 1990s, its effect was the opposite, because it
enabled the Second Chamber to also function as a spur to increased troop
deployments. In the 1990s, the Second Chamber wanted to further tighten
its grip on defence policy through a constitutional amendment giving it the
right to co-decide on troop contributions. As a compromise, Parliament
approved the Toetsingskader, a set of elements for decision making drawn
up by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence in June
1995, i.e., one month before the fall of Srebrenica.
With regard to foreign policy, the Second Chamber conducts most of its
parliamentary tasks through the permanent committees for Foreign
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Affairs and Defence, in which the parties’ foreign and defence affairs spe-
cialists have a seat. The larger political parties will each appoint an indi-
vidual to the two permanent committees. Smaller parties, however, have
to improvise. While the two committees may and do meet separately with
the responsible Cabinet Minister, they also frequently meet jointly with
both the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Foreign Affairs aside
from the regular briefings by officials. Debates of a sensitive nature are
usually conducted by the parliamentary party leaders. Usually it is only
the annual budget debates that attract a full Second Chamber.
Richard Eichenberg has pointed to the sensitivity to public opinion of
successive Dutch governments. Commenting on Dutch attitudes on
nuclear weapons in the early 1980s, he concludes: ‘What seems to be
unique about the Dutch case is not the level of public scepticism of secu-
rity policies but the comparatively strong impact that opinions have had
on Dutch governments.’18 In fact, of all the domestic actors who play a
formal role in the making of Dutch Foreign policy, Parliament is the most
obviously receptive to public opinion. As Jan Hoekema, a Member of Par-
liament (MP) and former senior Foreign Ministry official, puts it, ‘it is
incredible how we are influenced by what is written in (Dutch daily news-
papers) de Volkskrant and the NRC-Handelsblad.’19 Well-connected pres-
sure groups, for their part, are able to mobilise like-minded MPs with
proposals for posing official parliamentary questions to the government.
The Cabinet
In the Cabinet, the role of the Prime Minister is that of a broker and coor-
dinator, given that the Cabinet is a multi-party coalition and all the
important decisions are the ‘collective’ responsibility of the entire Cabi-
net. Between 1990 and 1994, Christian Democrat politician, Ruud Lub-
bers, was the Prime Minister. His successor was Wim Kok, a former
labour union leader, who became the leader of the Social Democrat PvdA
and had been part of the Cabinet under Lubbers as Finance Minister.
Clearly, in the Dutch political system the position of the Prime Minister,
particularly with regard to foreign policy, has not been as strong as in
many other democratic systems. His constitutional role is that of primus
inter pares. In a coalition government, inevitably some Ministers do not
belong to the Prime Minister’s own party and are not always willing to
agree with him. The Ministers can be quite assertive in defending the
       
opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:13  Pagina 50
interests of their own Ministry or party, given that the Prime Minister
cannot just dismiss them at his whim.20 The formal weakness of the
Prime Minister’s role is balanced by the shared desire for continued gov-
ernance and the consequent need for a broker. The degree to which the
Prime Minister can use his high profile to assemble direct public support
from the electorate may also be important – this is the so-called Prime
Minister’s bonus. Finally, the European dimension has considerably
enhanced the role of the Prime Minister in foreign policy through the
European Council of Heads of State and Heads of Government.
Despite the growing importance of the Prime Minister, the key role in
Dutch foreign policy is still reserved for the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
who heads the bureaucracy that largely determines the agenda of Dutch
foreign policy in most areas, including European cooperation. With this
major asset, and because he has the formal responsibility of presenting
proposals to the Cabinet regarding foreign policy, the Foreign Minister is
still ‘unquestionably the dominant actor regarding foreign policy in the
Netherlands.’21 The Foreign Minister’s position can be particularly strong
if he is a member or even leader of a different party than that of the
Prime Minister, if he commands the loyalty of his civil servants, and if he
exploits his formal powers to the fullest. Thus, in practice, Cabinet deci-
sions regarding foreign policy are usually endorsements of policy propo-
sals by the Foreign Minister. When other Ministries are involved, a prior
agreement between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and, say, the Minister
of Defence will usually be sufficient to secure an endorsement by the
Cabinet.22
The position of the Dutch Foreign Minister is further strengthened by the
fact that in European matters, the Prime Minister operates on the basis of
a Cabinet mandate. It is the Foreign Minister, in turn, who plays the key
role in the formulation of this mandate. Usually, the Cabinet offers the
Foreign Minister great freedoms in this area. Thus, the Foreign Minister
‘has remained pre-eminent in foreign policy’.23 Having said this, there is
no doubt that the complex relationship between the Prime Minister and
the Foreign Minister with regard to European cooperation can and does
cause tensions. There are regular calls for the Prime Minister to be given a
greater role in formulating foreign policy.24
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The first three years of Dutch Yugoslavia policy formulation since 1990
were carried out under the responsibility of Hans van den Broek, the
long-serving Foreign Minister. Van den Broek was a member of the CDA
and was known as an ‘Atlanticist’. Described as a ‘statesman’ by former US
Secretary of State James Baker, Van den Broek was famous for his loyalty
to NATO and the United States until well after the fall of the Berlin wall.25
In Europe, Van den Broek strongly favoured integration on a suprana-
tional basis. He was said to hold a tight reign over the Foreign Ministry, to
have a preference for ‘silent diplomacy’, and to possess a detailed knowl-
edge of the ‘dossiers’ he controlled. His relationship with both Lubbers
and Defence Minister Relus ter Beek was uneasy, as was his relationship
with a number of foreign colleagues including, and in particular, German
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Van den Broek’s successor, fel-
low CDA politician Pieter Kooijmans, re-entered Dutch politics following
a long absence during which he served as professor of international law at
the University of Leiden. A domineering but likeable figure, Kooijmans
had a reputation for moral virtue and showed himself to be a fighter for
human rights. In addition, the polarising institutional questions regard-
ing the European Union had been pushed into the background following
the conclusion of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in Maastricht,
the Netherlands, in 1992.
Finally, Hans van Mierlo, the leader of D66, sailed into the maelstrom of
Dutch Yugoslavia policy in 1994, directly after completing long drawn
out negotiations for a coalition agreement. Known as an articulate speak-
er, an exhausted Van Mierlo needed some time to grasp all the details of
the current issues in international politics. Van Mierlo’s main innovation
was to weaken the Atlantic orientation of the Netherlands somewhat in
favour of a more European orientation. In the traditional battle with the
Minister for Development Cooperation (development aid) over control
of the Foreign Ministry, Van Mierlo had a difficult time holding his
own.26 Van Mierlo complained about the heavy workload, and in 1998 he
proposed the introduction of a second State-Secretary.
The Minister of Defence was long recognised as the junior partner in the
relationship with the Foreign Minister. For much of the post-war era he
was seen as the keeper of the ‘iron shop’. Indeed, within the Cabinet,
the Defence Minister had for a long time been operating as if he was sim-
ply the guardian of the defence budget, meaning he assured that the
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equipment plans of the three armed services were not compromised. In
this function, the Defence Minister usually had the support of the For-
eign Minister, given their shared interest in maintaining a certain level of
military power. In his budget battles with other Ministers, the Defence
Minister’s position was strengthened by his ability to claim that his bud-
get was tied to NATO ‘obligations’.27
Three elements partly compensate for the intrinsic weakness of the Min-
ister of Defence’s position vis-à-vis the Foreign Minister. First, since the
1970s it has been increasingly difficult to distinguish between the politi-
cal and military aspects of security, such as the proliferation of atomic,
biological and chemical (ABC) weapons.28 This development was reflect-
ed in the organisational reforms at the Ministry of Defence, where the
creation of a Department for General Policy affairs (Directie Algemene
Beleidszaken; DAB) increased the Defence Ministry’s level of political
clout. Second is the fact that he does indeed head the ‘iron shop’. Where-
as the Foreign Minister may decide what is desirable in terms of military
commitments, it is the Defence Minister who determines whether what
is desirable is also physically viable. Thirdly, international peacekeeping
operations have proliferated and become an increasingly important
component of Dutch foreign policy, thereby increasing the Defence Min-
ister’s power.
The end of the Cold War triggered an important reform in the Defence
Ministry’s structure, which in the long term will probably also enhance
the position of the Defence Minister. From 1990 to 1994, PvdA Minister
of Defence Relus ter Beek initiated and oversaw the implementation of
the abolition of conscription and the creation of an all-volunteer army.
Given the decreased likelihood of large-scale conflict on the European
continent, the Cold-War dividend was cashed in by reducing the size of
the armed forces.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of two
Ministers and a State-Secretary (junior Minister). The ‘ship’s captain’, as
Prime Minister Wim Kok once put it, is the Minister of Foreign Affairs.29
The other Minister is responsible for development cooperation (devel-
opment aid), a post that was introduced in 1965. Though without a
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Ministry of his own, the Minister for Development Cooperation annually
spends 0.8 per cent of Dutch GDP. According to Voorhoeve, the ‘two-
headed leadership [of the Foreign Ministry by the Minister for Foreign
Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation] has usually (but
not always) worked smoothly’.30 In fact, in the 1990s the inevitable
demarcation disputes increased as the zealous and skilled Minister for
Development Cooperation, PvdA politician Jan Pronk, was widely per-
ceived to be successfully expanding his control over the Ministry at the
expense of successive Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The third political fig-
ure is the State-Secretary, a junior Minister with no Cabinet rank but with
the formal right to attend Cabinet meetings. The State-Secretary is usual-
ly charged with Dutch policy regarding ‘European integration’.
The Dutch civil service has traditionally known few appointments that
are tied to party-political affiliation. Civil servants are expected to be
loyal to the Minister regardless of their political views. In the Foreign
Ministry, as in all Ministries, the senior civil servant is the Secretary-Gen-
eral. Usually referred to as ‘S’, the Secretary-General’s main responsibility
is to manage the civil apparatus. Together with his deputy, the Secretary-
General coordinates the flow of information from civil servants to the
political leadership. As Frank Majoor, a former director of the Security
Policy Affairs Department, put it, ‘the idea is that the Secretary-General is
the guardian of the system.’31 Interestingly, Majoor was appointed Secre-
tary-General in 2000.
In 1995, the government produced a ‘Reorientation’-paper, which was
meant as a response to the end of the bipolar international system that
had accompanied the Cold War. Since the Reorientation, the formal flow
of information to the political leadership has emanated from four Direc-
torates-General, where there used to be only three. Until 1995, the most
important Directorate-General in the case of the Yugoslav crisis was the
Directorate-General for Political Affairs (DGPZ), headed by the Director-
General for Political Affairs and his deputy. The other two were the Direc-
torate-General for European Affairs (DGES) and the Directorate-General
for International Cooperation (DGIS). Since the Reorientation, the
regional departments of the DGPZ and the DGIS have merged to become
the backbone of the new Directorate-General for Regional and Country
Policy affairs (DGRB), led by a Director-General and a deputy. The
regional departments are supposed to serve all four Director-Generals
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and all three political leaders and thus play a coordinating role within the
Ministry.
The Director-General for Political Affairs and his deputy focus on the
classic ‘high-politics’ issues, such as the Yugoslav crisis, the Middle East
and the central African conflicts, and coordinate the Dutch input into the
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. They are supposed to coordi-
nate the political activities of the other Directorates-General and main-
tain the general policy line of the Ministry as a whole.32 Those sections in
the Directorate-General for Regional and Country Policy affairs whose
work is highly political will in practice receive their instructions from the
Director-General for Political Affairs.
Before the Reorientation, the most influential department under the
direct authority of the Director-General for Political Affairs was the
Atlantic Security and Cooperation Affairs Department (DAV), renamed
the Security Policy Affairs Department in 1995, and subsequently en-
larged from approximately 17 to some 27 officials. DAV/DVB is responsi-
ble for formulating policy regarding NATO, the Western European Union
(WEU), and the Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) as well as the various treaties on arms control. Throughout the
Cold War, DAV/DVB in practice also managed bilateral relations with the
United States, the most important NATO ally. Finally, it is DAV/DVB
which maintains relations with the Ministry of Defence.
The European Affairs Department was also heavily involved in the for-
mulation of Dutch Yugoslavia policy, first as part of the Directorate-Gen-
eral for Political Affairs, and since 1995, as part of the Directorate-Gener-
al for Regional Policy. At the outbreak of the Yugoslav crisis in 1990-1991
the Eastern Europe Division, responsible for bilateral relations with all of
the Warsaw Pact members, as well as Yugoslavia and Albania, consisted of
three officials – increased to four during the Dutch EC Presidency. Subse-
quently this was split into an Eastern Europe Division and a Central
Europe Division, the latter of which eventually expanded to some ten
people, approximately six of whom were concerned with the region of the
former Yugoslavia and Albania (Western Balkans). This informal subdivi-
sion dealing with the Western Balkans was headed by a ‘co-ordinator’. In
1999, a separate Balkans task force was created to coordinate the Dutch
input into the recently created ‘Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe’.
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The co-ordinator for the affairs of the former Yugoslavia since 1992 has
chaired a weekly meeting, which has brought together officials from as
many as eight different departments as well as, at times, an official from
the Ministry of Defence, in order to discuss current developments and
identify options.
Another department that contributed to the making of Dutch Yugoslavia
policy was the UN Affairs Department, which controlled communica-
tions with the Permanent Mission in New York. The Security Council
played a crucial role in international Yugoslavia diplomacy, particularly
during the period of the UN’s humanitarian intervention in former
Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1995, which meant that within the Min-
istry, the UN Affairs Department was relatively influential.
Hanno Würzner, a former senior desk officer in the UN Affairs Depart-
ment, gave the following description of the roles played by the different
departments: ‘For the people in the Atlantic Affairs Department, the main
concern was “NATO credibility”. This translated into strong support for
the use of NATO air power. We from the UN Affairs Department were
much more oriented towards the humanitarian side of the UN peace-
keeping operation itself. The people in the European Affairs Department
studied the nature of the successive peace plans on the table and did not
shrink back from taking a moral stance.’33
There were also other important Foreign Ministry actors, who were active
during the period under discussion, such as the Embassy in Belgrade, the
Permanent Mission at NATO in Brussels and the Permanent Mission at
the United Nations in New York. During the early phases of the crisis, the
Dutch Ambassador to France, Henry Wijnaendts, also played an impor-
tant individual role, first as a special representative of the European Com-
munity and, subsequently, as deputy chairman to the EC Peace Confer-
ence, chaired by former British Foreign Secretary, Peter Lord Carrington
in 1991 and 1992.34
The Ministry of Defence
The other politician in the Ministry of Defence besides the Minister is the
State-Secretary. Whereas the Defence Minister focuses on general defence
policy and spends much of his time with his senior civil and military
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advisers, in Parliament, with the Cabinet or abroad for meetings with fel-
low NATO and WEU defence Ministers. The State-Secretary’s traditional
tasks involve operational responsibility for policies regarding equipment
and procurement, as well as with manpower planning if a Minister so
desires.
The Defence Ministry’s senior nonpolitical figure is the Secretary-Gener-
al. He is always a civilian in order to emphasise the primacy of the civil
over the military. The Secretary-General is mainly responsible for the
day-to-day management. The Secretary-General’s easy access to the Min-
ister sometimes causes irritation among senior military.35
Two other groups of (mainly) civil servants in the Defence Ministry play
an important role in the formulation and presentation of defence policy
and in the management of the Ministry’s external affairs. These are the
officials in the Department of General Policy Affairs (DAB) and the
senior spokespersons in the department of information, which always has
a representative in the company of the Minister.
The DAB officials, in particular, have a reputation for political shrewd-
ness. DAB officials prepare the Minister’s statements to Parliament and
draft his speeches. A former head of the department once articulated the
extent of the DAB’s loyalty to the Defence Minister as follows: ‘We do
everything for the Minister. If he wants a speech on rhyme, he will get it
on rhyme.’36 In a remark which revealed the influence that the DAB offi-
cials (are perceived to) have, former Commander of Land Forces Lt. Gen-
eral Hans Couzy once lamented that while a Commander of Land Forces
‘does not belong to the Minister’s most intimate’, the DAB officials are the
Minister’s ‘trustees’.37
The highest senior military official is the chief of the Defence Staff. He is
the only four-star officer in the Dutch armed forces and the Minister’s top
military adviser. While formally ranked below the Secretary-General, the
chief of the Defence Staff, in practice, is treated as the Secretary-General’s
military counterpart. Whereas communication between the chief of the
Defence Staff and the Minister formally runs through the Secretary-Gen-
eral, a trusted chief of the Defence Staff will be able to develop his own
line of communication to the Minister. The chief of the Defence Staff
plays a crucial role particularly when Dutch troops are involved in opera-
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tions abroad. Meanwhile, the deputy chief of the Defence Staff assists his
superior and becomes the acting chief of the Defence Staff in the latter’s
absence. Here too, informal influence may be greater than formal influ-
ence. The chief of the Defence Staff also functions as a primus inter pares
with regard to the commanders of the three armed services: the Royal
Army, Royal Navy, and Royal Air Force, all of whom are entitled, however,
to approach the Minister directly.
Cooperation between the Foreign and Defence Ministries
During the period under discussion, apart from regular ad hoc visits and
telephone calls between the two Ministries, as well as – sometimes joint –
telegram traffic, there was no tightly structured framework to ensure the
interlocking of political and military views in the policy formulation
process. Formal communications between the two Ministries included a
daily Defence Ministry briefing on the situation of Dutch troops abroad,
attended by an official from the Foreign Ministry’s Department for
Atlantic Security and Cooperation Affairs (DAV). Officials from the
Defence Ministry’s DAB were invited to participate in the weekly Foreign
Ministry meeting chaired by the Yugoslavia-co-ordinator. Given that these
meetings were attended by some 8 different Foreign Ministry depart-
ments and sections (dealing with for instance: humanitarian aid, informa-
tion, European integration and human rights), they were not effective in
securing an open and clear communication between the two Ministries.
The Informal Foreign Policy Machinery
The academic community maintains relatively close relations with politi-
cians, with whom they discuss current issues on the basis of membership
of the same political party, or simply on the basis of common interest.
Relations between the academic community and the civil service are
much less warm. The Dutch Foreign and Defence Ministries still are
remarkably closed bureaucracies with relatively little interest in the opin-
ions of the academic community other than those produced in the most
influential daily newspapers and television programmes. Nevertheless,
given that a select group of academics have relatively easy access to the
media they can be influential in an indirect way.
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A number of national newspapers are widely read, while politicians and
senior officials (much more so than junior officials) also keep an eye on
what is written in such international media as the International Herald
Tribune, the Economist, and the New York Review of Books. Domestic and
foreign television programmes like NOVA, Netwerk, BBC Newsnight, and
CNN are watched with varying degrees of intensity. While it is difficult to
estimate the influence of the media on the Dutch foreign policy process,
it is clear that the domestic press in particular often succeeds in influenc-
ing foreign policy, primarily by provoking parliamentarians to react.
Parliament will not support particular foreign policies unless they are
perceived to be backed by a majority of the Dutch electorate. This is par-
ticularly true with regard to the question of whether to support the
deployment of Dutch troops abroad. Parliamentarians are quite suscep-
tible to public opinion as expressed in polls and through the media. One
organisation that regularly monitors the Dutch public’s attitudes regard-
ing the involvement of Dutch forces in military operations abroad is the
Stichting Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht (Foundation for Society and
Armed Forces), which has its own magazine and internet site.38
The European Dimension
Dutch foreign policy is formulated within the framework of a number of
international organisations or, more generally, regimes. The regime that
intervenes more directly than any other into the Dutch formulating
process is that of the European Union. The interlocking of national and
European policy formulation takes place in the framework of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy, which succeeded European Political
Cooperation (EPC) as the EU’s ‘collective enterprise through which
national actors conduct partly common, and partly separate, internation-
al actions.’39
Until November 1993, the EC member states were exchanging informa-
tion, consulting one another, taking joint action in the field of foreign
policy through European Political Cooperation. Through EPC, the EC
member states aimed to maximise their influence in international affairs
by developing common approaches to foreign policy issues. While EPC
had gradually been developing ever since the 1950s, it was not until 1987
that the process was formalised as part of the Single European Act (SEA)
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and was provided with a permanent Secretariat to support the country
holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers.
European Political Cooperation was organised on a strictly intergovern-
mental basis and served as a platform for co-ordinating national foreign
policies. Decision making took place on the basis of unanimity. The
shared desire for consultations and information exchanges did not mean
‘that essential interests would automatically be interpreted in a uniform
manner’.49 Each member state also used EPC as a platform for maximis-
ing national influence and defending national interests. Nevertheless,
most member states tried to make EPC work. Until the eruption of the
Yugoslav crisis, EPC was regarded as ‘one of the few bright spots’ of Euro-
pean integration.41
The Treaty on European Union (TEU), concluded in Maastricht in the
Netherlands in 1991, created a European Union of which a Common
Foreign and Security Policy constituted one of the three main pillars.
CFSP has retained the intergovernmental basis of EPC, with unanimity as
the most important form of decision making. Some areas of decision
making, such as disarmament and arms control, were deemed of suffi-
cient ‘common’ interest to allow for Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). In
addition, the Council of Ministers can, by consensus, designate particular
matters to be decided by QMV. The treaty also mentions the possibility of
eventually framing a common defence policy/organisation. Finally, the
Treaty stipulates that the member states will ‘to the extent possible, avoid
preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in
favour of that decision.’42 Nevertheless, the fact that the most important
decisions are still made on the basis of unanimity, indicates that member
states are reluctant to risk the possibility of being outvoted on issues they
consider to be of vital national interest. The Treaty of Amsterdam, agreed
in 1997, foresees common strategies in which decision making is taken on
the basis of QMV. By 2000, two common strategies had been formulated,
one of which dealt with Russia. The other related to Ukraine.
The ‘European Council’ of Heads of State and Heads of Government of
the EU member states, which commenced as a regular informal gather-
ing, was formalised with the SEA and the TEU and endorsed in Edin-
burgh in 1992. Given that the European Council ‘ensures coordination
between the various Councils and the many policy areas now subject to
       
opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:13  Pagina 60
European integration’, the visibility of the heads of government and state
in matters of foreign policy has increased. This development is reinforced
by the fact that the European Council, unlike the regular Council of Min-
isters, can meet ‘outside the mainstream institutional framework’, and can
cut through ‘all the procedural formality, which that involves.’43 Finally,
while the Foreign Ministers have been more successful than most Minis-
ters at retaining their autonomy in their area of expertise, ‘the original
central coordinating and strategic role’ of the Foreign Ministers’ General
Affairs Council (GAC) ‘has been weakened by the existence of the Euro-
pean Council.’44 The enhanced visibility of the Dutch Prime Minister in
European affairs was recognised in the Reorientation paper of 1995,
which notes a greater role for the Prime Minister in the ‘presentation’ of
foreign policy.
Despite the growing importance of the European Council, in most EU
countries the Foreign Minister remains the key player for several reasons.
The preparations for the European Council are carried out by the various
Councils of Ministers, the most important of which is the Foreign Minis-
ters’ GAC. Secondly, decisions by the European Council only obtain legal
force once they have been adopted by the relevant Council of Ministers
according to normal legal procedures. Fiona Hayes-Renshaw and Helen
Wallace point out that, ‘without the preparatory and executive functions
of the Council [of Ministers], the European Council would be unable to
function.’45 In addition, unlike the other Ministers, the Foreign Ministers’
competence encompasses both Community and CFSP affairs. Finally and
most importantly, the direct influence of the Foreign Ministers is ensured
by their physical presence at the European Council as the only other
political figures besides the heads of government or state.
In fact, EPC/CFSP has increased, rather than decreased, the domestic
powers of most European Foreign Ministers. Whereas the Prime Minister
may be gaining influence through the European Council, at the expense
of the Foreign Minister, EPC/CFSP has enabled Foreign Ministers to reaf-
firm their coordinating role vis-à-vis other national Ministers. EPC/CFSP
has ‘demarcated an area of European cooperation that was unarguably
the proper reserve of the Foreign Ministries, and allowed those Ministries
to re-establish their traditional positions of primacy within their national
civil services.’46
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The main advisory body to the General Affairs Council is the Political
Committee (CoPo), consisting of the Political Directors from the mem-
ber states’ Foreign Ministries. The political directors prepare the work of
the Ministers on issues of foreign policy. The CoPo also oversees the work
of specialised working groups. Finally, the CoPo prepares the discussions
and conclusions of the European Council of Heads of State and Heads of
Government regarding issues of foreign policy. It may do so at its own
initiative. The influence of the CoPo in meetings of the European Council
‘is significant, given the presence of its immediate masters, the Foreign
Ministers, at the meeting itself. The CoPo normally agrees on CFSP agen-
da items (which can subsequently be modified by the Foreign Ministers)
two days before the European Council. It meets on the first day of the
summit to discuss and draft the CFSP declarations to be included in the
final conclusions. The individual members of the CoPo are senior figures
in their national delegations, and trusted advisors to their Foreign and
prime Ministers.’47
Until the TEU concluded at Maastricht, the CoPo’s area of competence
was kept very much apart from that of its counterpart involved in
Community affairs, the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER). The Political Directors met regularly in the country hold-
ing the EU Presidency. From 1993 onwards, several operational proce-
dures were introduced to enhance the unity of purpose between the
Political Committee and COREPER in preparing for General Affairs
Councils and European Councils.48
Much of the groundwork in the attempts by the European Union to coor-
dinate national policies and formulate common policies, is done in spe-
cialised working groups. In the context of the Yugoslav crisis, policy coor-
dination initially took place in the Eastern Europe Working Group and
subsequently in the Committee on former Yugoslavia (COYUG), later
renamed COWEB (Committee on the Western Balkans).
The Ambassadors of the EU member states in any given post, apart from
undertaking their own bilateral activities, will try to reconcile their posi-
tions as much as possible at regular meetings and thereby present
common positions in their host country. In addition, the Ambassadors 
may be called upon to assist the CoPo to prepare draft declarations for
the General Affairs Council and European Council. In the case of the
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Netherlands, a bilateral treaty between the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
and the Netherlands stipulates that Dutch embassies are to represent Lux-
embourg politically in places where there is no Luxembourg embassy.
This is relevant in the context of the Yugoslav crisis, because Luxembourg
preceded the Netherlands as EC Presidency in 1991 and did not have an
embassy of its own in Belgrade.
Outside the formal policy-making process, the European parliamentary
formations of national political parties can sometimes play an important
informal role in the making of European foreign policy. In these confed-
erations of political parties, party chairmen and political leaders of like-
minded parties in individual EU member states and prospective member
states, meet to develop common philosophies and achieve common posi-
tions. During the early stages of the Yugoslav crisis, the European Chris-
tian Democrats, united under the European People’s Party, were a partic-
ularly important group, because, at that time, they were in power in six
EC member states as well as soon-to-be-member Austria.49
The Western European Union, a European defence body without materi-
al capabilities of its own, had been ‘asleep’ for much of the time between
its creation in 1954 and 1984. After 1984, the WEU was gradually reacti-
vated over the course of a number of ministerial meetings.50 During the
Gulf War, the WEU played a role in the naval embargo against Iraq, but in
the final analysis most European allies preferred to coordinate their
efforts with the United States on a bilateral basis. In July 1992, NATO and
WEU Ministers decided to task the WEU with a naval operation in the
Adriatic in order to monitor complicance with an arms embargo against
former Yugoslavia in UN Security Council Resolution 713 of 25 Septem-
ber 1991 and with economic sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 757 on 20 May 1992. At the present time, the movement towards a
common European defence body has gained momentum with the agree-
ment that the EU should be able to field a separate force that uses NATO
facilities in situations where action is needed but US involvement does
not seem likely.
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The Global Dimension: NATO, the OSCE, the UN 
and ad hoc Groups
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), founded in 1951 on the
basis of a treaty signed in 1949, ties the United States, most Western Euro-
pean countries as well as Turkey into an intergovernmental military
alliance. NATO decisions are made in the North Atlantic Council (NAC).
The NAC is composed of permanent national representatives and meets
at least once a week. The NAC also meets at a ministerial level (Ministers
of Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Defence), as well as at the level that
involves heads of state. But decisions are equally valid regardless of the
level at which the NAC meets. Decisions are made on a strictly intergov-
ernmental level and requires unanimity. An international staff headed by
the Secretary-General supports the work of the NAC and its various
political and military committees. NATO’s political and military head-
quarters are both located in Belgium. SACEUR, NATO’s commander-in-
chief for Europe, has as a rule, been an American national. NATO’s
involvement in the Yugoslav crisis between July 1990 and July 1995 was
restricted to the provision of air power, which was to be called in at the
request of the United Nations.
The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was
founded in 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act as the Confer-
ence for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and finally became
an ‘Organisation’ in January 1995. It is the only platform available that
deals with the European security environment and includes all European
countries (except the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose membership
is currently frozen), plus the United States, Canada and, as observers,
Japan and South Korea. The Charter of Paris of November 1990, conclud-
ed with a summit of the then 34 participating states’ heads of govern-
ment, created a permanent Council of Ministers. It also created the Com-
mittee of Senior Officials to prepare the ministerial meetings. At last,
there is now a permanent Parliamentary Assembly, a permanent Secre-
tariat in Prague, a Centre for Conflict Prevention in Vienna and an Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), based in War-
saw.
The United Nations was founded in 1945, with the Netherlands as one of
its original members. Its main bodies are the General Assembly, the Secu-
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rity Council and the UN Secretariat. The secretariat is headed by the UN
Secretary-General. The Security Council functions as the chief decision
making council. All UN member states have agreed to accept and carry
out the Security Council’s resolutions in accordance with the UN Charter.
The Security Council consists of fifteen members, five of whom occupy a
permanent seat (the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia) and
possess veto powers. The ten non-permanent members are elected by the
General Assembly to serve two-year terms. The United Nations became
involved in the Yugoslav crisis on 25 September 1991, when the Security
Council imposed an arms embargo against the whole territory of the for-
mer Yugoslavia. Between 25 September 1991 and 28 April 1995, two
months before the fall of Srebrenica, the Security Council adopted no
fewer than 73 resolutions directly related to the situation in the former
Yugoslavia.51 Some of the most important resolutions were resolution 743
(21 February 1992), which established the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR); resolution 759 (11 December 1992), which autho-
rised the preventive deployment of a UN force in Macedonia; resolution
819 (16 April 1993), which demanded that Srebrenica and its surround-
ings be treated as a safe area; resolution 824 (6 May 1993), which expand-
ed the safe area status to include not only Srebrenica, but Sarajevo, Tuzla,
Zepa, Gorazde, and Bihac; resolution 836, which gave a mandate to
UNPROFOR to deter attacks against the safe areas; and resolution 844 (18
June 1993), which authorised a reinforcement of UNPROFOR to enable it
to carry out resolutions 819, 824, and 836.
Apart from formal organisations, ad hoc groups of countries also played a
role in formulating international policy with regard to the Yugoslav crisis.
The five countries who signed the ‘Joint Action Programme’ on 22 May
1993 constituted an ad hoc group, that shared interests regarding the
Yugoslav crisis as the basis for its brief existence. The Contact Group,
made up of the US, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and later Italy, was
founded with the Yugoslav crisis specifically in mind. The Contact Group
evolved out of the impatience of its members concerning more formal
multilateral consultation and decision making mechanisms. In neither
case had the Netherlands been invited to join, prompting protests that
regular mechanisms had been bypassed.
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2 An Emerging Challenge,
July 1990 - June 1991
By July 1990, Yugoslavia was in deep crisis, although most European gov-
ernments did not notice it. In the various elections that had taken place in
the individual Yugoslav republics during the second half of 1990, com-
munists-turned-nationalists, or anti-communist nationalists had won
overwhelming victories. ‘Yugoslavia no longer exists’, declared Slovene
Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel in July 1990, having just been voted into
power as part of the pro-independence coalition DEMOS.1 In the Serbian
province of Kosovo, ethnic Albanians declared that Kosovo would no
longer be a province in Serbia but one of the federation’s constituent
republics. Kosovo’s autonomy had already been withdrawn by Serbian
President Milosevic and the two Kosovar representatives purged from the
federal Presidency. The year 1990 saw further purges of leading Albanians
from their positions. Both Slovenia and Croatia demanded that
Yugoslavia be restructured into a confederation of sovereign states. Croa-
tian Serbs, in turn, declared that if Croatia were to become independent,
they should be given the right to secede from Croatia and remain part of
Yugoslavia. The Croatian government responded by sending its own spe-
cial police into ethnically mixed Serb-Croat areas to replace the existing
police. A violent incident between Croatian Serbs and Croats took place
as early as September 1990 in the Croatian town of Glina, followed by
shoot-outs in Pakrac and in Plitvice National Park in March 1991. In the
meantime, various rounds of negotiations between the republics failed to
produce reconciliation. A serious clash between Croatian policemen and
Serb militiamen on May 2, 1991, in the Croatian village of Borovo Selo
finally put the Yugoslav crisis on the international-political map. When
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Serbia subsequently blocked the regular rotation of the Yugoslav federal
Presidency to the Croat Stipe Mesic (elected in 2000 as Croatian President
on a reformist ticket), the Yugoslav crisis had become a serious foreign
policy issue for Europe and America.
Turning to the international environment surrounding the Yugoslav cri-
sis, one sees three organisations dominating the scene between July 1990
and June 1991. These were the CSCE (later: OSCE) through its principles
and norms covering the relations between its member states, the EC
(later: EU) through its European Political Cooperation (EPC), as well as
NATO, through which the USA managed European security.
The external constraints placed by CSCE, EPC and NATO on their mem-
bers were strong. They were felt all the more strongly in the Netherlands,
a country whose foreign policy élite upheld the notion that international
regimes were by definition beneficial to its security and status. The
prospect of holding the EC Presidency during the second half of 1991,
with the responsibility of chairing an Intergovernmental Conference on a
treaty for a real EU, reinforced the Dutch self-perceived role as champion
of supranational European integration. If there was a specifically Dutch
foreign policy aimed at dealing with the Yugoslav crisis during this peri-
od, it only existed as part of various regime-building exercises. In other
words, any activity directed towards the Yugoslav crisis at this stage was
essentially a by-product of the broader aim of creating the EU.
Two additional factors should be borne in mind, the first of which is that
Dutch policy with regard to the emerging Yugoslav crisis was the exclu-
sive affair of the Foreign Ministry, as the public simply did not have an
opinion on the issue yet. Secondly, the question of whether the Nether-
lands exerted influence at this stage of the crisis is not relevant, given that
during its opening phase this was not an issue on which any government
desired to be influential, but more like a hot potato which governments
sought to pass off to each other.
The first half of this chapter is devoted to the policy-making process in
the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the emerging Yugoslav
crisis. It will describe the warnings emanating from various quarters and
the lack of a serious response to these warnings by the political leader-
ship. The second half will show that this absence of a concrete response
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must be understood in the context of the international environment in
which the Dutch Foreign Ministry operated. In particular, the Euro-
American consensus that the principle of territorial integrity should be at
the centre of diplomacy served as a tight constraint on Dutch policy.
Early Warnings
Nothing better illustrates how long the Yugoslav crisis remained unwant-
ed as a political issue than the failure of the regional experts in the Dutch
diplomatic service to obtain a serious hearing for their assessments from
their bureaucratic and political superiors. The failure by the EC and the
US to deal with the Yugoslav crisis with more rigour at an earlier stage
was not due to a lack of intelligence information. The early-warning sys-
tem itself worked on both sides of the Atlantic. In November 1990 the US
intelligence community presented the Bush administration with a com-
plete National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Yugoslavia’s approachng
disintegration. The NIE warned of ‘a Serbian quest for hegemony within
Yugoslavia, a popular desire on the part of many Slovenians, Croats, and
others for a looser federation and, barring that, for independence, depth
of feelings of the people of Yugoslavia and the likelihood of brutality’, and
‘the impossibility of maintaining the unity of Yugoslavia.’ However, the
co-ordinator of the American team that had written the NIE, Dutch-
American Marten van Heuven, later explained that ‘nobody was glad to
get this predictive assessment’ and, worse, that it was ‘ignored’.2 The main
reason for the hesitant Western response was distraction by other foreign
policy issues: the possibility of a collapse of the Soviet Union; the Gulf
conflict of 1990-1991; a partial US withdrawal from Europe; German
reunification; and the process of European integration in the run-up to
the establishment of a European Union.3 All these issues seemed more
important than the Yugoslav crisis. The collective mistake of the West,
then, was not so much a failure to recognise that the Yugoslav federation
was in crisis but to underestimate its potential for posing a fundamental
challenge to the new post-Cold War international order.
The staff that occupied the Dutch Embassy in Belgrade on the eve of the
Yugoslav wars of dissolution cannot be accused of grossly misinterpreting
or misrepresenting developments in the Socialist Federative Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1990 and early 1991. Nor, in fairness, can the Embassy be
said to have been slow or lazy in its reporting. Moreover, if the Dutch
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Ambassador was one of the EC Ambassadors whom German journalist
Viktor Meier argues were ‘arrogant', even ‘hostile', towards the indepen-
dence-seeking Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia, this was due in
the first place to instructions emanating from The Hague.4
‘Dark clouds are gathering above the multinational state of Yugoslavia…
The continued existence of the (con)federation as a viable state seems to
be hanging from a silk thread.’ This warning was sent to the Dutch Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague by the Dutch Ambassador in Bel-
grade, Albert Nooij, on July 23, 1990. Nooij had been given a new assign-
ment and had just paid farewell visits to Croatian leaders in Zagreb and
Serbian leaders in Belgrade. Two days earlier, Nooij had reported his con-
versation with Serbian Foreign Minister Dr Prlja. Quoting Prlja, Nooij
had written: ‘Serbia will not let itself be forced by Slovenia and Croatia
into a confederate governmental structure. Those republics will not suc-
ceed in pushing the always underprivileged Serbia down to its knees
through economic means of coercion. Serbia has shown before that it can
survive on its own and will do so, albeit with difficulty, in future. The
Serbs are… pessimistic about the continued existence of a viable Yugosla-
via.’
The difficult conversations with Serbian and Croatian politicians led
Nooij to conclude that the differences between Serbia and Croatia ‘had
deteriorated to the extent that there was in fact no longer a basis for a
continued common existence’. He assessed that a possible scenario was
the break-up of Yugoslavia into a confederacy encompassing Slovenia,
Croatia and possibly (a part of) Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a greater Serbia
encompassing the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Montenegro and
possibly the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina. (It was unclear how Macedonia
fitted into this.) Nooij explained that it was uncertain how this would
come about. Serbian president Milosevic had emphasised, Nooij contin-
ued, that in that case the borders between the republics would have to be
revised – by force if need be – so that every Serb again lived in Serbia
without, Nooij stressed, having to leave his present home in Croatia or
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatian President Tudjman would in that case
probably want the same for ‘his’ Croats.
On August 18 the Embassy in Belgrade sent another warning to The
Hague. Following the departure of Ambassador Nooij, the Chargé 
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d’Affaires, Dirk Hasselman, was running the Embassy. Hasselman had
been posted in Yugoslavia for nearly three years and was very pessimistic
about its future.5 In his message he warned that the silk thread on which
the survival of the Yugoslav federation was still hanging, was about to
break. The three most important indications for this, according to Has-
selman, constituted a strike by the Albanian community in Kosovo, a
decision by Slovenia that its conscripts could no longer serve outside
Slovenia and Croatia, and a referendum on independence among the
Serbs in Croatia, which was to be held the next day.
During the winter months of 1990, the Embassy temporarily moderated
its alarmist stance. On October 3, the day of German reunification, it
began to operate under a new Ambassador, Jan Fietelaars. Fietelaars had
been prepared and briefed in The Hague. There, the atmosphere had
been optimistic: a new European order was said to be coming about as a
result of the end of the Cold War. Many Central and Eastern European
countries would join up with the European Community, which was soon
to become a full-blown economic and political union. Yugoslavia, Fiete-
laars had been told, would become a member state following a large
financial injection to help it service its international debt. Moreover,
Fietelaars had been prepared for his job in the classical way, obtaining
much of his information from standard textbooks and the Yugoslav
Embassy in The Hague, whose information was, however, unreliable,
given that it was run by ‘a frightened Slovene who stuck precisely to the
Communist party-line'.6 As a result, Ambassador Fietelaars initially un-
derestimated the depth of the Yugoslav crisis and its potential for large-
scale violence.
While Hasselman disagreed with Fietelaars, the reporting from Belgrade
temporarily sounded less gloomy than before. Thus, on October 19, fol-
lowing a meeting of all EC Ambassadors in Belgrade, Fietelaars sent an
evaluation of recent developments. In its conclusion, which Fietelaars
argued was shared by all the Ambassadors, he stated that the process of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration was reaching its final stage and that a long
period of negotiations for a new form of cooperation between the Yugo-
slav republics was about to begin. He concluded: ‘Particularly at the start
of these, the regression, the theatre and the violent incidents may con-
tinue to take place. But one can say that civil war and extreme violence
remain unlikely.’
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Fietelaars’ more optimistic view may have influenced attitudes in The
Hague, although it is impossible to know to what degree. If it did influ-
ence attitudes, its main effect would have been to confirm an already
existing complacency and disinterest. In any case, Fietelaars soon realised
that Hasselman’s pessimism was justified. ‘Within the space of three
months he had completely converted me. His analyses and predictions
were correct. So I began to think differently. By the end of December
1990/ early January 1991 I had come round and said: "something very
nasty is going to happen here." And it was in that sense that we began to
report.'7 One of the clearest hints of what was yet to come was given by
President Milosevic himself in a lunch meeting with Ambassadors from
the EC on January 16, 1991. According to the report from Belgrade, Milo-
sevic had made it clear that if Yugoslavia were allowed to break up, Serbia
would seek to carve out a new state for itself. This new state would not be
restricted to the territory of the constituent republic of Serbia. Milosevic
said that he was ready to let Slovenia go and that Macedonia was still
under discussion. However, he wanted to be absolutely clear about the
Serb-inhabited parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia: they would be
part of the new state. He explicitly warned the Ambassadors: ‘If this is not
attainable peacefully, one forces Serbia to use the tools of power which 
we possess, but they [the other republics] do not.’ As the crisis developed
into a war, Fietelaars understandably became an outspoken advocate of
a forceful international intervention, including a military component,
against Serbia and the Yugoslav army.
The second group of officials trying to put the Yugoslav crisis on the
political map were the three people who made up the Eastern Europe
Division in the Ministry in The Hague, in particular Harm Hazewinkel
and Ellen Berends, the respective head and deputy-head of the division.
While the Embassy and the Eastern European Division worked in tandem
to push Yugoslavia as a foreign policy issue, the Eastern European Divi-
sion did not share the Embassy’s interventionist stance. By the time the
Netherlands succeeded Luxembourg as holder of the EC Presidency, the
Embassy and the Eastern European Division had begun to part company
on the question of intervention, with the latter favouring a managed dis-
integration including, if necessary, border changes between the various
republics.
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Between July 1990 and June 1991 the Eastern European Division, like the
Embassy, tried hard to capture the attention of the bureaucratic and
political leadership for developments in Yugoslavia. Thus, in a clear sign
of support of Ambassador Nooij’s early warning, Ellen Berends, the Divi-
sion’s deputy-head, wrote a telegram to the Dutch permanent representa-
tion at NATO, warning: ‘On this side too it is judged that the situation in
Yugoslavia is very explosive and that there is a real danger of a break-up
of the federation.’ Berends posed ‘the question of whether the West pos-
sessed the means to stop such a development’ and argued:
‘Although with the break-up of the federation the danger of (armed) con-
flicts between the former constituent parts of the federation is real,
increasingly the question seems justified of whether preserving the unity
of the federation at all costs results in a much more stable situation. One
is increasingly under the impression that federal cooperation in the federa-
tion has simply ceased to exist, and it is doubtful whether the central gov-
ernment will then possess the means to keep alive this federation, other
than through the use of force.’
The message was timely and correct and was followed by numerous other
warnings. Despite Fietelaars’ initial optimism between October-Decem-
ber 1990, the Eastern European Division did not divert from its pes-
simistic line. On October 23, the Division warned: ‘A break-up of Yugo-
slavia, however little desirable from the Western point of view, remains
one of the possibilities. Already, the country is largely being kept together
by negative considerations.’
An important reason for why the Eastern European Division adopted a
line in favour of a ‘managed disintegration’ was that Hazewinkel and
Berends believed that in the Yugoslav context, the principle of territorial
integrity came with continued authoritarianism.8 It would turn out later
that theirs was a minority position. But for now, what was important was
that the Division sketched the dilemma and presented it to the Director-
General for Political Affairs and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
dilemma was sketched in a note, signed by the Director for European
Affairs but drafted by the Eastern Europe Division, for the attention of the
Director-General for Political Affairs for a meeting of the Political Com-
mittee on November 14 and 15, 1990. The note reflected a German inter-
vention to the same effect made several days earlier in NATO and read:
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…one will, by the way, not be able in the future to ignore the
question of which choice must be made, if it were to turn out
that democracy and human rights would be better served by a
partitioning of the country than by holding on to the unitary
state. The way things are now, the greatest advocates of unity in
Yugoslavia do not seem to be the greatest advocates of democ-
racy.
Several months later, in April 1991, the Eastern Europe Division launched
another small-scale campaign to impress their Minister of the urgency of
the situation in Yugoslavia. In minutes for a General Affairs Council on
April 8, Hazewinkel and Berends warned Van den Broek that the situation
in Yugoslavia was worsening and that civil war was far from inconceiv-
able. The officials also questioned the utility of the Western reliance on
Yugoslavia’s Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, whose power base,
Hazewinkel and Berends argued, had to a large measure been eroded. A
week later, in preparation for a General Affairs Council on April 15, the
Eastern Europe Division began to sound somewhat desperate as they
asked Van den Broek: ‘How realistic is the hope for an undivided
Yugoslavia in the light of the Slovene determination to realise, through
secession, its endeavour to achieve independence no later than coming
July, as well as the increasingly far-reaching tendency that is now notable
in all individual republics? In the file for yet another (informal) minister-
ial meeting, which took place in Mondorf-les-Bains, Luxembourg, on
April 27 and 28, the Eastern Europe Division again questioned the real-
ism of the European approach:
The chance of a solution, whereby Yugoslavia continues to
exist with a central authority that deserves such a name at all, is
getting smaller and smaller… The Twelve have consistently…
held the position that the territorial integrity and unity of
Yugoslavia must be preserved. The question nevertheless has to
be asked whether a point will be reached, or perhaps is already
near, where the only possibility is to manage the disintegration
of Yugoslavia in such a way that bloodshed is prevented and a
part of the federal structure possibly preserved.
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The Eastern Europe Division had not sounded so desperate before, and
understandably so. For within the space of two weeks Yugoslavia sudden-
ly and belatedly did become an acute foreign policy issue for the EC Min-
isters of Foreign Affairs. However, this was not the result of a shift in the
body of opinion among the Ministers regarding the wisdom of continued
support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, but because a constitutional
crisis in Yugoslavia made clear that the possibility of disintegration was
more than just an academic speculation.
The Response
The regional experts believed, to their great frustration, that the bureau-
cratic and political leadership had not taken their early warnings serious-
ly. Looking back on this period, Berends commented: ‘Even though we
tried to sell our views to anyone who would listen, the general response
was: “you must be exaggerating”.’9 As for their minutes and memoranda,
Berends and Hazewinkel once mockingly suggested their superiors had
seemed less interested in what they had written than in the colour of the
paper they had used.10
Similarly, Ambassador Fietelaars bitterly complained that he had been
unable to convince the Ministry in The Hague of the urgency of the situ-
ation in Yugoslavia. According to Fietelaars, his reports were either
ignored or dismissed: ‘Initially, the reaction was: “You are too closely
involved. Get some distance and let it cool down for a while.” I jammed
the radio; I was a buzzing bumblebee flying around someone’s head, and
distracted from the work everyone was occupied with. I honestly never
succeeded in convincing The Hague. The department found our predic-
tions exaggerated and Cassandra-like.’11
Given that their views did not translate into policy, it is understandable
that the Yugoslavia-experts assumed they were not being taken seriously.
The question remains of whether this assumption is valid. The frus-
tration shared by all those who sounded the alarm is based on the belief
that their written messages, their main channel of communication to
senior officials and the Minister, were read either superficially or not at
all. In other words, the Yugoslav crisis was ignored, they argue, because
Yugoslavia was not considered important. If this is true, then the Nether-
lands and, perhaps, other EC member states compounded errors made in
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the USA during this period by treating the Yugoslav crisis with a degree of
misplaced arrogance. For, regarding the USA, former National Security
Staff member David Gompert argues that the absence of a serious
response by the US administration to early and correct intelligence infor-
mation about the Yugoslav crisis, was not due to an unwillingness to take
this information seriously. ‘Rather, despite considerable deliberation and
diplomatic action, no good option emerged to arrest the accelerating,
awful logic of break-up and war.’12
The three obvious targets for the attempts by the Embassy and the East-
ern Europe Division to have the Yugoslav crisis recognised as a priority
foreign policy issue were, apart from the Foreign Minister himself, the
Director-General for Political Affairs and the Atlantic Security and Co-
operation Affairs Department (DAV). Of these three (groups of) actors, it
seems that the Director-General for Political Affairs was the first to
become seriously engaged with the issue.
On the eve of ‘the Yugoslav war of dissolution’, despite the need for a new
perspective on Central and Eastern Europe, the Dutch Foreign Ministry
still very much reflected Cold War traditions, both in terms of bureau-
cratic structure and general mentality. Inside the Ministry, three foreign
policy themes had long outweighed all others in importance to the extent
that they had become veritable ideologies. These were loyalty to NATO
and the USA, the building of a supranational European economic and
political union, and, third, the promotion of international order and soci-
ety. In none of these three foreign policy themes had a place been
reserved for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, all of whom
had been tossed into a single basket labelled ‘Warsaw Pact’. The primacy
of these three policy themes and the corresponding lack of real interest in
Central and Eastern Europe were reflected in the structure of the Min-
istry. The functional departments focusing on NATO, EC/EU and UN
affairs, not to mention the various departments in the Directorate-Gen-
eral for International Cooperation [development aid] had become much
more important than the regional desks responsible for bilateral political
relations. This made it possible that on the eve of the Yugoslav war, only
three officials were responsible for relations with Central and Eastern
European countries, including the Soviet Union.13
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Without the help of more powerful departments, the Embassy in Bel-
grade and the Eastern Europe Division carried insufficient bureaucratic
clout to serve as catalysts for an active approach towards the Yugoslav cri-
sis. The obvious department to help the Embassy and the Eastern Europe
Division, would have been DAV. Responsible for NATO, WEU and CSCE
affairs, DAV could always count on being listened to by the Director-Gen-
eral for Political Affairs and his deputy as well as, crucially, by the Minis-
ter. The head and deputy-head of DAV, while formally ranked below the
Director-General for Political Affairs and his deputy, during times of cri-
sis were heavily relied upon for advice concerning political-strategic and
military-strategic matters.
DAV remained aloof from the Yugoslav crisis until after war had already
broken out. While the DAV officials naturally received copies of the rele-
vant messages regarding Yugoslavia, there had been no serious discus-
sions between the officials of DAV and the Eastern Europe Division
regarding Yugoslavia. Hazewinkel and Berends mentioned ‘compartmen-
talisation’ of the Ministry as one of the causes. Rather than face the great
changes of 1989-1991 together, officials spent much time and energy on
‘co-ordination’ and ‘conflicts’. The bureaucratic leadership of the Ministry
was said to have promoted bureaucratic conflict by openly stimulating
‘competition between the directorates’, rather than e.g. creating a single
‘task force’ to develop a coherent approach to the new situation in Central
and Eastern Europe.14
According to Herman Schaper, Deputy-Head of DAV in 1990-1991, crit-
ics are right to point out that DAV was not involved enough in developing
a policy for the Yugoslav crisis. However, Schaper believes that this pas-
sivity on the part of DAV was not caused by arrogance or bureaucratic
conflict but by institutional constraints, political priorities and the
absence of credible policy options. As Schaper puts it, from the perspec-
tive of the USA and, by extension, the Netherlands, developments in the
Soviet Union were ‘much more important’ than developments in the
Balkans. ‘Yugoslavia was a sideshow’, both for him and his colleagues as
well as for Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek.15 While ‘the Eastern
Europe Division’s analyses were fine’, the question remained ‘what to do
about it. It was clear that the existing approach was not working, but was
one supposed to promote fragmentation? The answer was “no” because
Yugoslavia was not to set a precedent for the Soviet Union.’16
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Apart from the fact that Yugoslavia was regarded as a sideshow to the pos-
sible disintegration of the Soviet Union and was not to function as a
precedent, institutional constraints also played a role. According to
Schaper, the ‘warnings emanating from Belgrade’ did at one point trigger
the question of ‘whether we should have a look at Yugoslavia’. But,
Schaper explained, ‘Yugoslavia lay outside the NATO area and therefore
was not our subject’. Moreover, Schaper and his staff were ‘very busy with
Maastricht and the CSCE. We were working sixty to seventy hours per
week. That is why, for me, the most important lesson of this period is:
“The immediate drives out the important.”’17 Schaper acknowledged
there had also been a denial of the problem: ‘Following Tito’s death we
had heard many times that Yugoslavia would fall apart. The military were
training for the possible start of a Third World War in Yugoslavia. We
were hoping so hard that nothing would happen that we did not want to
think about it too hard.’18
The Director-General for Political Affairs (equal to the ‘Political Director’
in most countries’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs), Peter van Walsum,
began to critically review existing EC policy with regard to the Yugoslav
crisis in February 1991. While late in the day, this was some three months
before Van den Broek and the other EC Foreign Ministers began to regard
the Yugoslav crisis as a serious issue. According to Van Walsum, if the
regional experts believed their warnings about Yugoslavia went unnoticed
between July 1990 and June 1991, they were wrong: ‘Because since Tito’s
death everyone had really been waiting for the disintegration of Yugo-
slavia, the admonitions by the Eastern Europe Division were not exactly
hot news.’19
Like Schaper, Van Walsum believes that, rather than disinterest or distrac-
tion, a combination of political priorities and institutional constraints
made it hard for Dutch officials to formulate a credible response to the
Yugoslav crisis. The main political priority after the end of the Cold War
was, it seemed, to prevent fragmentation and preserve as much as possi-
ble the territorial status quo in Central and Eastern Europe. In Van Wal-
sum’s words, ‘that one had to try to keep the country [Yugoslavia] togeth-
er for as long as possible was a kind of dogma for the [EC foreign]
Ministers’.20 At the institutional level, Van Walsum argues, Dutch policy
was formulated within a framework where more powerful countries, the
USA in particular, assumed that it was both desirable and possible to keep
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Yugoslavia together as a country. On that basis, the US and other Western
countries gave priority to territorial integrity over the right to self-deter-
mination. As for the EC, Van Walsum argues that Dutch foreign policy
was constrained by the fact that the EC member states, including the
Netherlands, were not so much driven by a shared desire for effective pol-
icy as by a shared desire for consensus.21
In fact, Peter van Walsum, who had been appointed Director-General for
Political Affairs in 1989, was more receptive than most to the warnings
emanating from the Eastern Europe Division. Having served in Bucharest
from 1967 until 1970, Van Walsum had travelled through all of South-
Eastern Europe. He strongly believed that provisions for minority rights
alone could not solve the nationality question of Yugoslavia. For that rea-
son, as the Yugoslav crisis deepened, Van Walsum ‘did not feel at all com-
fortable with our [the EC’s and the Dutch] unconditional support for the
unity of Yugoslavia.’22
Despite Van Walsum’s scepticism about the realism of continued West-
ern support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, it took until February
1991 for him to become seriously engaged over the issue. Thus, the East-
ern Europe Division’s note of November 1990, which sketched the
dilemma that democracy and human rights might not go together well
with territorial integrity, had not inspired Van Walsum to make an inter-
vention in the ensuing meeting of the Committee of Political Directors.
Instead, the political directors had ‘solved’ the dilemma by concluding
that the EC should continue to support the Yugoslav federal authorities
led by Prime Minister Ante Markovic. Several months later, however, he
made this very point in meetings with EC and US officials. Something
had obviously happened to focus his mind more closely on the Yugoslav
problem.
What really sparked Van Walsum’s interest was a visit to The Hague by
Slovene Prime Minister Lojze Peterle and Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel
on February 12 and 13, 1991. While the invitation to Peterle and Rupel
had come from a Dutch employers union, meetings had also been sched-
uled with Foreign Minister Van den Broek and Prime Minister Ruud Lub-
bers. However, a few days before the arrival of the Slovene politicians,
their meeting with Van den Broek was cancelled and replaced by a meet-
ing with Van Walsum. The reason for the cancellation was that Van den
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Broek decided that the meeting clashed with the agreed EC strategy of
formally distinguishing between Yugoslavia’s federal and republican lead-
erships, as part of the overall EC policy of support for the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the Yugoslav federation. Van den Broek’s Bel-
gian colleague, Mark Eyskens, also cancelled his meeting with Peterle. For
his part, Prime Minister Lubbers decided to receive Peterle nonetheless,
having changed the format of the meeting from one between heads of
government into one between members of the Christian-Democrat
European People’s Party.
Van Walsum was taken aback by what he viewed as the ruthless determi-
nation with which the Slovenes seemed to be striving for independence.23
According to Hazewinkel, the ‘outright irresponsibility and indifference
of the Slovenes regarding the rest of Yugoslavia’ struck the Dutch officials
who attended the meeting.24 According to Dutch minutes of the meeting
Peterle said that the Yugoslav conflict should be ‘internationalised’ and
that Slovenia and other republics ‘should be recognised by the EC when
they became independent’. He said that he ‘regretted’ that the internation-
al community, which had ‘initially cheered for democracy, was now reluc-
tant’. He did not believe it likely that violence would occur in Slovenia. He
believed there could be fighting between Serbs and Croats in Croatia, but
‘this did not seem to worry him’. Peterle argued that those republics that
were in the process of democratic reforms ought already to be given a
clear prospect of membership of organisations like EFTA or the Council
of Europe. The overall impression left on the Dutch was that ‘Slovenia
would in any event want to declare its independence, regardless of the
consequences this could have for other individual republics, even if it
would be accompanied by violence.’
The Peterle visit marked a turn in Van Walsum’s thinking. While he had
been careful to stay well within official policy during the meeting, the
confrontation with Slovene nationalism convinced him that the EC poli-
cy of support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity would neither stop
Slovenia from declaring independence, nor prevent the rest of Yugoslavia
from falling apart.25 During the meeting itself, Van Walsum had pointed
out to Peterle that it would be difficult for the EC member states ‘to
differentiate within states’, meaning that it would not be easy to offer
individual Yugoslav republics the prospect of membership of interna-
tional bodies as long as the Yugoslav federation was an internationally
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recognised sovereign state. It later turned out turned out that Van Wal-
sum’s careful wording had convinced the Slovenes that the Netherlands
was much less supportive of their cause than Belgium and Germany. For,
upon Peterle’s return to Ljubljana, the honorary consul in Ljubljana,
Matija Skof, informed the Dutch embassy in Belgrade, that the meetings
in the Netherlands had been disappointing. The Slovene interpretation
was correct to the extent that the Dutch government remained firmly
within the EC/NATO consensus on support for Yugoslavia’s territorial
integrity. Van Walsum, however, was increasingly doubtful that this con-
sensus was built on the right assumptions. He began to air divergent per-
sonal views in meetings with EC and US officials.26
The first occasion for Van Walsum to express his doubts was a visit to The
Hague by a senior US official. The USA at this point in time had launched
a veritable campaign for greater action on the part of the Europeans to do
more to prevent a crisis in Yugoslavia and preserve the country’s territor-
ial integrity. Thus, on February 27,1991 US Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Canadian affairs, James Dobbins, vis-
ited The Hague as part of a tour around several EC member states. Wash-
ington, Dobbins explained, would like to see the EC member states take
on a more active role. The existing policy of support for Yugoslavia’s terri-
torial integrity, Dobbins added, needed to be maintained as it was certain
that the alternative, disintegration, would trigger a civil war. Van Walsum,
however, referred to the recent visit by Peterle and said that in the EC the
fear was growing that stressing the integrity of Yugoslavia was a ‘lost
cause’. He added that there was some hesitation in the EC to take up too
strong a position, because one did not want to ‘identify oneself before-
hand with all the means that Belgrade might resort to in order to main-
tain the country’s unity. After all, it was mostly precisely those with the
worst human rights record who championed the unity of the federation
most strongly.’
Three weeks after the meeting in February, there was another opportuni-
ty for Van Walsum to share his views directly with the US administration.
An EPC Troika, consisting of Van Walsum and his Italian and Luxem-
bourg counterparts, visited Washington on March 21 and again met with
Dobbins. Dobbins repeated the criticism that the EC had not sufficiently
exploited its capacity to influence Yugoslavia. The Italian Political Direc-
tor conceded that the Europeans had been ‘slow’ in their reaction. But
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Van Walsum disagreed and said that ‘it was not so much European slug-
gishness which was an obstacle but the dilemma that in Yugoslavia the
proponents of unity as a rule were not the greatest proponents of democ-
ratic and economic reforms.’
Clearly the dilemma sketched in the Eastern Europe Division’s note of
November 1990, namely that democracy and territorial integrity could
perhaps not be supported at the same time, were now part of Van Wal-
sum’s own reasoning. However, according to Van Walsum, his interven-
tions were ‘fruitless’.27 Political reality dictated that the Netherlands
should remain within the EC/US consensus and this consensus centred
on a policy of support for the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav federa-
tion.
According to Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, ‘before May 1991,
Yugoslavia was not a topic for discussion among the EC Ministers of For-
eign Affairs.28 While mentioned in ministerial declarations, the Ministers
themselves did not actually discuss Yugoslavia until its constitutional cri-
sis placed the country on the diplomatic agenda in May 1991. Given this
general lack of interest, there were few incentives for Van den Broek to
take the warnings emanating from within his Ministry too seriously.
When Yugoslavia was mentioned in ministerial meetings, Van den Broek
adopted a low profile, despite the warnings emanating from within the
Ministry. Van den Broek felt he could not speak freely on the issue of
Yugoslavia’s potential disintegration. The reason was that Yugoslavia was
always discussed in the context of the potential disintegration of the So-
viet Union and the desire of the Baltic States to become independent.
With regard to the Baltic States, Van den Broek was hampered by what he
regarded as an embarrassing historical legacy on the part of the Nether-
lands.29 In 1942, when the exiled Dutch government had entered into
official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, it had implicitly
recognised the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States by not making a
reservation regarding this issue. Most Western states had not recognised
the Soviet annexation. Given the Netherlands’ formal recognition of the
Soviet Union’s annexation of the Baltic States, Van den Broek felt the
Dutch government could not openly support the Baltic states in their
quest for independence.
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Another reason for Van den Broek not to bring up his officials’ concerns
about Yugoslavia’s potential disintegration in ministerial meetings was
his basic agreement with the general Western approach to the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet empire, which was to preserve the status quo as much as
possible. To preserve the status quo meant giving primacy to the principle
of territorial integrity over the principle of the right to self-determina-
tion. Van den Broek later reflected: ‘My thinking, with the majority of EC
member states was fed by the idea “fragmentation, my god, what is that
going to be?” [US Secretary of State] Jim Baker was also of that opinion.
The aim was to prevent a fragmentation of Yugoslavia because of the
unforeseeable consequences of a splintering of Europe, of which this
could prove to be the beginning. “Imagine”, we said, “that the whole of
Europe would partition itself along ethnic lines”, that was a nightmare-
scenario.’30
A third and final reason explaining Van den Broek’s apparent indifference
regarding the Yugoslav crisis in 1990 and early 1991 was his focus on
other policy questions. For Van den Broek the questions of European
integration and NATO cohesion were far more important than develop-
ments in Yugoslavia.31 This also meant that Van den Broek was less inter-
ested in the quality of a Dutch response to the Yugoslav crisis than in the
perceived need to be in the mainstream of collective European and
transatlantic approaches. Indeed, so well known was Van den Broek’s loy-
alty to NATO that the following joke was sometimes heard in European
diplomatic circles: ‘The USA does not need its embassies in Europe, given
that it already has the Netherlands to champion its interests.’ US Secretary
of State James Baker recognised as important the role Van den Broek
played in Europe as a defender of common Atlantic interests and as a
bridge-builder between Europe and the USA. Having toured all of Europe
in early 1989 to discuss the modernisation and reduction of short-range
nuclear arms, Baker concluded: ‘Yet of all my stops… it was my meeting
in the Netherlands with Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek that may
have been the most important of all… He passed me a paper with some
ideas. Conceptually, he was right, and it was the first time, but far from
the last, that I would see this astute statesman suggest a solution to diplo-
matic deadlock.’32
Not surprisingly therefore, Van den Broek’s first explicit intervention in
EPC in the context of the Yugoslav crisis dealt with procedure, not the
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actual crisis. On June 17, 1991, he opposed a proposal by the Luxembourg
Presidency to organise an ad hoc gathering in the margins of the upcom-
ing CSCE ministerial Council meeting to be held in Berlin on June 19 and
20. The gathering was intended to bring the non-EC member states Aus-
tria and Hungary in line with EC and US policy. The two countries had
adopted positions in support of the independence-seeking Yugoslav
republics of Slovenia and Croatia, which clashed with the EC and US
emphasis on Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.33 The Luxembourg Presi-
dency proposed to hold a meeting between the EC Presidency, the Euro-
pean Commission, Italy, Greece, the USA, Hungary and Austria. How-
ever, Van den Broek, supported by his French and Spanish colleagues,
declared that he opposed the Luxembourg idea, not because of the
intended pressure on Austria and Hungary but because of the proposed
format of the meeting, which would include two member states, Italy and
Greece, on purely geographical grounds. Instead, he proposed a meeting
of only the EC Presidency, the USA and Austria and Hungary. Van den
Broek had his way: it was decided that only the EC Presidency and the
European Commission would join the US in the meeting with Austria
and Hungary.
The policy of supporting Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity was kept up ad
absurdum. Hence, when the declarations of independence by Slovenia
and Croatia were issued, the Netherlands had difficulty in devising a
diplomatic response that would neither insult the Slovenes, nor upset the
Yugoslav federal authorities. When Rupel invited the EC Ambassadors to
attend the formal celebrations of Slovenia’s independence on June 26, it
was decided that Ambassador Fietelaars could not take part. Fietelaars
wrote a draft reply, which read: ‘Professional considerations will make my
presence at the ceremony impossible.’ On June 24 The Hague approved
this draft. In response to further questions from the Embassy in Belgrade,
the Ministry responded that there was a possibility that the Netherlands
would not recognise Slovenia and Croatia. The Embassy officials could
normally visit the areas but would have to avoid creating the impression
of implicit recognition. There should for the time being be no official
contacts at ambassadorial level but one had to be careful not to insult the
Slovenes and Croats unnecessarily. The honorary consuls in Zagreb and
Ljubljana would continue to report to the Embassy in Belgrade.
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External Constraints
The refusal by Van den Broek to heed his officials’ calls for a more creative
approach at an early stage to the growing crisis must be understood with-
in the framework of the CSCE, EPC and NATO regimes in which the
Netherlands operated. The CSCE, EPC and NATO each exercised semi-
autonomous external constraints that were so strong that the Nether-
lands would under any circumstances have found it difficult to formulate
a different policy from other Western states. The following section traces
the external constraints that were exercised by these three mentioned
organisations on the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The CSCE 
The principles of the right to self-determination and territorial integrity
appear in the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE) of 1975. Initially a consultation process for
Western Europe, Central- and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, the USA
and Canada, it became a permanent organisation in 1995. In the three
years of negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviets in
particular had demanded the inclusion of explicit references to territorial
integrity and the inviolability of borders, while Western countries, with a
clear interest in promoting democracy, had advocated human rights and
stressed the importance of the right to self-determination.34
The Helsinki Final Act, which is supposed to be binding in a political but
not in a juridical sense, refers to the right to self-determination in its
eighth principle. The Final Document of 1989, agreed at the follow-up
conference of Vienna, repeated it in paragraph 4. In one important aspect
the references to the right to self-determination in the CSCE Act diverge
from what had earlier been agreed in the framework of the United
Nations, which was the possibility of a peaceful change of borders. This
possibility had been included in the CSCE Act’s first principle at the insis-
tence of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Ger-
many) with a view to keeping open the option of a reunification of the
Western and Eastern parts of Germany.35 Despite the references to the
right to self-determination and the possibility of peaceful border changes,
the CSCE Final Act also emphasised the principles of the ‘inviolability of
borders’ (the third principle) and ‘territorial integrity of the states’
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(fourth principle). In addition, given the potential conflict between the
principles, the Final Act’s eighth principle qualified the freedom to exer-
cise the right to self-determination by stressing that this should take place
‘in conformity with… the relevant norms of international law, including
those relating to territorial integrity of States.36
The impact of the CSCE on Western foreign policy establishments was
that of a double-edged sword. As a political institution, the CSCE was too
weak to intervene effectively in the Yugoslav crisis, while as a norm-giver
it did much to set the parameters of European and American policy. As
an institution, the CSCE possessed no credible political or military capac-
ity for the implementation of agreed policies when the Yugoslav crisis
blew up. Nor did the CSCE offer procedures or mechanisms for the settle-
ment of disputes within, rather than between, its member states. The
Charter of Paris for a new Europe, signed on November 21, 1990, was
intended to give the CSCE greater institutional clout and created the
CSCE secretariat, the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO), an office of
free elections, and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). All three were
activated between January and March 1991. Nevertheless, when the
Yugoslav crisis descended into war in June 1991, the CSCE was still large-
ly ‘a set of voluntary agreements by states to abide by the norms of co-
operation, consultation, and human rights that they had established.’37
Moreover, the USA and the Soviet Union had in November 1990 vetoed
CSCE involvement, a decision the US only reversed at the summit of July
1991, when war had already broken out.38
While weak as an institution, the CSCE’s norms and principles func-
tioned as important parameters for the Western response to the Yugoslav
crisis. The efforts by the Netherlands, as well as other countries and
organisations, to formulate a credible foreign policy to address the
Yugoslav crisis, were greatly hampered by the shared wish to adhere to the
conflicting CSCE principles regarding territorial integrity and the invio-
lability of borders on the one hand and the right to self-determination on
the other. These ‘diametrically opposed concepts… to an important
degree paralysed policy analysis and hampered the ability of the policy
makers to adapt to reality.’39 Van den Broek acknowledged this, saying
that ‘the tension between these two basic principles was the continuing
dilemma that we [the Foreign Ministers] had to cope with’.40
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Europe
‘Obsessed with proving themselves, on the one hand, and preparing the
difficult arrangements for their union, on the other, and with only half an
eye on the problem itself, the EC was nonetheless in the vanguard of
international efforts to deal with the dissolution of Yugoslavia.’41 Until
May 1991, Yugoslavia was for most member states a problem of secon-
dary importance in comparison with the building of a union. In the light
of efforts to build that union, with its common foreign and security poli-
cy component, EC consensus became an important interest in itself.
Perhaps one of the first occasions in which a European politician invoked
the concepts of unity and territorial integrity in the context of the
Yugoslav crisis, was a visit by Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos
to Yugoslavia on August 27 and 28, 1990. The Luxembourg Foreign Min-
ister was accompanied by the Chargé d’Affaires of the Netherlands Em-
bassy, Dirk Hasselman (see above). During talks with Yugoslavia’s rotat-
ing federal Presidency (not the government), Poos strongly criticised
Serbian oppression in Kosovo, but also stated that the EC wanted
Yugoslavia as a ‘strong federal state and had no interest whatsoever in a
break-up of the country.’
In October 1990, Yugoslavia was mentioned in two declarations by the
EC Foreign Ministers. At the General Affairs Council in Luxembourg on
October 22 the Ministers instructed the committee of political directors
to ‘make recommendations with regard to the appropriate means to
encourage the maintenance of its unity in a framework of democracy.’ Six
days later, the EC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Rome, expressed their
‘wish that the present process of democratic evolution in Yugoslavia will
succeed in the framework of a development of respect for human rights
and the preservation of the unity and the territorial integrity of that
country.’42
While an important decision, in Rome there had been no discussion of
the question of why territorial integrity should become a cornerstone of
the EC’s approach to Yugoslavia. The meeting in Rome had focused
entirely on the process of European integration and the preparations for
the upcoming Intergovernmental Conference on European Union, to be
held the next year in Maastricht, in the Netherlands. According to Van

opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:13  Pagina 89
Walsum, the Italian-drafted statement stressing the importance of
Yugoslavia’s unity and territorial integrity ‘was not discussed at all by the
Ministers; it lay there suddenly and then they all simply concurred.’43
The committee of political directors met on November 14 and 15, 1990 to
draw up a response to the ministerial request for advice on how the terri-
torial integrity of Yugoslavia could best be supported. The German Politi-
cal Director had difficulty with the draft under discussion, which
emphasised the principle of territorial integrity. His argument, the one
that so impressed the Dutch Eastern Europe Division, was that if the
choice between stability and the unity of Yugoslavia, on the one hand,
and democracy and human rights, on the other, became inevitable, prior-
ity would have to be given to the latter. The German argument, later used
by Van Walsum in his discussions with US officials, was brushed aside
and the political committee concluded that the political imperative, for-
mulated by the Foreign Ministers, of supporting Yugoslavia’s territorial
integrity must have priority.
This was a first indication that unease existed within the European Com-
munity about the policy to which the Ministers had signed up in October
1990. Another series of internal discussions in January and February 1991
revealed that the potential for division was real. The first of these meet-
ings took place on January 29 in Belgrade. There, the EC Ambassadors
had difficulty agreeing a draft declaration, to be adopted the following
week by the political directors and the Foreign Ministers. Whereas the
Greek and French Ambassadors took up positions favouring the con-
tinued EC support for Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity, the Ambassadors
eventually decided to go so far as to omit any reference to the EC’s earlier
stated interest in Yugoslavia’s continued unity and territorial integrity.
However, when the political directors met on February 4, 1991, the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity was reintroduced, following a reminder by a
representative of the European Commission that the ministerial declara-
tion of December 18, 1990 had contained a reference to unity and territo-
rial integrity.
On March 4, the political directors, who had gathered to discuss US ini-
tiatives, again papered over the unease about existing policy by agreeing
to stick with it nonetheless. Several political directors said that in their
separate discussions with Dobbins in EC capitals they had pointed out to
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him that public opinion in their country would not allow a Slovenia that
had declared independence to ‘remain completely in the cold’. Neverthe-
less, the political directors agreed that support for territorial integrity
should remain EC policy on the basis of the following argument:
in those cases where the pros and cons of maintaining the ter-
ritorial integrity of a state threatened with disintegration were
approximately balanced, respect for territorial integrity should
come first. There was agreement that a very dangerous situa-
tion would arise in central and Eastern Europe if politicians,
confronted with ethnic problems, would begin to see the crea-
tion of a new state as an easy way out.
The EC Foreign Ministers, who also met on March 4, briefly discussed
Yugoslavia during lunch, repeated their call for a dialogue between Bel-
grade and the republics. Five days later, however, Serbian security forces
backed up by tanks crushed student demonstrations in Belgrade.44 The
event prompted Germany to circulate a tough draft-declaration, which
spoke of the need for a ‘creation of a new Yugoslavia’. Other member
states argued that Germany was racing ahead of developments and it
proved impossible to reach agreement.
The political directors decided to suspend the issuing of a declaration
pending further developments in Yugoslavia. The Eastern Europe work-
ing group was asked to advise on the matter whereby it was to pay specif-
ic attention to the problems involved in the attempts to ‘issue a balanced
declaration which would do right to the tension that existed between the
principles of unity of the central state on the one hand and the right to
self-determination on the other.’ Given the struggle for independence of
individual Yugoslav republics as well as former Soviet republics, notably
the Baltic States and Ukraine, the working group was asked to advise on
the question of to what extent the unity of Central European states
should be supported under all circumstances.
The apparent mood shift seemed to provide an opening for Van Walsum
and the Eastern Europe Division to articulate their concerns about the
continued support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. In a discus-
sion paper distributed before the meeting, the Netherlands argued: ‘there
seems to be a tendency among the Twelve to prefer the preservation of the
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unity of states (e.g. Yugoslavia) to disintegration as a result of secession.’
Noting that the fourth principle of the Helsinki Final Act forbade coun-
tries to take any action to undermine each other’s territorial integrity but
did not oblige them to support each other in preserving their territorial
integrity, the Dutch posed the question of whether ‘contacts’ with, or even
‘recognition’ of a secessionist republic should be seen as such an ‘action’.
When the Eastern Europe working group met, on March 19 and 20, it
seemed initially that there was considerable support for the Dutch (and
German and, probably, Danish) line of thought. The working group con-
cluded that for the Soviet Union as well as for Yugoslavia, a ‘double track
policy’ was needed whereby the EC would maintain contacts, both with
the central authorities and, independently, with the republics. However,
this conclusion was thought to contradict the established policy of main-
taining a formal distinction between the central authorities and the inde-
pendent Yugoslav republics. As a result, the working group’s meeting
ended in confusion. The report of the meeting, drafted and circulated by
the EPC secretariat, qualified the conclusions: the contacts should pri-
marily serve to convince the Yugoslavs to stay together.
In May, developments in Yugoslavia finally turned the crisis into an acute
political problem for the European Community’s Foreign Ministers. In a
clash in the Serb-held village of Borovo Selo in Croatia, Serb militiamen
killed twelve Croatian policemen, while three Serbs also lost their lives.45
Further complicating the situation was the announcement on 15 May by
Serbia that it would block the rotation of the Yugoslav federal Presidency
to the Croat Stipe Mesic.
As had been the case with the violent suppression of the student demon-
stration in Belgrade, Germany wanted the EC to issue an unequivocal and
strong response to the Borovo Selo incident. A German draft declaration
no longer mentioned the words ‘unity’ and ‘territorial integrity’ and con-
cluded that the fundamentals of a durable solution were democracy, right
to self-determination, respect for human rights and the rights of minori-
ties as well as the rule of law. The subsequent discussions revealed that the
majority of EC member states still believed that Yugoslavia’s territorial
integrity should remain the key principle of EC policy. In the final decla-
ration, again, German thinking was left out and the ‘unity’ of Yugoslavia
again advocated.
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The shared wish to stick to a consensus that had been reached in late 1990
continued to paralyse the European Community until the Slovenian and
Croatian declarations of independence of June 25, 1991 forced the Euro-
peans to face up to a new reality. The first occasion on which to reassess
the European Community’s policy of support for the territorial integrity
of Yugoslavia came with the European Council of June 28 and 29 in Lux-
embourg. The declarations of independence now constituted a fact and
armed conflict between Slovenian police and the Yugoslav Army had
erupted the day before. A worst-case scenario that took into account such
developments had not been worked out. The Eastern Europe working
group and the CoPo had decided that a wrong signal would go out to
Slovenia and Croatia if the EC worked out potential responses to a crisis
situation triggered by their coming declarations of independence. Instead,
it had been decided to adopt a ‘wait and see’ attitude. Existing policy
would have to be continued right up until the moment of actual secession
and there would be no recognition before all possible consequences for
peace and security had been evaluated. There were to be no deals with
Slovenia that could not be reproduced with other republics, so as to keep
alive the possibility of a confederation. No wonder that the European
Council ‘had difficulty with the new situation’, as Prime Minister Ruud
Lubbers put it. According to Lubbers the main question faced by the Euro-
pean Council was: ‘How was one to handle the right to self-determination
within Yugoslavia?’.46 This was the question the EC Foreign Ministers had
found impossible to address seriously without splitting the European
Community. Not surprisingly the European Council did not, within the
space of two days, manage to find satisfying answers either. Van den Broek
remembers a ‘vehement debate about CSCE principles’ between French
President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.
‘Mitterrand emphasised the importance of territorial integrity and Kohl
that of the right to self-determination.’47 Indeed, in his remarks to the
press, Mitterrand said that the EC ‘must not be accused of trivialising the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia’, while Kohl declared ‘that the priorities
now were human rights, the rights of minorities and the right to self-
determination’ [of individual Yugoslav republics].48 As some sort of con-
clusion, according to Lubbers, the European Council agreed that to ‘keep
Yugoslavia together as a country seemed neither a realistic nor a desirable
option. Nor was an uncontrolled departure by the constituent republics.
The process instead had to be managed and behind that aim the European
Community would rally in unison and with all strength.’49
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The European Council decided to dispatch the ministerial Troika to Yugo-
slavia with the aim of negotiating a cease-fire. The Troika presented three
demands: a resolution of the constitutional crisis; a suspension of three
months of the implementation of the declarations of independence; and
the return of the Yugoslav army to its barracks.50 On June 28 Foreign
Ministers Poos, Van den Broek and Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de
Michelis boarded a plane, accompanied by dozens of journalists. In a
series of tumultuous meetings in Belgrade and Zagreb, the Troika Minis-
ters posed their demands. Believing that the various Yugoslav parties had
accepted all three, the Troika flew back to Luxembourg in the middle of
the night so as to be able to report to the European Council on the morn-
ing of June 29. On his way to the meeting, Van den Broek told the assem-
bled journalists: ‘I believe there are signs of hope, but these days will have
to show whether the promises are being lived up to.’51 They were not:
twenty-four hours later, the same three Ministers were on their way back
to Belgrade to put the same demands to the same parties. De Michelis,
whose place in the Troika was about to be taken up by his Portuguese col-
league, had insisted that he should take part in the Troika one more time.
The United States
Initially, the USA was more active in trying to formulate a response to the
Yugoslav crisis than the EC. US analysis showed that a break-up of Yugo-
slavia would be accompanied by violence (see above). Given that the US
saw a disturbing analogy between events in Yugoslavia and developments
in the Soviet Union, the USA initially strongly urged the Europeans to join
it in finding a way to prevent a violent break-up of Yugoslavia. However,
like the European Community, the US too became caught between the
principles of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination.
In February 1991, the Europeans were asked to ‘develop new ideas, which
could contribute to preventing disastrous developments in Yugoslavia.’ In
a conversation on 14 February between Dutch officials and US Deputy
Assistant Secretary Curtis Kamman in Washington, the latter confirmed
that the US wanted to prevent Yugoslavia from falling apart because this
would lead to chaos, civil war and problems for all neighbouring coun-
tries. In Washington’s view the best solution would be a ‘flexible confed-
eration or a so-called asymmetrical federation.’ Dobbins repeated the same
message during his European tour at the end of the month (see above).
   ,   -  
opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:13  Pagina 94
US policy, like that of the EC, was little more than wishful thinking along
the following lines: because we support the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia, we oppose moves towards secession even if we have no clear
idea on how we can stop it, nor on how the right to self-determination
can be given meaning within a Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. Nevertheless,
because this approach was US policy, it was the one to stick to for most of
the EC member states and NATO partners as well. Thus, when in March
1991 President George Bush sent a letter to Yugoslav Prime Minister Mar-
kovic to emphasise once more the importance of Yugoslavia’s territorial
integrity, US officials pointed out that it would be good for a forthcoming
EC ministerial declaration to match the content of Bush’s letter, which
had stated that the US would would neither encourage, nor reward those
who would break the country apart. The declaration eventually adopted
by the EC Foreign Ministers on March 26 was handed to the Yugoslav
federal authorities ‘in close concert with the USA’ by the Troika of EC
Ambassadors. The declaration concluded that ‘a united and democratic
Yugoslavia stands the best chance to integrate itself harmoniously in the
new Europe.’
US policy was kept up until well after the declarations of independence
by Slovenia and Croatia (see chapter three). A telling moment constituted
a visit by Secretary of State Baker to Belgrade on the eve of the Slovenian
and Croatian declarations of independence. Following the CSCE summit
in Berlin on June 19 and 20, where Baker had according to the Croatian
member of the Yugoslav Presidency ‘brushed aside’ Croatian efforts ‘to
obtain support for the peaceful disassociation of the country’, Baker went
to Belgrade and spoke to eleven Yugoslav leaders in one day. 52 As he later
indicated, he came out of the talks more concerned than upon his arrival.
He had tried to convince the Slovenes not to declare independence uni-
laterally and had warned them that neither the US nor any other country
would recognise a unilateral secession. At the same time, indicating the
dilemma, Baker had warned the Serbs not to use force to impose their
will on the Slovenes and Croats. If Serbia were to force the US ‘to choose
between unity and democracy’, the US would ‘always choose democra-
cy.’53 Despite Baker’s stern words, there were, as Fietelaars reported, ‘very
few indications that the Yugoslav leaders were prepared for sensible nego-
tiation and compromise.’
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Thus ended the fruitless attempts by the international community to pre-
vent the disintegration of Yugoslavia. In the following days, the crisis
descended into war. On July 1 the Netherlands took on the EC Presidency
whereby its role changed considerably. Apart from the position of the
Netherlands, the international external environment itself also changed
in two important respects. While the EC member states began to lose
their appetite for consensus per se, the USA disengaged from the issue
altogether.
Conclusion
This chapter has traced the failure of the Dutch Foreign Ministry to for-
mulate a credible foreign policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis between
July 1990 and June 1991. It has been argued that the absence of a credible
policy was not due to an intelligence failure. Yugoslavia’s troubles did not
go unnoticed. Between July 1990 and May 1991, the Embassy in Belgrade
and the Eastern Europe Division in The Hague issued regular warnings
that Yugoslavia might, even would, disintegrate. In addition, the Eastern
Europe Division, later supported by the Director-General for Political
Affairs, offered a starting point for policy, namely to give primacy to the
principle of the right to self-determination over the principle of territori-
al integrity. Whether or not one agreed with this choice, it was important
that it had been outlined.
However, the response to the warnings was inadequate, due primarily to a
set of political priorities on the part of the Dutch government, in turn
largely the result of institutional constraints imposed on the Dutch for-
eign policy machinery by international regimes. The episode had high-
lighted that for a smaller state like the Netherlands membership of and
loyalty to regimes does not only bring the benefit of a relatively great
influence within and through such a regime but can also limit consider-
ably the individual state’s manouvering freedom. This is all the more true
in a country where the foreign policy élite had not deemed it necessary
for decades to think critically about specifically Dutch interests and pref-
erences. With regard to the Yugoslav crisis, it seemed unnecessary, even
risky, for a medium-sized NATO ally, EC partner and champion of inter-
national law to promote an approach that could not a priori count on the
support of the leading elements in these regimes, in spite of the belief
held by several important individual participants to the Dutch foreign
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policy process that a managed disintegration of the Yugoslav federation
would be a more effective approach than the continued focus on the
country’s territorial integrity.
Conflicting CSCE principles posed EC Foreign Ministers with a dilemma,
which they ‘solved’ in their declarations in late 1990 by turning the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity into the cornerstone of EC policy. As the
Yugoslav crisis deepened, these public statements, in combination with
the widely shared desire for the EC to project unity, ensured that the prin-
ciple of territorial integrity remained at the centre of EC policy until June
1991. Former Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek admits that it
was not until late June that the EC governments started ‘thinking about
how one could stop the violence in its tracks and how one could let the
fragmentation take place in as orderly a fashion as possible.’54
If even Germany, with its greater political clout and with stronger views
on the issue, was unable to steer EC policy in a different course, it is hard
to imagine how the Netherlands could have achieved this goal. This was
all the more the case in a situation where support for Yugoslavia’s territo-
rial integrity was not just a European consensus but a Euro-American
consensus as well. The USA had been the strongest of all advocates of
Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity. Given the long-established Dutch inter-
est in maintaining NATO’s cohesion and US leadership in European secu-
rity affairs, US policy by itself might have prevented the Netherlands
from going along – at the political level – with any change of course that
might have occurred within the EC.
The existence of these external constraints, however, does not excuse the
absence of an independent Dutch view on the Yugoslav crisis. The criti-
cism from the Dutch regional experts that their superiors were not inter-
ested in the Yugoslav crisis seems justified, given that no serious attempt
to formulate policy seems to have taken place. No internal policy debate
seems to have taken place within the Foreign Ministry following which
participants might still admittedly have been forced to accept that good
options were unavailable, nor did Van den Broek ever seem interested in
alternative policy options. It seems that until May 1991, when a constitu-
tional crisis occurred in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav crisis could not compete
with other foreign policy issues for the attention of the Minister. Symbol-
ising the feeling that the Yugoslav crisis came at a time when officials were
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already hard-pressed by other issues was a remark scribbled onto one of
Fietelaars’ florid reports from Belgrade, in March 1991: ‘This reporting is,
like previous reports, interesting but much too long (certainly when put
next to the other reports from Belgrade).’
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3 From ‘Even-Handedness’ to 
‘Selectiveness’, July - December 1991
The Yugoslav crisis was escalating into armed conflict. TV images of skir-
mishes in Slovenia in late June 1991 brought home to European and
American families the incredible message that war had returned to
Europe. In Slovenia hostilities ended quickly, due to the combination of
an effective defence on the part of the Slovenes and the absence of a Serb
minority question. Croatia was not so lucky. Fierce fighting erupted
there, which lasted until the end of the year. By the end of 1991, the com-
bined Serb/Yugoslav forces controlled large swaths of territory in the
Croatian border areas. The vicious siege of Vukovar, which fell to Serb
units in November 1991, and in particular the attacks by Montenegrin
units of the Yugoslav People’s Army on the tourist town of Dubrovnik,
aroused Western public opinion. Innocent people had been murdered in
cold blood on both sides, but the mass murder by Serb forces of Croat
patients from the hospital in Vukovar counted as a horrendous crime
against humanity.
As holder of the EC Presidency, the Netherlands was in a position of
responsibility and influence at an important moment in European histo-
ry. This position of prominence in the EC might have meant little, had it
not been for the fact that the EC itself continued to be in the driver’s seat
of international Yugoslavia-diplomacy, given the absence of the United
States from the scene. The responsibilities associated with the EC Presi-
dency forced Dutch policy makers to operate with more maturity than
they had done before and would do later. Moreover, as the stakes began to
rise, the Yugoslav crisis became a priority issue for Foreign Minister Hans
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van den Broek, who according to one of his Cabinet colleagues kept the
Yugoslavia-issue ‘rather close to his chest’.1
Dutch policy during the second half of 1991 constituted a broad move-
ment from ‘even-handedness’ to ‘selectiveness’. The initial approach was
‘even-handed’ to all the Yugoslav parties. Increasingly, ‘even-handedness’
was seen as an ineffective way to contain the strongest and most aggres-
sive party to the conflict, Serbia. As a result, this approach gave way to
one that was ‘selective’ and directed primarily against Serbia and the
Yugoslav army. This is not to suggest that the development from even-
handedness to selectiveness was a smooth one. ‘Selective’ proposals were
made when the trend favoured ‘even-handedness’ and vice versa. The
selective approach carried a risk that the Netherlands would drift apart
from the gravity of opinion in the EC and NATO, which still centered
around ‘even-handedness’. However, Dutch Yugoslavia policy was kept
firmly in check, not only through the external constraints associated with
regime membership, but by three clearly defined Dutch institutional
interests.
The most important institutional interest for the Netherlands was the
cohesion of the EC, particularly at a time when the EC member states
were busily preparing a treaty for a European Political Union. According
to Herman Schaper: ‘We considered it a disaster if the camps in the EC
would fall apart. The primacy of our policy was to keep the Twelve in line
at all cost. Minister Van den Broek categorically did not want polarisation
between the Twelve to occur as a consequence of Yugoslavia’.2 A second
interest, closely related to the first, was the interest in a Presidency that
would be termed successful afterwards. While ‘success’ was initially
defined as a negotiated settlement, as the pressure increased and the criti-
cisms of EC policy became more marked, the precise nature of the out-
come mattered less and less, so long as it allowed the EC to portray some
measure of unity and it was reached under Dutch chairmanship. A third
important institutional interest was the continued leadership of NATO
and the United States in European security affairs.
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Even-Handedness: July - October 1991
Europe and the USA continued to support Yugoslavia’s territorial integri-
ty up to the moment of secession and beyond. Despite what now had
become public opposition by Germany, this policy persisted during the
first week in July 1991. Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek, in
particular, showed himself to be a strong advocate of maintaining exist-
ing policy. An explanation for Van den Broek’s attitude would be that,
first, the Dutch Foreign Ministry had not yet developed a real view of the
causes and consequences of the Yugoslav crisis. In the absence of credible
policy alternatives, it seemed safest to continue a policy that had, after all,
been agreed to by all EC member states. Secondly, the United States gov-
ernment remained adamant that nothing should be done to encourage
the secessionists and that the goal remained the preservation of some
kind of Yugoslav federation.
The first occasion, since the beginning of the Dutch Presidency, on which
Van den Broek reconfirmed the EC’s support for Yugoslavia’s unity, was a
renewed mediation attempt by the EC Troika of Foreign Ministers in Bel-
grade and Zagreb on June 30 and July 1. This was the second time in
twenty-four hours that the EC Troika tried to arrange the rotation of the
Yugoslav Presidency, as well as a suspension of the Slovenian and Croat-
ian declarations of independence and a return to the barracks by the
Yugoslav army. When the clock struck midnight in Belgrade, Luxem-
bourg Foreign Ministers Jacques Poos and Van den Broek stood up, toast-
ed with President Milosevic and turned towards the assembled Yugoslav
Presidency members. Van den Broek told them: ‘You see, this is how
democracy works. I will chair the meeting now because I have taken over
[the EC Presidency]. Similarly, you should elect Mesic’. In return he
promised: ‘ …and I will make a public statement saying that Europe sup-
ports the unity of Yugoslavia’.3 Later on July 1, the new Dutch EC Presi-
dency distributed a strongly worded telegram to all EC capitals, in which
the Netherlands stated that the Twelve should do all in their power to pre-
vent the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Van den Broek and Van Walsum flew to Washington on July 2 in an
attempt to involve the Bush administration more directly in the manage-
ment of the Yugoslav crisis. In Washington they met with National Secu-
rity Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker, who
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made it clear that the administration still believed in the importance of
keeping the Yugoslav federation together as a country. According to Van
Walsum, the visit was a ‘waste of time’. Van Walsum had become ever
more pessimistic regarding the possibility of keeping Yugoslavia together
and felt the Americans were refusing to face up to reality: ‘There was a
complete absence of vision and commitment. There was no willingness to
talk about any option other than the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia.’4
The effect of this visit on the Dutch Presidency was twofold. While it con-
firmed that the line followed so far was indeed the line supported by the
leading NATO ally, the United States, it also became clear that the United
States did not want to invest much in order to make its policy actually
work. This meant that at the beginning of the term of the Dutch Presi-
dency, its position and those of other member states who supported
existing policy weakened considerably in relation to those, in particular
Germany and Denmark, who favoured an early recognition of Croatia
and Slovenia. It would not be possible for traditional NATO allies like the
Netherlands to fall back on the US position as a legitimisation of their
own stance. Given the US aloofness, Van den Broek was forced to give less
consideration to American opinion and policy than he would normally
have wished to.5
Van den Broek and Van Walsum flew back to The Hague during the night
of July 3, just in time for the first of what proved to be a long series of EC
ministerial meetings devoted to the Yugoslav crisis. Throughout this min-
isterial meeting and the subsequent press interviews, it emerged that the
tension between the German position on the one hand, and the French,
British and Dutch positions on the other, had only grown and threatened
to become a major embarrassment for the EC as a whole. At the meeting,
Germany proposed to abandon the policy of supporting Yugoslavia’s
unity. Instead, argued Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the EC
member states should threaten Serbia ‘with immediate recognition of the
independence of Slovenia and Croatia if the JNA [Yugoslav People’s
Army] renews its intervention.’ According to a Dutch report, the German
proposal had been supported by Denmark and Italy (and to a lesser
extent Luxembourg and Belgium) but opposed by the remaining member
states. Sensing that a majority opposed the German proposal, the Dutch
EC Presidency had sided with that majority and successfully resisted the
explicit language requested by Germany. In remarks to the press Van den
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Broek made no secret of his opposition to the German proposal. Asked
about his opinion regarding recognition, Van den Broek answered: ‘I
don’t find that an effective approach. The reverse, I feel it could exacer-
bate the tension and the violence.’6
Negotiating a General Settlement
With the Dutch EC Presidency in a central role, the international attempt
to preserve the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia was finally
abandoned on the island of Brioni on July 7. Apart from German pres-
sure and American aloofness, it was Van den Broek’s own confrontation
with reality, which caused this shift in the stance of the EC Presidency.
Meier is, therefore, mistaken to argue that the negotiations conducted on
the island of Brioni under the chairmanship of Van den Broek were still
meant to ‘restore’ the old Yugoslavia.7 Rather, with regard to a major ele-
ment of the Brioni agreement, EC-chaired negotiations between the
Yugoslav parties, a Dutch report commented: ‘the idea that these negotia-
tions could lead to the total independence of Slovenia seems at present to
have been accepted by everyone.’
The declaration of Brioni was generally seen as a diplomatic success. On
Brioni, after thirteen hours of negotiations, a ‘domineering’ Van den
Broek, as Silber and Little put it, could announce a ‘joint declaration’, in
which the parties agreed to the three demands which the EC had formu-
lated at the end of June. There would be a three-month moratorium on
the implementation of the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of inde-
pendence, though the declarations themselves still stood. The Brioni
agreement also stipulated that ‘a new situation’ had arisen and that nego-
tiations for a peaceful solution to the conflict would start no later than
August 1 and ‘were to include all aspects of Yugoslavia’s future, without
preconditions.’8 An EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM) would be deployed
in order to oversee the cease-fire in Slovenia. Crucially, the Brioni decla-
ration gave the EC member states the opportunity to adapt to the new
situation and agree a new policy, even though the agreement was ‘fragile’
and the ‘prospects for constructive negotiations still extremely uncertain’.
The main weaknesses inherent in the Brioni declaration were, first an
underestimation of the potential for violent conflict in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, second, the mistaken assumption that the EC
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possessed the will and the capacity to follow up on the declaration by
agreeing a new approach and then pursuing it in unison. As Van den
Broek himself recalled, the Brioni declaration ‘gave us time… but I
remember that Tudjman approached me and said: “Mr. Van den Broek,
congratulations, but beware: this was Slovenia, but the next one is Cro-
atia.”’9
The Slovenian question was much more easily solved than the Croatian
case, partly because it was less complicated and partly because it triggered
fewer emotions among West European politicians. As Silber and Little
explain, the Slovenes and Serbs themselves shared no major bones of con-
tention, given that there was no large ethnic Serb minority living in
Slovenia, and reached an informal agreement on Slovenian secession in
Brioni.10 In Croatia, by contrast, Serbs made up some 11 per cent of the
population. Whereas Croatia was adamant that there could be no change
of its borders, the Serbian minority was equally adamant in their refusal
to become part of a new Croatian state. In 1991, West European politi-
cians and diplomats looked at Croatia with no or hardly any more sym-
pathy than they reserved for the Serbs. The Dutch in particular were
influenced by the legacy of the Second World War, during which Nazi
Germany had occupied the Netherlands for five years and murdered most
of its Jewish population. For decades after the war, anti-German feelings
had run deep among the Dutch. The fascist Croatian Ustasha regime had
been a staunch ally of Nazi Germany and had methodically murdered
hundreds of thousands of its Serb, Gypsy and Jewish inhabitants. In com-
bination with the fact that Croatia had a substantial Serb minority, the
legacy of the Second World War influenced people’s ideas about what
constituted a fair approach to the Serb-Croat conflict. In addition, there
was at this early stage in July a real concern, perhaps a greater one than at
any later stage during the Dutch Presidency, about Croatian attitudes
towards the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Reports from
the Embassy in Belgrade made clear that the Croats, despite their conflict
with the Serbs, were negotiating with the latter with an eye to dividing up
Bosnia-Herzegovina at the expense of that republic’s Muslim popu-
lation.11 From the Dutch point of view, Croats and Serbs were equally
bad. Hence, the communis opinio inside the Dutch Foreign Ministry at
this stage was that for any solution to be both effective and fair, it would
have to be even-handed.
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Brioni perhaps created the breathing space the EC needed, but the mem-
ber states proved unable to formulate a credible follow-up. Nevertheless,
a first attempt to formulate a common policy was undertaken by the
Dutch EC Presidency. The EC Foreign Ministers gathered on July 10 to
discuss the results of Brioni and agreed that it was now necessary to iden-
tify ways in which the EC could assist the Yugoslav parties to solve their
problems. The Dutch believed that if the EC was to meet the expectations
surrounding its mediating role and to have real influence on the negotia-
tions, its member states would have to rally behind a common approach.
In the week following Brioni, Van Walsum sat down to study the conflict
and formulate a first, tentative attempt to structure the intra-EC debate
on Yugoslavia.
Between July 8 and 12, Van Walsum immersed himself in ‘nothing but
Yugoslavia’.12 His conclusion was that the ‘real choice was between the
recognition of individual republics within their existing borders whereby
the protection of minorities would have to be guaranteed by legal instru-
ments, or the redrawing of the republics’ borders in order to achieve a
maximum degree of ethnic homogeneity.’13 By July 12, Van Walsum had
worked out both options in a memorandum, which he sent to Van den
Broek, who was then in the regular Friday meeting of the Cabinet. Accord-
ing to Van Walsum, Van den Broek telephoned him that afternoon to say
that, while an interesting academic analysis, the paper did not actually
constitute policy. For his paper to be policy, Van Walsum would have to
make a case for one of the two options. Van Walsum told Van den Broek
over the phone that, despite obvious objections against border changes,
this was nonetheless the option he favoured. According to Van Walsum,
the Foreign Minister replied that once the author’s preference was reflect-
ed in the paper, it could go out to the EC capitals as a Coreu telegram’
(Coreu stands for ‘Correspondence Europeenne’, the telegram system
through which the EU capitals communicate).14 This telegram was sent on
Saturday July 13, with only the initials of the Director-General for Political
Affairs on it. The key section of the proposal was a carefully worded case
in favour of a ‘voluntary redrawing of internal borders as a possible solu-
tion.’15
As was pointed out, Van Walsum did not believe that legal instruments
could solve Yugoslavia’s minority problems. ‘It was unthinkable that 
the Serbs in the Krajina, for example, would reconcile themselves to an
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independent Croatia on the basis of a minority statute.’16 ‘If Yugoslavia
was being destroyed by its ethnic differences, it did not seem very sensible
to choose precisely that option which would result in the creation of new
independent states (most notably Bosnia-Herzegovina), that would be
plagued by exactly the same ethnic differences.’17 Moreover, Van Walsum
believed the means to stop the moves towards partition from the outside
were lacking. Crucially, while Van Walsum recognised that the Serbs
stood to gain most from a revision of borders, the proposal was applica-
ble to all of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, where the ethnic Albanian popu-
lation had similar ambitions to the Croats and Slovenes, Bosnians and
Serbs. As such, the proposal was intended to function both as a carrot and
a stick in the EC’s relationship with the Serbian leadership.
The Dutch border changes proposal was rejected out of hand by virtually
all the EC partners (only Denmark expressed some sympathy). It clashed
with the German approach, as presented by the acknowledged Yugo-
slavia-expert at the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Michael Libal,
which was founded precisely on recognition of the republics within their
existing borders as the juridical instrument to render illegal the Yugoslav
army’s intervention in Croatia.18 In addition, even those countries which
disagreed with Germany’s calls for a speedy recognition were adamant
that if the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia could not be preserved, then
sovereignty should be transferred to the republics within their existing
borders. This was perceived to be particularly important in the light of
the growing unrest in the Soviet Union, where the internal borders, as in
Yugoslavia, did not necessarily correspond to ethnicity. Moreover, it was
argued by a number of member states that the Dutch proposal would
open up a ‘Pandora’s box’, since borders were imperfect nearly every-
where in the world, in particular in the Soviet Union and Africa.
During the next week, it turned out that even within his own Ministry,
Van Walsum stood completely isolated. His deputy, Christiaan Kröner,
sharply criticised the proposal, while Van den Broek, embarrassed by the
overwhelmingly negative response, did not push it. Six years after the
event, Van den Broek could not remember that he had given his consent
for the text drafted by Van Walsum to go out as an official proposal: ‘I do
not, in any case, claim the fatherhood of the border changes proposal by
Van Walsum. I can actually not remember it and, given my views at the
time, I do not understand how I could have supported such a proposal.’19
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The possibility of border changes was firmly buried by the EC Foreign
Ministers at a meeting in Brussels on July 29 –attended by Van den Broek
and Kröner, who accompanied the Minister in Van Walsum’s absence.
The Ministers declared that a forceful change of Yugoslavia’s internal bor-
ders could not be a solution to the crisis. Although this did leave open the
theoretical possibility of peaceful and mutually agreed changes of bor-
ders, the Ministers had implicitly upgraded Yugoslavia’s internal borders
to the level of international borders.The Dutch Presidency’s first attempt
to formulate a common approach for the EC had failed.
The First Move towards Selectiveness:
the Anti-Serbian Declaration of August 28
The rejection of the border changes proposal had a substantial impact on
the Dutch approach to the Yugoslav conflict. In particular it facilitated the
shaping of a consensus in favour of some form of military intervention.
From mid-July onwards, the introduction of a military presence on the
ground in former Yugoslavia was always a ‘more or less explicit goal on
the part of the Dutch Presidency’.20 Van den Broek and his senior advisers
believed that the EC’s political approach required some military compo-
nent if it were to have a chance of success. Van Walsum’s view was that the
EC Foreign Ministers, by rejecting border changes, had ‘effectively opted
for a non-peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia’ and should now face up to
the consequences of their decision and be ‘prepared to use force to con-
tain Serbia as the most aggressive and heavily armed party’.21 The director
of DAV, Boudewijn van Eenennaam, also quickly opted ‘for the line
whereby Serbia was isolated’.22 As the war in Croatia continued to esca-
late, opinion inside the Ministry thus began to favour a political isolation
of Serbia and some form of military intervention to contain the Yugoslav
army. Only the Eastern European Division disagreed and began to fight a
rear-guard battle, advocating non-intervention and continuing to make
the case for border changes. In doing so, the Eastern European Division
isolated itself, lost influence and eventually ceased to be regarded by col-
leagues as a serious participant in the policy-making process.23
The Dutch movement towards ‘selectiveness’, which seemed to narrow the
gap between the German and Dutch positions, could not be completed at
this stage because it clashed with all three of the institutional interests
referred to above. Any proposal that singled out Serbia for punitive action
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would run into the opposition of France and several other member states
and thus cause the split the Dutch EC Presidency sought to avoid. At the
same time, no anti-Serbian selectiveness on the part of the Dutch Presi-
dency veered far enough from the German point of view because it did
not include the most ‘selective’ policy of all: an early recognition of Croa-
tia and Slovenia. When, for instance, Germany repeated on August 6 its
earlier call to threaten Serbia with a recognition of Croatia and Slovenia,
the Dutch Presidency refused to reopen the debate on recognition, receiv-
ing support in that position from ‘the vast majority of the EC-partners’.
The desire to contain Serbia and the Yugoslav army was real, but could not
be satisfied without splitting the EC and undermining the Dutch Presi-
dency. Prepared to intervene, but not to recognise, the Netherlands
entered a ‘neither-nor’ period, in which it favoured selectiveness but not at
the expense of EC unity. This attitude lasted until October 10, when an
unequivocal choice in favour of selectiveness was made.
The Dutch desire for some form of intervention clashed with the stated
Dutch interest in NATO and US leadership in international security. This
meant, for instance, that the Foreign Ministry long refused to give serious
thought to the idea of involving the Western European Union (WEU).
According to the former Dutch WEU Secretary-General, Willem van
Eekelen, ‘Hans van den Broek had no desire to involve WEU in the mid-
dle of the debate on its role in the future Political Union.’24 For this reason
also, the Dutch Presidency had decided to organise the monitoring mis-
sion agreed to in Brioni itself, obtaining an endorsement from the CSCE
rather than turning to the WEU to implement the mission.25 While the
Dutch vehemently opposed involving the WEU in the management of the
crisis, for fear of undermining NATO, the aloofness on the part of the
United States made it impossible to count on a NATO intervention
instead. Thus the Dutch Presidency found itself in the paradoxical posi-
tion of supporting some form of military intervention on the one hand,
while on the other hand refusing to use the only platform theoretically
available for such an intervention at this point in time, the WEU.
Caught between their love for NATO and their desire for some form of
intervention in the Yugoslav crisis, the Dutch seemed inconsistent in their
policy regarding military intervention. Thus, when France on July 25 pro-
posed to send a WEU ‘interposition’ force to Croatia and let it be known
that it wanted the WEU to become ‘the full-blown defence arm of the EC’,
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both the ‘UK and the Netherlands resisted the idea…, because of the dam-
age it could do to the NATO partnership’.26 (Curiously, by mid-September,
it was the Dutch EC Presidency itself, which was to propose the deploy-
ment of a WEU-interposition force.) Nevertheless, despite the apparent
contradiction, Dutch policy simply remained true to its traditional two-
track approach of promoting supranational integration inside the EU in
all fields except security, where NATO should remain the lead organisa-
tion.
Notwithstanding the inevitable brake which these institutional interests
put on the movement towards a selective approach, this was the path now
favoured by the Dutch. Indeed, so great was the desire for action on the
part of the Dutch officials that any idea for introducing an external pres-
ence on the ground in Croatia was taken up enthusiastically, sometimes
mistakenly. Four days after the rejection of the French proposal the
Netherlands supported the ministerial decision of July 29 to extend the
activities of the EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM) to Croatia. In addition,
Van den Broek suggested that the EC propose to the Yugoslav parties that
they set up ‘mixed patrols’ of units of the Croatian national guard and the
JNA and, possibly, the EC monitors. Germany and Belgium criticised the
Dutch proposal for failing to take into account that the JNA had effective-
ly taken sides with the Serbs. The idea eventually came to nothing.27
In the heated atmosphere of The Hague and given the strong desire ‘to do
something’, very few people had noticed that Van den Broek’s proposal to
set up ‘mixed patrols’ was the fruit of a misunderstanding between offi-
cials of the Eastern European Division and the Atlantic Cooperation and
Security Affairs Department (DAV). At a meeting of officials dealing with
Yugoslavia, a member of the Eastern European Division had mockingly
suggested: ‘why not work with mixed patrols, with an EC observer, a
Croat and a Serb, three men in a jeep, the way it happened in Namibia?’28
Though meant as a joke, the idea was taken seriously. DAV officials devel-
oped the concept into the proposal carried to Brussels by Van den Broek
and Kröner.
The Dutch Presidency was rather more fortunate in launching the
ECMM. Seen widely as a successful example of common European action
and as a valuable provider of intelligence information for the EC capitals,
the Dutch Presidency is usually credited for having taken the mission
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seriously enough to make it work. Following the decision at Brioni to cre-
ate it and the ministerial decision to extend its activities to Croatia if pos-
sible, Dutch officials had worked round the clock to find the necessary
funding and manpower to get the ECMM up and running. The concept
was worked out by a small team of DAV officials eager for the Nether-
lands to show that common action on the part of the member states was
possible. The mission’s terms of reference were drafted within seventy-
two hours on the basis of the CSCE verification protocol. Kröner visited
the EC capitals to raise the money and obtain personnel for the mission.
The mission started operating in Slovenia in July, extended its activities to
Croatia in September, and continued to serve as an important provider of
first-hand information throughout the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and
thereafter).
The month of August saw a continuous hardening of Dutch attitudes vis-
à-vis the Serbian leadership and the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army.
This culminated in a proposal to single out Serbia and the Yugoslav army
for a public condemnation by the EC and a threat to exclude it from
negotiations regarding the future of the Yugoslav federation. If the pro-
posal were adopted, it could also be the first step in the direction of some
form of military response to the Yugoslav army’s actions in Croatia.
Events on the ground in the Yugoslav conflict, sometimes witnessed by
Van den Broek’s newly appointed trouble-shooter, Ambassador Henry
Wijnaendts, did much to confirm the need for a tough response on the
part of the EC. (Wijnaendts, a former Director-General for Political
Affairs, now resided in Paris as Ambassador to France. Over the course of
the next months, he was busily engaged in several rounds of shuttle-
diplomacy, attempting to obtain the agreement of the Yugoslav parties to
various EC proposals. In this position, Wijnaendts witnessed the destruc-
tion of Vukovar.)29 Since the first direct clash, on July 25, between the
Yugoslav army and the Croatian guard it was now obvious to all that the
Yugoslav army had sided with the Croatian Serb militias. By far the most
important event on the ground to cause a hardening of Dutch attitudes
was the behaviour of the Yugoslav army around the Croatian border town
of Vukovar. Already on July 3 the Embassy in Belgrade had warned The
Hague that ‘a unit at brigade-strength of around 3,000 men, a great num-
ber of tanks, mortars, artillery and other military equipment’ was leaving
Belgrade in the direction of Croatia. Speculating on the unit’s assign-
ment, Ambassador Fietelaars had written: ‘it is also possible that they are
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on their way to the surroundings of Vukovar, a hotbed of inter-ethnic
fighting in Croatia, in order to be able to prevent a large-scale confronta-
tion between Croats and Serbs. For this, however, the force is actually
much too large.’ The exact assignment of the force became all too clear
when in August, following additional JNA reinforcements, Vukovar came
under shelling from the JNA artillery, sporadic at first but intense from
the third week onwards. The offensive against Vukovar seemed to con-
firm that the JNA and the Serbian leadership were in cahoots.
The Dutch now realised that the time was right for the Presidency and the
EC as a whole to take a stand or else risk inviting the wrath of interna-
tional public opinion. The following exchange illustrates the changing
mood inside the Foreign Ministry. In reply to yet another unorthodox
plea for restraint by the Eastern European Division and their suggestion
to suspend mediation efforts until the Yugoslav parties showed them-
selves more willing to cooperate, Van Walsum simply replied: ‘Even if
doing nothing is objectively the best course of action, experience teaches
one that that is not politically practical. All twelve Ministers are under
pressure to do something.’
Dutch officials frantically searched for ways to respond to the Serbian
aggression without being forced into a rerun of the debate on recogni-
tion. Thus on August 23 the Eastern Europe Division sent a memoran-
dum to Van den Broek, via Van Walsum, in which they noted: ‘Now that
as a consequence of Serbian violence increasingly large parts of Croatia
have fallen into the hands of the Serbs, it seems useful to forcefully take a
stance against this… This could be done by means of a message of the
Twelve that is supported by the Central and Eastern European countries,
the Soviet Union and the US.’ Van Walsum took up the suggestion in a
somewhat different form.
The best platform for a tough message to be formulated, Van Walsum
believed, would be the upcoming ministerial meeting of September 3. In
preparation for that meeting, the political directors were to meet on
August 28. Evidence that Van Walsum was planning to draft a tough dec-
laration was provided by a written response to a suggestion from else-
where in the bureaucracy to organise secret, EC-chaired, talks between
Tudjman and Milosevic. Van Walsum opposed such talks and scribbled
onto the memo:
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I propose this scenario: - Wed[nesday] 28 Aug. Co[mité]
Po[litique]: Tough declaration against violence, so implicitly
against Milosevic + JNA. (…) Secret meeting Tudjman and
Milosevic must not deal with carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
(…) Talk is therefore not timely. First comes pressure. Tough
declaration of next Wednesday fits into that.
The text drafted by Van den Broek and Van Walsum was indeed the
toughest so far and exploited to the full the limited means of pressure at
the disposal of a civilian power like the EC. The episode that followed
constituted a source of pride and frustration on the part of the Minister
and the Director-General for Political Affairs. Proud that they had drafted
the toughest declaration the EC Foreign Ministers could possibly have
issued, they were disappointed to find that the necessary support for the
text itself, and the selective approach associated with it, was lacking. The
greatest disappointment and a major source of frustration was the fact
that German Foreign Minister Genscher, who had consistently advocated
isolating Serbia and by whom, the Dutch thought, their draft would be
warmly welcomed, gave only half-hearted support.
The Dutch text, which had been drafted on August 27, explicitly con-
demned Serbia and the Yugoslav People’s Army for their fait-accompli
policy in Croatia. It warned that this policy could never succeed in effec-
tively protecting the Serbs in Croatia because the international communi-
ty would never recognise borders that had been changed through force.
The text stated that an effective cease-fire, monitored by the international
community, was an absolute precondition for fruitful negotiations and
called upon Serbia to give up its resistance to an expansion of the EC
Monitoring Mission to Croatia. Crucially, the sanction proposed by the
Dutch Presidency, if Serbia were to refuse to heed these calls, would be
the exclusion of Serbia (and Montenegro) from EC-chaired negotiations
regarding the future of Yugoslavia. The implicit threat was clear: without
Serbia such talks could easily result in an agreement to recognise individ-
ual Yugoslav republics as independent states.
The Dutch EC Presidency thus for the first time showed a willingness to
adopt an anti-Serbian selectiveness. It was prepared to try and build a
consensus around the possibility of a settlement to which Serbia and
Montenegro would not be party, which would in turn open the way 
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for an armed response of some sort to Serbian cross-frontier military
activities. The Dutch were not yet ready to give explicit support to an
early recognition as such; nor were they eager to repeat the debate of June
and July over that issue, the deceptive simplicity of which – one was either
for or against recognition – had divided the member states. Nevertheless,
the Presidency’s draft should have taken away any doubts on the part of
Germany as to whether the Netherlands was prepared to accept recogni-
tion as the eventual outcome.
So what went wrong? There had been much less time to draft the text and
prepare the EC partners for it than the Dutch had envisaged. This was
due to the fact that, at German insistence, the ministerial meeting had
been brought forward from September 3 to August 27. There had not
been a possibility for the political directors to prepare the ground for the
Ministers. In fact, Van den Broek and Van Walsum had drafted consider-
able sections of the text in their car, during the two hours or so it took
them to reach Brussels for the GAC. It was expected that French Foreign
Minister Roland Dumas would try to water down the text, given France’s
preference for continuing an even-handed approach. En route, Van den
Broek and Van Walsum put additional flesh on the draft, ‘so that it could
take some scratching.’30 The result, according to Van den Broek was a
‘rock-hard anti-Serbian declaration’.31 Upon arrival he showed the draft
declaration to Genscher who was, as expected, visibly enthusiastic.
Genscher’s enthusiasm did not, however, translate into strong support
when the Council went into session. Under normal circumstances, Gen-
scher would probably have gone to great lengths to help preserve the
Dutch draft. However, Genscher had telephoned Dumas and arranged a
private meeting in advance of the GAC. According to Genscher, the inten-
tion of the call was to reconfirm the importance of the French-German
relationship and to give a new impulse to the EC’s involvement in the
Yugoslav crisis.32 Impatience with what the Germans saw as Dutch obsti-
nacy regarding the recognition issue, as well as the personal animosity
between Genscher and Van den Broek, probably also played a role. During
their private chat, Genscher and Dumas agreed to present their colleagues
with a French-German initiative. Genscher’s input to the proposal con-
sisted of an EC-sponsored conference involving, crucially, all the Yugoslav
parties. (In actual fact, it had been the British who had first proposed, on
August 2, to organise a conference.) Dumas, for his part, introduced the
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idea of an arbitration commission, which he later explained might be able
to ‘substitute violence with arbitration’.33 The French-German initiative
was based essentially on what had hitherto been seen as French and
British, rather than German, ideas and reconfirmed the Community’s
even-handedness towards all the Yugoslav parties. The problem for Gen-
scher, upon being presented with the Dutch draft, was that the approach
he favoured clashed with the one he had just promised to co-sponsor. As a
result, more was taken out of the text than the Dutch had expected.
At the Council meeting, Dumas immediately sought to stymie the possi-
bility that the Dutch draft would be accepted as it stood. He offered the
all-party conference and the arbitration commission as an alternative to
the Dutch idea of a conference without Serbia and Montenegro. More-
over, he criticised Van den Broek’s proposal as too anti-Serbian. This
French concern was also echoed by Britain and, especially, Greece. The
rest of the line-up was as follows: the Spanish, Luxembourg and Irish For-
eign Ministers argued that while the analysis of the Presidency was cor-
rect, the criticisms of Serbia should be moderated. Denmark, Belgium,
Portugal, Italy and the Commission all more or less supported the Dutch
draft as it stood. Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis, Commission Presi-
dent Delors and Portuguese Foreign Minister De Pinheiro all spoke
strongly in favour of the Dutch draft, pointing out that a political isola-
tion of Serbia was the only weapon available to the EC. The outcome of
the discussion, which lasted until 00.30 hrs, depended largely on the
stance Germany’s Foreign Minister would take.
While Genscher spoke sympathetically of the Dutch draft, he was in no
position to drop the French-German initiative introduced by Dumas. He
solved his dilemma by proposing to combine the two initiatives. Despite
criticisms from representatives such as De Michelis that this undermined
the strength of the original Dutch proposal, this was the road taken. The
compromise eventually reached encompassed a watered-down version of
the Dutch text, as well as the EC Conference and the arbitration commis-
sion. The result was an inconsistent mish-mash of separate ideas, leaving
the Serbian leadership much more room for manoeuvre than the Dutch
draft would have done. In particular, the Serbs could, as a ‘concession’,
now give access to the monitors in exchange for participation in an all-
party conference. Such a favourable deal for the Serbs had been absent in
the Dutch draft.
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Despite the disappointment on the part of the Dutch, the declaration,
issued on the morning of August 28, was the toughest so far, stating, for
instance that ‘elements’ of the Yugoslav army were actively supporting the
Serbian side. The EC governments would never condone a fait-accompli
policy, although the declaration did not identify Serbia as the culprit, as
had been proposed by the Dutch. Serbia was, nonetheless, warned that
the EC would organise a meeting with the ‘cooperative’ parties in order to
‘discuss additional measures, including international action’ if before
September 1 it had not agreed to an EC-monitored cease-fire. Van Wal-
sum was later told by a Slovenian official that the Slovenes had interpret-
ed the use of the term ‘fait-accompli policy’ as the first step towards recog-
nition of their independence.34
Back to Even-Handedness: August 28 - October 10, 1991 
The ministerial meeting of August 27 was not the first nor the last time
the Dutch and the Germans should have been able, but failed, to take up a
common position. The Dutch EC Presidency formulated a policy that
could, in theory, have helped the shaping of a majority stance within the
EC around what was – and still is widely- seen as the exclusively German
line. The negative German response seems to have upset the Dutch and
motivated them to recoil from their selective stance and head back for the
safety of even-handedness. This might invoke the wrath of Germany but
it reduced the risk of being caught between the majority line of support
for even-handedness and a Germany that in the final analysis gave prima-
cy to the German-French axis over the substance of the EC’s policy
towards the Yugoslav crisis.
The discussions of late August 1991 show that Germany missed an
opportunity to gain early EC support for its pro-recognition stance. The
German literature has generally glossed over the episode and, further-
more, continued to look back on Dutch policy as totally opposed to
recognition. In his memoirs, Genscher is admittedly frank about his
meeting with Dumas and the resulting French-German initiative but he
does not mention the Dutch proposal. Nor does he explain that the
French-German initiative in essence constituted a German concession to
France at a point in time where the Dutch Presidency and, probably,
other EC member states were seriously considering abandoning the
impartial line so far maintained. Hans-Heinrich Wrede, who was the
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German Foreign Ministry’s deputy-head of the Yugoslavia Crisis Staff,
simply referred to the August 28 declaration as a confirmation of German
policy: ‘With some delay, the other EC Foreign Ministers also took up this
[Genscher’s] view.’35 Viktor Meier, whose furious attacks on Dutch policy
in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung greatly helped to sour Dutch-Ger-
man relations, seems mistaken in his conclusions regarding the August 28
ministerial declaration. According to Meier it was the line ‘represented by
Van den Broek’ which ‘led directly to the Hague [EC Peace] Conference’.
In fact, as Genscher admits, it was he who proposed the Conference as his
input into the French-German initiative of August 27/28. Meier aug-
ments his omission by falsely stating that the Conference was ‘proposed
by France’.36
An important factor in explaining the failure of the Dutch and the Ger-
mans to join forces was the exceptionally poor state of relations between
the two countries around the turn of the decade. Beneath a shared desire
for further European integration, the personal relations between the two
countries’ top politicians soured dramatically during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The main cause of these personal-political antagonisms
between the long-serving leaders of the Netherlands and Germany prob-
ably lay in the German reunification, the expected growth of German
power and the concern this caused in the Netherlands. According to
Kohl’s adviser Horst Teltschick, Lubbers and Van den Broek were among
the minority of Western politicians who were ‘decidedly cool’ about the
prospect of German reunification.37 Several Dutch officials remember a
clash between Genscher and Van den Broek during a meeting in February
1991, one of whom recounts: ‘Genscher expatiated emotionally and
impressively about German reunification. He referred in a penetrating
way to his youth in Halle. It was so quiet that you could hear a pin drop.
When Genscher had finished, Van den Broek took the floor and held a
20-minute Philippic in which he made it clear why there could be no Ger-
man reunification for the time being. It was very painful and I believe
that this was the beginning of the antagonism between Genscher and Van
den Broek.’38
Following German reunification, the personal antagonisms only became
worse, as Dutch concern rose over the perceived monopoly of the French-
German axis over matters European. Dutch-German differences eventu-
ally led to another painful episode in 1994, when Kohl conspicuously
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refused to support the candidacy of Lubbers for the Presidency of the
European Commission.39 No wonder, then, that Dutch and German
politicians had difficulty in identifying common ground with regard to
the EC’s approach to the Yugoslav crisis.
The draft-declaration of August 27/28 had not only been an important
break with past Dutch Yugoslavia policy, but had also constituted a major
opportunity to repair some of the damage done to Dutch-German rela-
tions in past times. The German rebuttal instead poured salt into the
open wound. As the Dutch reverted to the majority stance of even-hand-
edness, thereby inviting renewed German criticism, it became practically
impossible for the two foreign Ministries to conduct sensible discussions
on how to proceed. Instead, the two countries began to pursue two differ-
ent tracks. Germany began to increase the pressure on the remainder of
the EC in favour of a recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, while the
Netherlands – paradoxically – focused its energy on supporting the EC
Peace Conference.
The EC Peace Conference’s first session was held on September 7, and
throughout that month, the Dutch focused on ensuring maximum sup-
port for the Conference and its chairman, former British Foreign Secre-
tary Peter Lord Carrington. The Conference, the Presidency (despite the
Dutch scepticism about the Conference’s chances of success) and the
majority of EC member states concentrated on achieving a negotiated
settlement. This was in line with the EC ministerial declaration of Sep-
tember 6, which had spoken of the necessity of speaking with a single
voice so as to give the Conference legitimacy. Germany, instead, began to
push openly for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, seeking the support
of like-minded EC member states.
To illustrate the widening gap between Dutch and German policy, one
needs only to look at the activities of both countries’ Foreign Ministers in
mid-September 1991. On September 14 Van den Broek received Croatian
Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic in The Hague. Van den Broek had
been informed by Wijnaendts that the Croats felt encouraged by the
August 28 declaration and were now responsible for most of the escala-
tion in the fighting in Croatia.40 Given that Croatia’s cooperation was
required if the EC Conference was to successfully negotiate a settlement,
Van den Broek pointed out to Separovic that, despite the tough-sounding
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declaration, Croatia should not pin its hopes on a European military
intervention which was ‘out of the question’. He also accused Croatia of
deliberately escalating the war and jeopardising the Conference that had
just started in The Hague. Genscher, for his part, took a completely differ-
ent road. On September 15 he and De Michelis held a bilateral meeting in
Venice. Afterwards, the two Foreign Ministers told the assembled press
that if peace negotiations between the warring parties broke down, Ger-
many and Italy would be obliged to recognise the declarations of inde-
pendence of Croatia and Slovenia. They were ready to do so even if the
rest of the EC member states refused to do so.41
The conflicting approaches caused an immediate and angry quarrel
between The Hague and Bonn. While the Presidency sharply criticised
the German-Italian declaration of Venice for undermining the Confer-
ence and the cohesion of the EC, Germany was furious about the Dutch
criticisms of Croatia. The mutual irritation came to the surface on Sep-
tember 16. The Dutch Presidency distributed a telegram to its partners,
which delivered a sharp and outspoken attack on the Venice meeting. It
expressed concern that the remarks by the two EC member states might
encourage Croatia to disengage from the Conference. Germany coun-
tered by inviting Dutch Ambassador Jan van der Tas to the German For-
eign Ministry. In Bonn, Van der Tas was subjected to some strong criti-
cisms of the Dutch position. A senior German official told Van der Tas
that the Dutch allocation of guilt to the Croats, as well as Dutch refer-
ences to growing German assertiveness were seen in Bonn as a burden on
German-Dutch relations. The remarks by Dutch officials, as they had
been reproduced in the German press, were interpreted by Bonn as
directed specifically against Foreign Minister Genscher. The Dutch Am-
bassador did not leave without retorting that the German press had
embarked on a veritable smear campaign against the Dutch Presidency,
against his own Minister in particular, and that accusations like ‘conspira-
tor with a minority of EC-countries’ were below the belt.
Greatly frustrated by the perceived attempts on the part of Germany to
discredit the Dutch Presidency, Van den Broek decided to call his German
colleague’s bluff by proposing a military intervention.42 The Dutch
realised full well that Germany, on the one hand, would be morally
obliged to support such an intervention, but would probably be unable to
participate for constitutional reasons. The proposal would therefore at
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best lead to a military intervention and thereby enhance the prestige of
the Dutch Presidency or, at worst, fail because of a lack of support for
which Germany for one, but certainly not the Netherlands, could be
blamed.
The Dutch proposal was made public on September 17. The idea was that
the Europeans would deploy a ‘lightly armed’ WEU-force to Croatia to
protect the EC monitors. ‘Dutch officials said the idea of the force was not
to impose a cease-fire but rather to use a European show of arms to dis-
courage a resumption of warfare after a new cease-fire goes into effect.’43
Remarkably, the proposal seemed to imply that the Dutch had aban-
doned the principle that any military involvement in Yugoslavia should
be NATO-led. In reality, the reasoning behind the proposal was that WEU
involvement would inevitably trigger NATO involvement. It was thought
that soon after a form of intervention had been launched under the WEU
flag, France would find out that NATO’s command and control facilities
were indispensable. The USA, in turn, would heed calls for support from
their allies and reinforce the operation. A NATO intervention would have
been engineered. Had the proposal been accepted, the Dutch would have
squared a circle: German critics would have been silenced; a selective
approach would have been adopted without splitting the EC on the ques-
tion of recognition, while the Dutch interest in continued NATO cohe-
sion and US leadership would have been protected.
Unfortunately for the Dutch Presidency its proposal came to nothing.
Over the next month or so various contingency-plans were drawn up,
involving several lighter and heavier options. But no option could attract
the support of a majority of WEU and EC member states. By the end of
September, when British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd expressed seri-
ous reservations about the existing contingency planning, the European
debate on military intervention had been concluded firmly in the nega-
tive. Thereafter, the UN became the main platform for the discussion of
military options.
Despite the German-Dutch dispute and regardless of the latter’s formal
support for the EC Conference, it was obvious to the officials in The
Hague that recognition could not be withheld indefinitely. In his analysis
of the EC’s diplomacy in 1991, Meier claims that the lack of progress
around the negotiating tables of the Hague Conference, was in large part
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due to the ‘negative’ role played by ‘Van den Broek and his people.’ Dutch
‘politicians, diplomats and military monitors’ were the ‘catalysts’ of the
‘EC-debacle’.44 Moreover, according to Meier, Dutch officials tried ‘every-
thing in their power’ to extend the three-month moratorium on the
implementation of Slovenian and Croatian independence agreed at
Brioni. In reality, Van den Broek and his colleagues were facing a difficult
dilemma: how could the Dutch EC Presidency pave the way towards a
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and at the same time avoid being
accused by Britain and France of having given up on Carrington’s Con-
ference? 
Van den Broek later described the continuing dilemma between selective-
ness / recognition and even-handedness / the Conference: ‘On the one
hand the common philosophy was to first have a general settlement and
only then to recognise. Genscher opposed that. On the other hand, it
quickly became obvious that this was a case of might makes right. A situ-
ation arose whereby one had to admit to Genscher that a peaceful frag-
mentation was no longer possible. We faced the dilemma to either pro-
ceed towards a premature recognition, or to have a divided [European]
Union. This continued to play until the end.’45 There exists written evi-
dence that Dutch officials were thinking of the implications of the expiry
of the three month moratorium and of a possible response to it. A diplo-
mat who had been seconded to Carrington’s secretariat at the Conference
wrote to Van Walsum that ‘it might in the near future become necessary
to deal in a creative way with the question of recognition of Yugoslav
republics. The pressure to undertake something in that direction is
increasing, witness also the German-Italian ministerial meeting of Sep-
tember 15 in Venice’. According to the official there was ‘a conceivable sce-
nario, in which recognition constitutes an option that, provided it is
couched in safeguards, can contribute to a continued cohesion of the EC-
member states’. He went on to advise that the EC, though not its member
states, would recognise the ‘claim to independence’ of all republics,
including those who had not asked for it, but to announce that recogni-
tion would not be put into practical effect until a general settlement had
been reached. Van den Broek opted for a slightly different line, which was
announced to the Yugoslav parties on October 10.
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Selectiveness: October-December 1991
On October 8 and 9 Van den Broek spent hours on the telephone talking
to European and American politicians to tell them he intended to set a
two-month deadline to the talks chaired by Lord Carrington. If no settle-
ment had been achieved by December 10, a decision to recognise individ-
ual Yugoslav republics would automatically have to follow. This new poli-
cy was hardly known at the time and remained largely unknown in the
Dutch, British and American literature on the subject.46 However, the evi-
dence suggests that the proposal was instrumental in opening the way to a
decision in favour of recognition, the most selective policy available to the
EC.
There were several important reasons for Van den Broek to set the dead-
line. The first was to save the Dutch EC Presidency from disgrace. As
Europe’s failure to stop the war in former Yugoslavia was becoming ever
more obvious there was a growing concern in The Hague that the Dutch
EC Presidency would end up becoming a scapegoat for that failure. That
this fear was not wholly unrealistic was confirmed in a private assessment
for the attention of Van Walsum, drawn up by a Luxembourg diplomat
who had been seconded to the Dutch Presidency in the framework of the
Troika: ‘One observes that the partners are increasingly inclined to take
up positions in public which are easily sold to the media before with-
drawing behind common positions while attacking the Presidency for its
inactivity or its lack of resolve.’
Further indications of the possibility that the Dutch Presidency might
find itself completely isolated at some point, were provided by the events
of September 30, 1991, or ‘Black Monday’ as it is usually referred to in
Dutch policy-making circles.47 That day the Dutch Presidency suffered a
particularly humiliating defeat, albeit largely self-inflicted, in the negotia-
tions for a treaty on a political union. The Dutch had prepared a draft
treaty, which consisted of what was widely judged to be a contradictory
blend of overly federalist proposals for a political and economic union,
and pro-NATO proposals in the field of defence. On Monday September
30 the draft was presented to the EC partners and after a short meeting
rejected by all but Belgium. The fact that Germany – against earlier
expectations – had not supported the Dutch proposals came as a pro-
found shock to the Dutch. After ‘Black Monday’, the Dutch government
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was determined to save the Netherlands’ EC Presidency from further dis-
aster, and not to let the Netherlands be a scapegoat for the EC’s unsuc-
cessful handling of the Yugoslav crisis.48
Another important question which the Dutch sought to address with the
deadline proposal, given Germany’s attitude in September, was how long
that country would be able to resist the domestic pressure to go solo. The
increasingly obvious answer was ‘not very long’. The ever-stronger Ger-
man pressure on the Dutch, which combined public criticisms with pri-
vate warnings that Bonn would, if necessary, break ranks and recognise
Croatia and Slovenia single-handedly, called for a change of tune on the
part of the Presidency. The Dutch were still reluctant to give in to their
arrogant big neighbour but were equally concerned about the image of
the Dutch Presidency as it was being painted internationally by the Ger-
man foreign policy establishment. Moreover, Dutch officials could not
help admitting that they essentially agreed with the German analysis: to
postpone recognition was to play into the hands of the Serbian leader-
ship. Van den Broek and his senior advisers, that is Wijnaendts, Van Wal-
sum and Van Eenennaam, concluded that now was the time to steer the
EC towards recognition. As such, the deadline fitted neatly into the Dutch
views on the conflict itself and the prevailing scepticism as to whether an
all-party conference could contain, let alone punish, Serbia and the JNA.
However obvious it was that recognition should now be the goal to work
towards, it was important to give the Conference a fair chance of negoti-
ating a settlement, at least in theory. To close ranks with Germany com-
pletely would bring as great a risk of division as to let Germany go at it
alone. Countries who wanted to keep open the possibility of a general set-
tlement for the whole of the former Yugoslavia might respond furiously
and blame the Presidency for having undermined the Conference. A
deadline, it was hoped, would be acceptable to both poles of opinion
within the EC. It gave the Conference two more months, but made recog-
nition the inescapable outcome if the talks were to fail.
On October 4 the Conference apparently achieved a remarkable success.
All parties, including Serbia, agreed that recognition might be the out-
come of the negotiations. This outcome was produced in a private meet-
ing between Carrington, Van den Broek, Tudjman, Milosevic and Yugo-
slav Defence Minister General Veljko Kadijevic. Following the meeting,
Van den Broek announced that the EC had obtained the ‘acquiescence of
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all Yugoslav parties present at the plenary meeting’ for an agreement that
‘included the principle that a political solution should be sought on the
basis of the perspective of recognition of the independence of those
republics who wished it, at the end of a negotiating process conducted in
good faith and involving all parties.’
The result of the October 4 meeting was discussed and applauded by the
EC Foreign Ministers on October 5 and 6 in the castle of Haarzuilens in
the Netherlands. Van den Broek remarked to his colleagues that ‘from the
agreements of October 4 it could be gathered that the Serbs too now
seemed to accept the perspective of recognition’. Nevertheless, given that
it was extremely difficult to gauge Serbian motives – why continue to
wage war in a country whose borders you have publicly promised to
respect? – Van den Broek subsequently proposed to ‘set an ultimatum
with regard to the implementation of the agreements of October 4’. His
colleagues agreed and Van den Broek and his officials sat down to formu-
late one.
On October 8 and 9 Van den Broek proposed that the ultimatum should
be a two-month deadline. In many hours of telephone conversations the
Foreign Minister consulted Genscher, Dumas, De Michelis, Hurd and US
Secretary of State Baker about the idea of setting a two-month deadline
for, on the one hand, the withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia and, on the
other hand, the signing of an overall settlement.49 Van den Broek ob-
tained the consent of colleagues like Hurd and Dumas by promising to
stick to the October 4 agreement, which stipulated that recognition
would be ‘granted in the framework of a general settlement’. Hence, the
firmness of the deadline still seemed open to interpretation. To Genscher,
on the other hand, the two-month deadline constituted a confirmation of
German policy and became a fixed, agreed, deadline for either a settle-
ment or recognition on December 10, 1991.
Lord Carrington, who was in New York for a meeting with the UN Secre-
tary General, remembers that, when told, he believed the idea ‘wholly un-
realistic’.50 As the Dutch position hardened throughout October, Lord
Carrington became increasingly concerned that the Conference would
disintegrate, for what would be the incentive for the Croatian and Sloven-
ian governments to accommodate Serbian or international demands at
the Conference when all they needed to do was to sit tight for another two
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months and wait for the recognition of their republics to follow automat-
ically? But whether the deadline undermined the Conference was not a
point that much bothered the Dutch any longer. What The Hague wanted
was a political outcome before the end of its term as holder of the Presi-
dency. As Van den Broek later admitted, the deadline-proposal was meant
as a ‘means of pressure on the Serbs, not on the Croats and the Slovenes.’51
The deadline proposal was put to the Yugoslav parties on October 10, 1991.
Miraculously, after five hours of talks, Van den Broek was able to announce
to the press that all parties had agreed to a two-month deadline for the
withdrawal of the JNA from Croatia and achieving a general settlement.
Ironically, even Milosevic conceded in public that such a deadline was ‘real-
istic, assuming that all parties cooperate’.52 This was probably a fake-con-
cession and a result of Milosevic’s recognition that the deadline was going
to be imposed on the Conference anyhow. What is more, the Yugoslav army
subsequently let it be known that it would not withdraw from Croatia.
While a sceptical Carrington was still in New York, Wijnaendts as his
deputy distributed a memorandum to the Conference’s staff, laying out
the precise timetable:
I therefore think that we should have at the latest within two
months an agreement… That would also be the point in time to
have a concluding and solemn session of the Hague Confer-
ence. That would also be the latest occasion for the Twelve to
take a decision on the recognition of the independence of
those republics that have expressed through a democratic
process their will to be independent.53
If there were still any doubts in London and Paris as to whether the Dutch
had joined the German position, these should have been removed by an
interview which Van den Broek gave to the Austrian newspaper Die Presse.
In the interview, he indicated that recognition would automatically follow
at the end of the two months if no overall settlement had been reached:
‘This solution must be found within one month. The negotiations can be
prolonged for the maximum of one more month. At that moment in time
there must be a political settlement and the JNA must have been com-
pletely withdrawn from Croatia… If this does not happen, the time will
have come for the EC to decide on the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.’54
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Just how determined the Dutch had become to achieve a recognition
before the end of their term as Presidency can be seen by the deliberate-
ness with which they subsequently proceeded to isolate Serbia from the
rest of the Conference. For some time the Dutch had believed that the best
way to isolate Serbia politically was to hold a conference of ‘cooperative’
republics only. Instead, the EC had decided to organise an all-party con-
ference. Initially loyal, Van den Broek and his advisers quickly became
impatient as German pressure increased, the JNA’s behaviour around
Vukovar and, later, Dubrovnik became ever harder to stomach and the
Conference apparently failed to make substantial progress. These factors
combined to create a shared view among Van den Broek and his senior
advisers that what was needed was a return to the August 27/28 concept.
Serbia would need to be identified as a ‘non-cooperative’ republic and
excluded from the Conference. As a result, the road to recognition would
lie open, and an outcome would be obtained before the end of the Dutch
Presidency.
As could be expected, Serbia itself was a great help in the search for a
legitimate reason to exclude it from the Conference. On October 18,
Milosevic refused to agree to the ‘Arrangements for a General Settlement’
which Lord Carrington had presented. This paved the way for an isola-
tion of Serbia. In response, Dutch officials began to identify ways of sin-
gling out Serbia for punitive measures. First the principle of distinguish-
ing between ‘cooperative’ and ‘non-cooperative’ republics had to be
established as a starting point before one could proceed to isolate Serbia.
Thus, on October 23, Van Eenennaam sent a memorandum to Van Wal-
sum, stating that a ‘distinction between cooperative and non-cooperative
parties’ was ‘an essential ingredient of any attempt at mediation in a con-
flict’. Ambassador Fietelaars backed up Van Eenennaam’s argument and
called for an isolation of Serbia at the Conference: ‘Serbia has in sub-
stance given up on the Conference and probably on a peaceful solution.
Probably isolation of Serbia is now the best modus operandi.’
Van den Broek personally devised the tactical approach by which Serbia
should be identified as a non-cooperative party. On October 24 he issued
precise instructions in a long telephone conversation with Van Walsum,
who was to pass these on to Wijnaendts as deputy chairman of the
Conference. Subsequently, Van Walsum wrote a message to Wijnaendts 
and summarised Van den Broek’s instructions on how the chair should
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handle the next day’s plenary session of the Conference. Serbia, argued
Van den Broek, would have to accept Lord Carrington’s plan and be told
that there was no room for the approach it favoured, which was a contin-
ued existence of the Yugoslav federation for those who did not wish to
secede. Then, if Serbia would refuse to cooperate with the Conference on
the basis of Carrington’s plan, Serbia would have identified itself as a
non-cooperative party. Once that had happened, the Presidency would
call for a meeting of the EC Foreign Ministers and offer proposals in the
spirit of the ‘ultimatum’ agreed to at Haarzuilens on October 6. These
could be recognition of cooperative republics, the introduction of a pack-
age of selective sanctions, or both.
The meeting of Foreign Ministers envisaged by Van den Broek took place
over lunch on October 28. The day before, the JNA’s shelling of Dubrovnik
had been condemned in a declaration and the meeting took place in a
heavy, emotional atmosphere with Van den Broek and Genscher in par-
ticular calling for tough measures. Van den Broek argued that ‘it was now a
matter of putting the Serbs under pressure and forcing them to take up
clear positions at the next plenary session of the Yugoslavia conference’ on
November 5. He proposed to threaten Serbia with ‘restrictive measures’ if
it refused to accept Lord Carrington’s draft settlement. Genscher support-
ed the idea and, despite opposition from Dumas, the Ministers agreed to
issue a declaration on that basis. The declaration issued on October 28
stated that if Serbia did not give up its opposition to Carrington’s propo-
sal, the Conference would ‘proceed with the cooperative Republics’ and
that ‘non-cooperating parties’ could then expect ‘restrictive measures by
the EC and its Member States.’ Also, Serbia was warned that the EC would
ask the UN Security Council to adopt further restrictive measures.
The selective approach originally formulated by the Dutch Presidency
was further formalised by the EC Foreign Ministers on November 8 in the
margins of a NATO summit in Rome. Three days before, Milosevic had
refused to accept the draft settlement and had expressed his republic’s
‘great bitterness’ over what he called, ‘the ultimatum and threat’ con-
tained in the European Community’s declaration of October 28. The dec-
laration issued on November 8, in turn, listed a number of measures that
the Community had decided to take, in particular the suspension or ter-
mination of various trade and aid programs. In addition, the Security
Council was invited to impose an oil embargo.
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The fall of Vukovar on November 18 provoked a mood change in the
Dutch Foreign Ministry. It seems that in the eyes of senior Dutch officials
this event tilted the Yugoslav crisis from the political to the moral level.
The existing anti-Serbian selectiveness was continued but acquired a new,
sharper-edged quality that could not always be reconciled easily with the
stated Dutch interest in maintaining EC cohesion. Principled beliefs
about right and wrong began to constitute a more important ingredient
in the mixture of domestic sources of Dutch foreign policy. This mood
shift from an interest-driven policy to an idea-driven policy was
described in an interview with three officials by Vrij Nederland: ‘Because
the Serbs used ever more violence, opinions began to turn increasingly
against them.’55 Nevertheless, precisely because these beliefs fitted so well
in the already existing framework of selectiveness, there was no immedi-
ate clash between principles and interests. Moreover, the institutional
interests related to the position as EC Presidency remained, on balance,
the dominant forces restraining the growing Dutch temptation to push
for policies that could not count on sufficient international support.
The best illustration of the mood-change inside the Foreign Ministry
was a memorandum by Van Walsum to Van den Broek. The memoran-
dum was sent on November 19 and constituted a kind of formalisation
of anti-Serbian selectiveness. Several senior officials later explained that
Van Walsum’s November 19 memorandum marked for them the defi-
nitive good-bye to ‘even-handedness’.56 In the memorandum, Van Wal-
sum argued that the Dutch should ‘clearly take sides against Serbia.’ He
continued: ‘Taking sides against Serbia is an imperative because we are
dealing with a conflict between two republics, one of which has appro-
priated the complete national army and the remainders of the national
governmental bureaucracy. This is not a situation that can be sensibly
approached with “even-handedness”.’ Van Walsum wanted the Nether-
lands as EC Presidency and the EC as a whole to consider ‘applying so
much pressure [on Serbia] through a selective and discriminating policy
that it will sooner or later be prepared to compromise.’ In conclusion,
Van Walsum wrote: ‘I realise that it will not be easy to convince all part-
ners, but “even-handedness” can only lead us to having to miserably
accept the Serbian conquests and their corresponding new borders in the
course of 1992.’
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Vukovar also prompted a number of telegrams from the Dutch Presiden-
cy to the EC partners that were worded in the most explicitly ‘selective’
language used so far. The immediate triggers for the Dutch messages
were, first, reports that the fall of Vukovar would be followed by an
assault on the town of Osijek and, secondly, the discussions in the Securi-
ty Council on the possibility of sending a peacekeeping force to Croatia as
a buffer between the two sides. Van den Broek and Van Walsum had been
sorely disappointed by a meeting with UN Under-Secretary-General
Marrack Goulding and Cyrus Vance, the newly appointed UN special
representative to Yugoslavia, at Schiphol airport the week before.57 Vance
and Goulding had indicated that they thought a peacekeeping force
should be deployed, not on the official borders between Serbia and Croa-
tia, but on the existing front lines, between Serb and Croat forces. This
caused a concern among the Dutch that the UN force would simply serve
to consolidate the Serbian gains, a suspicion that was being reinforced by
the enthusiasm on the part of the Serbian government for such a UN
force to be deployed in Croatia.
When reports came in that Osijek would be the next target of the JNA,
the Dutch Presidency decided to make a push for recognition and help
forestall the deployment of a UN force that would consolidate the Ser-
bian gains. The Dutch drafted a declaration to be issued by the EC. It stat-
ed that the fall of Vukovar and the subsequent attack on Osijek by the
JNA and Serbian irregulars ‘must rule out the deployment of a UN peace-
keeping force’ in Croatia. The draft distributed among the EC partners
also argued that if attacks on Croatian towns and villages were to con-
tinue, the EC and its member states would ‘have no choice but to proceed
with recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and other interested republics with-
in their established borders.’
The exchange that followed showed that, while there were still different
views about the timing of such a decision, the principle of recognition
was now supported by a majority of EC member states. To deal with the
criticisms concerning the principle of recognition and the timing at
which this should take place the Presidency sent a response that made
clear it had given up on the idea of a negotiated settlement:
If the Twelve should take the view that the prospect of recogni-
tion of the independence of republics can only be envisaged in
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the framework of an overall settlement which involves all 6
Republics, they are powerless against one Republic blocking
the process meant to achieve an overall settlement while in the
meantime conquering territory…
Over the next few days, the issue of the UN peacekeeping force faded, but
before it did, the Presidency sent another telegram showing how single-
mindedly it was pushing the selective approach. Part of that approach,
as we have seen, was the distinction between cooperative and non-coop-
erative parties. While a package of sanctions against Serbia had been
announced on November 8, in the absence of recognition of cooperative
republics as independent states, there was a risk that they would suffer
from the measures announced on November 8. This had not been the
intention behind the distinction between cooperative and non-coopera-
tive republics. Hence, on November 25, the Presidency urged its partners
to institute ‘positive compensatory measures’ favouring the cooperative
republics. A package of such measures was adopted, despite some opposi-
tion, at the GAC of December 2. The ‘cooperative’ republics constituted
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.
Recognition: the ‘Collective’ Decision
In the run-up to the ministerial meeting of December 16, where the
recognition issue was to be settled, the course seemed obvious: recogni-
tion would indeed be the outcome. Precisely how inevitable governments
judged recognition to have become was a matter of their perception of
–  and information on – other member states’ positions. A considerable
number of governments and Foreign Ministers were possibly unaware of
the pro-recognition consensus apparently reached by Christian-Demo-
crat government leaders and party-chairmen on Tuesday November 26.
Meeting privately in Stuyvenberg castle near Brussels under the aegis of
the European People’s Party (EPP), six Christian-Democrat government
leaders from EC member states, had gathered and agreed that the recog-
nition of Croatia and Slovenia should take place before Christmas. The
meeting was attended by Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany, Prime
Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy, Prime Minister Wilfried Martens of
Belgium, Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg, Prime Minister
Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands and Prime Minister Konstantin Mit-
sotakis of Greece.58 The Christian-Democrat pro-recognition consensus
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that had apparently emerged at this gathering of political leaders was
referred to in a message from the Dutch Ambassador in Bonn on Novem-
ber 28 concerning other high-level meetings that day:
At the end of the conversation between Chancellor Kohl and
Prime Minister Andreotti (after the meeting between Prime
Minister Lubbers and Chancellor Kohl this morning) it was
declared that Italy also intends to recognise, before Christmas,
independent republics in Yugoslavia. During the Dutch-Ger-
man meeting it was indicated that on this matter there was
agreement between all (!) Christian-Democrat government
leaders who were together in Brussels Tuesday evening in the
framework of EPP.
Several EC government leaders had not been party to this meeting and
were perhaps unaware of its outcome. For in contrast to later EPP decla-
rations on e.g. Turkish EU-membership, the consensus reached on
November 26 was not published. Even Van den Broek, himself a Christ-
ian-Democrat, claims to have been unaware (despite the message from
Bonn).59 A former Cabinet colleague of Van den Broek and Lubbers
thought it possible that Lubbers would either have not fully informed Van
den Broek, or that Van den Broek would not have felt bound to the
November 22 agreement due to the poor state of personal relations
between the two.60
It is difficult to assess precisely what impact the EPP consensus may have
had on the EC’s handling of the recognition issue. According to Lubbers,
to suggest that a pro-recognition consensus was reached at Stuyvenberg
castle, is a ‘bizarre’ summary of events, in light of the pressure that had
been exerted by Kohl and Genscher. “Let’s not fight (any longer)”, says
Lubbers, ‘would constitute a more accurate interpretation’.61 The most
obvious consequence would have been that German Chancellor Kohl
could pursue recognition in the knowledge that this was supported, or no
longer opposed, by at least half of the EC government-leaders.
Even to governments that were not part of the EPP consensus, it was
obvious from Germany’s public statements in early December that it
would insist on a decision on recognition before Christmas. On Decem-
ber 4, Genscher spoke to the WEU assembly and declared that the EC
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Presidency had set a deadline of December 10. This was a reminder of
how seriously Germany had taken the deadline set by Van den Broek and
how important a factor it had been in tying Germany into the EC’s
diplomacy. There were numerous other public and private indications of
Germany’s resilience, such as a statement by a German government
spokesman on December 13. Asked by journalists whether Germany
would recognise Croatia and Slovenia (the other republics were not men-
tioned) before Christmas, the spokesman answered: ‘Together with as
many other countries as possible within the framework of the EC. . . . On
December 16 the Foreign Ministers of the EC will discuss this issue. We
will in any case wait for that.’
The German self-assuredness prior to the final debate seemed justified.
The last vestiges of potential opposition from other EC member states
had been cleared at the Intergovernmental Conference of Maastricht on
December 9 and 10. In Maastricht, Germany supported Britain on a
number of crucial points, including an opt-out of the TEU’s social chap-
ter. As a consequence, the British, who still had great doubts about the
timeliness of recognition, seem to have felt a sense of obligation to Ger-
many that made it hard to oppose Germany on the matter of recogni-
tion.62 With British opposition silenced, France also gave way. To avoid
potential humiliation the French devised a formula, which they hoped
would cover France if the EC went ahead with recognition. This formula
consisted of a number of general criteria for recognition of new states in
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. If the EC and its member states
would go ahead with recognition, then they would do so on the basis of
criteria which the French could claim to have formulated.
The outcome seemed so certain that the Dutch Presidency on December
12 distributed a telegram among the Twelve, proposing that recognition
should be the decision taken at the ministerial meeting of December 16:
‘[T]he Twelve should consider to proceed with a policy of conditional
recognition. This would imply granting recognition only to republics that
have accepted EC proposals.’ Shortly before the meeting on December 16,
France gave in completely, turning its criteria-formula into a joint
French-German proposal.
Despite the apparently justified German self-assuredness, the Dutch
Presidency went into the final debate with reservations about the policy it
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had supported for the past two months. The main reason was that the
Dutch had belatedly realised that their anti-Serbian selectiveness con-
tained one crucial omission: the consequences of recognition for Bosnia-
Herzegovina. All this time the discussion about recognition had really
been about Croatian and Slovenian independence. The initial concern
about Bosnia-Herzegovina had slipped into the background as the Presi-
dency’s time was taken up by different considerations, despite regular
reminders from the Embassy in Belgrade that Bosnia’s stability was grad-
ually being eroded. Warnings from Lord Carrington, UN Secretary Gen-
eral Javier Perez de Cuellar, UN mediator Cyrus Vance and US President
George Bush about the consequences of a recognition in the absence of a
general settlement had served as unwelcome reminders of the dangers
associated with a selective approach that was not backed up by some kind
of military force. When on December 15 the Security Council adopted
resolution 724, the Dutch Presidency began to feel even more uncomfort-
able with its own position. Resolution 724 called upon all states and par-
ties ‘to refrain from any action which might contribute to increasing ten-
sion, to inhibiting the establishment of an effective cease-fire and to
impeding or delaying a peaceful and negotiated outcome to the conflict
in Yugoslavia.’ Clearly, in their eagerness to maintain the EC’s cohesion, to
keep Germany on board and have an outcome before Christmas, the
Dutch had ceased to pay sufficient attention to a problem whose serious-
ness they had been acutely aware of in earlier phases.
As a result of these fresh concerns, Van den Broek entered the ministerial
meeting of December 16 ‘with reservations about recognition’.63 Eventu-
ally, Van den Broek went along with what was now the German-French
compromise ‘because we could not allow the Serbs to go on as they
liked.’64 But before that happened, Van den Broek had instructed Van
Walsum to see if he could get the political directors to achieve a consen-
sus on the basis of non-recognition and isolate Germany. Surprisingly,
Van Walsum succeeded in doing so, the reason being that the great major-
ity of political directors agreed that ‘the effect of the recognition of Croa-
tia on the precarious peace in Bosnia should outweigh the unity of the
Twelve’. But when Van Walsum reported the outcome of the meeting to
Van den Broek, the latter was not as pleased as Van Walsum had expected.
Instead, an agonising Van den Broek indicated that it was ‘a complex issue
and that recognition was inevitable.’65 The Italian, Danish and Belgian
Foreign Ministers had immediately overruled their political directors and
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indicated that their countries were prepared to go a long way to keep Ger-
many within the consensus of the Twelve, with De Michelis in particular
expressing the need to maintain the unity of the EC. Moreover, when
Britain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland and Greece indicated
that they were concerned about the consequences of an early recognition,
Germany, supported by Denmark, Belgium and Italy, refused to postpone
recognition any longer. France, moreover, pointed out that a reasonable
compromise-proposal, the French-German criteria, lay on the table,
which would enable the EC to paper over the existing divisions. German
Foreign Minister Genscher hinted more than once that his country had
accommodated others at Maastricht and that the German government
could not renege on its public commitment to a recognition before
Christmas. Open division was the last thing Van den Broek needed.
According to Van Walsum, this ‘would look bad on the Dutch Presidency.
Van den Broek then turned the meeting around and a compromise was
sought on the basis of the French formula.’66
The decision eventually reached in the morning of December 17 was that
those republics that wished to be recognised as independent states would
have to apply for recognition no later than December 23. Recognition
would then take place on January 15, 1992. In order to be eligible for
recognition by the EC and its member states, these republics would have
to fulfill a number of criteria laid out in the EC ministerial declaration of
December 16. It would be for the arbitration commission, whose origins
lay in the French-German initiative of August 27/28, to judge whether
the republics fulfilled the criteria. The republics would have to respect
the CSCE and UN principles of international law, such as the inviolabili-
ty of borders, human rights, the rights of minorities and the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. Also they had to accept Lord Carrington’s
proposals for a special status for certain areas and to oblige themselves to
search for a peaceful solution of the conflict, if necessary through arbi-
tration.
In a final twist to the debate, Germany and Italy indicated that they did
not regard themselves bound to a negative judgment from the arbitration
commission regarding the fulfillment of criteria. This meant that Ger-
many, despite having co-sponsored the creation of an arbitration com-
mission and the establishment of criteria, reserved the right to recognise
Croatia and Slovenia (the only two republics that seemed to matter to

opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:13  Pagina 135
Germany in this context) in spite of a possible negative judgment from
the arbitration commission. Germany was apparently concerned that
France might use the arbitration commission, which was chaired by
Robert Badinter, an eminent French judge and former justice Minister, as
a block against recognition. In the end, the German government kept its
promise to German, Croatian and Slovenian public opinion and announ-
ced its decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia on December 18, before
the arbitration commission had been able to pass judgement.
Conclusion
The Dutch EC Presidency of 1991 was an influential player in the Euro-
pean diplomatic effort regarding the Yugoslav crisis. In some cases, such
as the negotiations in Brioni in July, the launch of the EC Monitoring
Mission or the blocking of a French proposal to launch a military inter-
vention under the auspices of the Western European Union (WEU), the
Dutch Presidency played a crucial role. What is more, the Netherlands
during this period successfully protected its own interests. The most satis-
fying result in this regard was that the Dutch were successful in maintain-
ing and presenting a basic degree of unity between the EC member states,
despite the underlying divisions. Initially, the Netherlands achieved this
by resisting pressure from Germany and a few other countries to recog-
nise individual Yugoslav republics in the absence of a negotiated settle-
ment when a majority of member states still favoured pursuing such a
settlement. Later, when Dutch views hardened and became more anti-
Serbian, the Presidency constituted an important factor in steering the
remainder of the EC member states towards the pro-recognition line.
Clearly, the decision of December 16 and 17 was the most important
political decision taken in the context of the international community’s
diplomacy with regard to the Yugoslav crisis between July and December
1991. The circumstances in which the decision was taken, the players
involved and the goals it was meant to serve, tell us three things about the
environment in which the Netherlands operated during the second half
of 1991. First of all, that environment was marked by an absence of the
United States. Following the Dutch Presidency’s attempt of July 2 and 3 to
engage the United States in the management of the Yugoslav crisis,
America remained aloof. Rather than formulating and implementing a
joint approach, American policy makers in their contacts with The Hague
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restricted themselves to irregularly expressing their concern or support
for European policies or else to give advice. Partly because of the Ameri-
can distance from the issue, the main platform for international diploma-
cy constituted the EC; an elaborate international regime with shared
norms, rules and decision-making procedures. In a regime-dominated
environment, a smaller state should theoretically be better placed to exert
influence on international affairs than in an adversarial, multi-polar envi-
ronment. Thirdly, by the end of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis, having continu-
ally risen in importance on the international political agenda, became the
litmus test of Europe’s ability to pursue common foreign policies. In
retrospect, the collective decision making of December 1991 constituted
both the high-point of European efforts to approach the crisis jointly and
the end of the European road. Lacking a credible military capability,
recognition was the most important card the EC member states possessed
but once played, there remained little else with which to influence events
on the ground.
When we consider the position of the Netherlands in its environment,
clearly the country was well placed to exercise power. This was to an
important degree the result of ‘position power’. As the EC Presidency, the
Netherlands stood at the centre of most European attempts to formulate
and implement common policies, with the exception of bilateral French-
German initiatives, which were usually prepared outside the formal
structures of European Political Cooperation. Nevertheless, as EC Presi-
dency, the Netherlands was responsible for presenting a common stance,
was relatively well informed about the national positions of its EC part-
ners and, as a result was well placed to initiate or give direction to com-
mon European approaches.
The evidence suggests that the Netherlands exploited the possibilities
associated with the Presidency to considerable effect on a number of
occasions during the second half of 1991. Apart from exercising negative
power, such as when resisting German pressure for an early recognition
and the French idea of a WEU-force, the Dutch used their position-
power in a more creative fashion as well. The most important occasion in
this respect was the imposition of a two-month deadline on the parties to
the EC-chaired negotiations for a general settlement. By making it
inevitable that a decision on recognition would have to be taken before
the end of the Dutch Presidency, the Netherlands was able to contain
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German pro-recognition pressure and prevent a German ‘Alleingang’. At
the same time, by keeping open the theoretical possibility of a settlement
the Dutch could not be accused of undermining the EC Conference even
though this was the practical effect of the deadline. The obligation now
lay with the supporters of a negotiated settlement to explain how this
could be reached and, if they were forced to admit it could not, why one
should postpone recognition any longer. The warning of a spill-over of
the conflict to Bosnia-Herzegovina by Lord Carrington and others seems
to have created some doubt in The Hague about the effectiveness of the
selective approach. But by then the path to recognition had been so firm-
ly laid down that there was no way back. Moreover, Van den Broek and
his officials believed that their main argument in favour of recognition,
namely the need for a response to Serbia’s fait-accompli policy, was still
valid. Moreover, by showing himself to be concerned about the situation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the meeting of December 16 and 17, Van
den Broek ensured that he could not later be accused of having underesti-
mated the potential for spill-over. All subsequent criticisms of the EC’s
handling of the recognition issue could be passed on to Germany, whose
ruthless pursuit of Croatian and Slovenian recognition had been plain for
everyone to see.
External factors, particularly the Netherlands’ position-power, were key
to Dutch influence during the second half of 1991. Domestic factors
nevertheless also facilitated the exercise of power in Dutch foreign policy.
In contrast to the earlier period, there was a strong desire for action in the
Dutch foreign policy establishment. However, in contrast to later
episodes, the policies geared to the Yugoslav crisis generally remained
firmly tied into the all-important, explicitly stated, national interest of
maintaining EC cohesion. The Dutch interest in EC cohesion, itself
admittedly influenced by Dutch values, principles and views regarding
European integration, functioned as a constant and an ‘objective’ nation-
al interest in the framework of the Yugoslav crisis. That said, it is clear
that the fall of Vukovar and the shelling of Dubrovnik triggered a
response that was far more emotional than anything seen until that
moment. The Dutch dropped all pretense of supporting the idea of a
negotiated settlement, thus risking opposition, when a continuation of
the ‘calculated’ selectiveness would almost certainly have led to the
desired outcome anyway.
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4 Moral and Political Entrapment 
The Netherlands and International Peace Plans 
for Bosnia, 1992-1994.
In 1992 Bosnia-Herzegovina became the scene of the next, most violent
phase in the Yugoslav crisis. In late March of that year, the Serbian cam-
paign began in earnest. Within the space of little more than two weeks all
the cities commanding the roads between Bosnia and Serbia as well as be-
tween Bosnia and Serb-held Croatia were taken by Serb forces and emp-
tied of its Bosnian Muslim or Croat population. Subsequently, the roads
between these towns were opened up. By May, some six weeks after the
start of the campaign, Serb forces controlled some 60 per cent (ultimately
70 per cent) of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though Serbs
constituted only 31 per cent of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina.1
Within the territory taken by Serb forces, thousands of Muslims in particu-
lar were murdered and imprisoned, while hundreds of thousands more
were driven from their homes in a strategy that became known as ‘ethnic
cleansing’. In Eastern Bosnia the towns of Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde
had somehow withstood the attacks and had been able to organise a
Yugoslav-style territorial defence successfully. By the end of the year, the
Bosnian Muslim forces from Zepa en Srebrenica, as well as some smaller
enclaves to the north of Srebrenica had been able to link up with each
other, connecting the isolated enclaves into one swath of territory – hav-
ing killed hundreds of Serbs in the process. However, isolated from Bos-
nian Muslim-held central Bosnia, the resistance of these enclaves withered
away, so that by March 1993 it looked as if Srebrenica would fall too. This
was when the UNPROFOR Commander, French General Philippe Moril-
lon intervened personally and went into the Srebrenica enclave to share
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the population’s plight and stave off further attacks. The UN Security
Council subsequently declared Srebrenica a ‘safe area’. A cease-fire agree-
ment was reached between the Bosnian Serb commander, General Ratko
Mladic, and the commander of the Bosnian government’s forces, General
Sefer Halilovic. Canadian peacekeepers were placed inside the ‘safe area’
in order to deter attacks against it. The Canadians were replaced by Dutch
peacekeepers in early 1994.
During the first two years of the Bosnian war, from April 1992 until late
1993, the ‘selectiveness’ that had started to emerge during the Dutch
term as EC Presidency gradually intensified. The general aim of Dutch
selectiveness was to defend law and order in the former Yugoslavia, par-
ticularly in the now officially recognised republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
When war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in May 1992, on a scale not
seen in Croatia, this concern translated itself into three related – though
not always easily reconcilable – policy aims. The first was to preserve or
restore as much as possible the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina
against what was seen as external aggression by Serbia and the Yugoslav
army. The second was to defend democracy and human rights against
the Serbian strategy of ethnic cleansing. The third was to relieve the suf-
fering of the civilian (Muslim) population. These three goals had in
common the apparent need for a political and military intervention in
support of the legitimate Muslim-dominated government of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.2
We will endeavour here to trace the beginning of the Dutch road into
entrapment. We will demonstrate how in August 1992, leading Dutch
politicians applied high moral rhetoric to mark their positions domesti-
cally and internationally. Secondly, having occupied the moral high-
ground so visibly, the Dutch government became a loyal supporter of the
legitimate Bosnian government. This meant backing up demands posed
by the Bosnian government and maintaining a principled opposition to
peace initiatives and policies that did not seem to deliver these demands.
Nor could settlements be supported that did not fulfil the moral criteria
which the international community had formulated, but to which the
Netherlands clung more tightly than most other Western governments.
By the time it was realised that the Netherlands risked isolation, it was too
late to backtrack, given that the domestic audience had been fed the
moral diet on a daily basis and would not have been able to stomach an
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abrupt change of message. What is more, the Dutch troop commitment
to the UN’s safe area policy had already been made.
Moral Entrapment
Following the end of the Dutch Presidency, the Dutch Foreign Ministry
continued its selectiveness. Van den Broek and his officials stuck to their
analysis that Serbia and the Yugoslav army were the main culprits in the
Yugoslav crisis. Hence, the Netherlands disagreed with suggestions from a
small number of EC member states and UN officials to suspend the EC’s
decision to recognise Bosnia in order to forestall a VJ-backed secession by
the Bosnian Serbs. Van den Broek opposed this reasoning, arguing
instead that ‘Serbia should not be rewarded for its policy of faits-accom-
plis and for effectively holding Bosnia-Herzegovina hostage, by withhold-
ing recognition from that republic if it fulfilled the criteria.’ Indeed, as
Van den Broek had added, the crucial question was whether Milosevic
would be prepared to respect Bosnia’s borders; if not, then the situation
in Bosnia would escalate regardless of whether the EC recognised Bosnia
or not. The USA and a majority of EC member states shared the Dutch
position regarding Bosnia’s recognition.
When war broke out in Bosnia in early May, Dutch officials and Minister
Van den Broek could not help feeling vindicated in their analysis. They
had since December 1991 supported the Bosnian government’s calls for a
preventive deployment of UN peacekeepers in that republic. During the
public hearings of the TCBU Parliamentary investigation committee in
May and June 2000, Van den Broek reflected on the explicit intervention-
ist stance he took up after the Dutch EC Presidency had ended its term.
The Netherlands had been among the vanguard of countries that wanted
a forceful intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992. Van den Broek
solemnly declared: ‘I am not ashamed to say that I have always been a
supporter of military intervention… The Netherlands has a moral duty
to contribute to the maintenance of the international legal order.’3
What really engaged the Dutch, as well as Western, moral consciousness,
were the TV images of Serb-run concentration camps full of emaciated
non-Serb prisoners. ITN’s television production of August 6, 1992
triggered the kind of response that neither written journalism, nor the
siege and fall of Vukovar, nor events in Bosnia until then had provoked.
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Analogies with the German concentration camps of the Second World
War were too obvious to be ignored: ‘The main objective of the concen-
tration camps, especially Omarska but also Keraterm’, a UN report later
concluded, ‘seems to have been to eliminate the non-Serbian leadership.’4
Like in Britain, France or the US, many Dutch commentators now
argued the case for a military intervention against the Serbs, who were
embarking on a project akin, in nature if not in scale, to what the Nazis
had done between 1939 and 1945.
Virtually the entire Dutch political establishment adopted the case for a
military intervention in support of the Bosnian Muslims as their own.
But, in contrast to their counterparts in France and Britain, Dutch politi-
cians showed little interest in, and were even dismissive about, such prac-
tical questions as how the Bosnian Muslims could best be helped politi-
cally and militarily, who would carry out a military intervention, or what
the political outcome of a military intervention ought to be. The whole
debate on intervention was conducted on a moral level and left no room
for practical considerations. The general attitude was very much that the
Bosnian government needed to be supported and that as a politician,
journalist or diplomat it was vital to be seen to be supportive of the Bos-
nian government, simply because it was the morally right – and the polit-
ically correct – thing to do.
Following the discovery of the camps, the Dutch Minister for Develop-
ment Cooperation, PvdA politician Jan Pronk, made it clear that in his
view the war in Bosnia was of a different nature than the one that had led
to the destruction of Vukovar: ‘Pure racist violence on a large scale, you
cannot let that pass. Because of the attempt of the Serbs to exterminate
minorities, the character of the conflict in Yugoslavia has changed. Now
that this Hitlerian strategy is evident, military intervention must take
place.’5
Pronk was not just a Minister. He was one of the most prominent and
outspoken politicians in the Netherlands with a vocal band of supporters
in the PvdA (Labour), the largest political party at this stage. More than
any other politician in the Netherlands Pronk embodied the ‘ethical
impulse’ in Dutch foreign policy. Strongly supported by a substantial por-
tion of the PvdA electorate, Pronk’s opinions were always noted and
could strongly influence opinion within his party. In this case he had also
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touched a nerve in the Dutch population at large. Only a small minority
of commentators voiced their doubts about the new-born intervention-
ism on the part of a political class that had hitherto not been known for
its enthusiasm and knowledge about military matters. Thus, Jerôme
Heldring wrote in NRC Handelsblad that Pronk was too nonchalant
about the nature of the military intervention he advocated. It was not
done for a Cabinet Minister to argue away the complexities of military
intervention by stating that ‘as an amateur’, he did not know ‘how one
could best intervene’.6 Nevertheless, Pronk’s remark illustrative of the
thinking of most of his colleagues, irrespective of their political back-
ground. When the terrible news from Bosnia reached them, they aban-
doned their summer holidays for a special session of Parliament to dis-
cuss what should be done. In the run-up to the debate, the media were
replete with calls for action, such as by CDA (Christian-Democrat) par-
liamentary spokesman for Foreign Affairs Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who
said: ‘I think that has to happen, military intervention. You have to ask
yourself for a moment in which way. You must intervene militarily.’7
Another leading figure in the Dutch foreign policy establishment was
Joris Voorhoeve, former parliamentary leader of the VVD (Conservative
Liberals), who was at that time the head of the international relations
think-tank ‘Clingendael’ and later became the Minister of Defence. In an
open editorial Voorhoeve and his colleague Theo van den Doel wrote: ‘…
if humanitarian law does not compel us to an active combating of geno-
cide, then certainly ethics compels us to take action against mass murder,
torture, starvation and expulsion. For Evil to be victorious the only
requirement is for good people to do nothing. In that sense the outside
world becomes co-responsible for the mass murders in Bosnia.’8
These are but a few of an endless series of public statements testifying to
the moral indignation felt by Dutch politicians upon learning the true
scale of the atrocities being committed in the Bosnian war by Serb forces.
Dutch politicians were by no means isolated from Dutch public opinion
as expressed in the media. Editorials, television interviews, opinion polls,
parliamentary debates and the advice emanating from the officials in the
Foreign Ministry all pointed in the same direction: giving moral, political
and military support to the Bosnian Muslims.9 Together with the very few
columnists such as Heldring, the main voice of dissent was that of the
Ministry of Defence, which warned that the kinds of military steps being
discussed in Parliament and in the press would not be easy to carry out in
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practice and that, in any case, the means at the disposal of the army at a
time of reforms were limited (see chapter 5).
The Netherlands at the 1992 London Conference
It was in this heavy atmosphere that Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek
led a Dutch delegation to the London Conference of August 26-27, 1992.
The Conference was hosted by the British EC Presidency and brought
together the EC and the UN in what British Prime Minister John Major
called a ‘major effort to mobilise international pressure on all the former
Yugoslav parties and in particular the Serbs to abandon their wholly
unacceptable use of force.’10 Only a week before, the UN Security Council
had passed Resolution 770, which empowered states, ‘acting nationally or
through regional arrangements, to use any measures necessary to deliver
humanitarian relief ’. From the Dutch point of view the time was right
and the Conference the perfect forum to mobilise international public
opinion for the selective approach the Dutch had themselves adopted
almost a year ago.
The Dutch delegation arrived in London in a purposeful mood. Employ-
ing classic small-state tools, the Netherlands sought both to mobilise in-
ternational public opinion in support of the Bosnian government and to
enhance its reputation as a haven of moral virtue. Using a mixture of
demonstration politics, moral guidance and public criticism the Dutch
delegation tried to exert influence on the direction of international
Yugoslavia diplomacy. At the same time there was an element of self-
congratulation in the Dutch delegation’s approach to the Conference, as
was later admitted by one member of the delegation. According to the
Foreign Ministry’s director for UN Affairs, Jan Hoekema, the delegation
members felt as if they were on a mission to convert the international
community: ‘In London, salvation and blessing would have to come
from ourselves.’11 Using ‘clear language’, the Dutch would try to push the
international community into taking sides with the Bosnians against the
Serbs.
Van den Broek’s speech at the Conference did achieve international fame,
often being mentioned in the literature as one of the Conference’s tough-
est.12 In it he stated: ‘The most important aim of this conference in London,
in our view, is therefore to increase the pressure on the chief culprit, Serbia,
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with its abhorrent practice of ethnic cleansing’. He reminded the partici-
pants of the principles, such as respect for borders and human rights,
which were under threat and called for the full and immediate implemen-
tation of UN Security Council resolution 770. He went on to propose a
number of tough measures against Serbia, fully in line with Dutch selec-
tiveness, such as the admission of observers in a number of places in 
the former Yugoslavia, notably in Serbia’s Albanian-inhabited province of
Kosovo, a tightening of the trade embargo, the expulsion of Serbian repres-
entatives from official bodies and the setting up of a war crimes tribunal.
Having made references to the need to protect human rights, recognise
borders and the rights of minorities, Van den Broek went further: ‘I said
that “military intervention must not be excluded as a last resort”. That
was something my officials were not allowed to write.’13 According to Sil-
ber and Little, Van den Broek’s statement formed the basis for a declara-
tion ‘lambasting the Serbs’, which the Netherlands and Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina insisted should be adopted by the Conference, or else they would walk
out of the Conference together.14 Eventually, most of the Dutch-proposed
elements were indeed taken up in the various statements issued by the
Conference. The most important of these were the ‘Programme of Action
on Humanitarian Issues Agreed Between the Co-Chairmen to the Con-
ference and the Parties to the Conflict’, a ‘Statement of Principles’, the
‘Work Programme of the Conference’ [which set up the International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia], ‘Specific Decisions by the London
Conference’ and a ‘Statement on Bosnia’.15
In particular the ‘Statement of Principles’ would often be cited by the
Dutch government in months to come as the yardstick by which to mea-
sure the moral and political acceptability of the plans on the table.
Indeed, there were thirteen principles a peace plan should adhere to, the
most important of which were the non-recognition of all advantages
gained by force, the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
of the members of ethnic and national communities, compliance with
the Geneva Conventions and the fundamental respect for the indepen-
dence, sovereignty and integrity of state borders.16
For the Netherlands, the London Conference constituted a diplomatic
triumph, albeit a short-lived one. The problem with the Dutch position
was not that it was wrong – in retrospect it may be said to have been very
right – but that it presumed a willingness to make sacrifices on the part of
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those countries who would be instrumental in turning principle into
reality. Van den Broek later recalled receiving a hand-written note from
Major immediately after his speech, which read: ‘Hans, I agree with every
word you said’, adding that he wished he still possessed it.17 That last
remark indicated that Van den Broek felt that Major had backtracked on
these words after the Conference. Whether or not this was a fair judge-
ment to make, clearly the words produced by the London Conference
meant little by themselves. They required practical measures for them to
be given real weight. But the Dutch hope that more powerful countries
might launch a military intervention was soon proven to be false. ‘Those
framing policy felt unable to undertake more decisive military action
both for practical reasons and because of the limits imposed by both the
UN Charter and the conventions of international relations’.18 The inter-
vention eventually launched was of a strictly humanitarian nature and
consisted of the provision of military escorts to the humanitarian opera-
tion carried out by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.
For the Dutch Foreign Minister and his officials, the weak follow-up to
the London Conference was hard to swallow. The Netherlands now
entered into a state of self-righteousness that was as understandable as it
was dangerous for a country that lacks the political and military power to
turn high moral principles into concrete action. Believing the case for
intervention to be crystal-clear from a moral point of view, the Dutch
Foreign Ministry refused any longer to try and understand, let alone
respect, the reasons why the countries that would have to ensure compli-
ance by the Yugoslav parties to the London decisions were reluctant to
pay the military costs associated with this kind of coercion. To Van den
Broek and his officials ‘the British were appeasers, the French pro-Serb’
and the refusal to intervene militarily was a matter of ‘weak knees’.19
Dutch officials, politicians and journalists frequently made similar
remarks. Some of this contempt inevitably showed through in contacts
with European counterparts and, inevitably, the moral pride of the Dutch
was registered outside the country. (Interestingly, in June 1993 the French
permanent representative to the UN in New York remarked that France
had 6,300 troops on the ground and ‘would not accept lessons in morali-
ty from anyone.’20) In essence, in studying Dutch policy between August
1992 and May 1993, one is studying the behaviour, not of a government,
but of a single-issue pressure group.21 For months, an ever more frustrated
Dutch government continually advocated policies that were morally
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righteous but whose implementation would not be a Dutch responsibili-
ty. At some point, Dutch policy makers would inevitably begin to feel
uncomfortable with this position. They would then be faced with a diffi-
cult choice: either they would have to moderate a message they them-
selves and Dutch public opinion claimed strongly to believe in, or they
would have to take on a considerable share of the burden for implement-
ing the policies they were advocating. While the entrapment of 1994-1995
was still far from inevitable, its contours had slowly begun to take shape.
Political Entrapment
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan
The Vance-Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) had been drawn up in late 1992 by
the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) under the
chairmanship of Cyrus Vance and David Lord Owen. A crucial role in the
actual drafting of the plan had been played by Martti Ahtisaari, the later
Finnish president and international mediator for the Kosovo-crisis. The
ICFY had drawn up various options, all of which needed to reconcile the
tension between the stated wish of the international community and the
Bosnian government to retain a single, multi-cultural Bosnian state with
a central government on the one hand and military reality, pre-war
demographics and the desire on the part of the Bosnian Serbs and the
Bosnian Croats to obtain at the very least a high degree of autonomy on
the other. Eventually, the ICFY co-chairmen had opted for a de-cen-
tralised state of ten provinces. These provinces would inevitably have an
ethnic majority but all were constitutionally designed to be multi-cultur-
al, while none would have international-legal status, so as to prevent the
tripartition of the country and allow as many refugees as possible to
return to their homes.22 The plan was presented on January 2, 1993 in the
first of a series of plenary sessions comprising the political leaders of all
three sides. At the end of the two-day session the Bosnian Croats signed
the package, consisting of the constitutional principles, the cessation of
hostilities agreement and the map, in full. Within the following two weeks
the Bosnian Muslims signed the constitutional principles and the cessa-
tion of hostilities but refused to accept the map. The Bosnian Serbs, who
were being asked to give up some 38 per cent of the 60 to 70 per cent of
territory they controlled in Bosnia-Herzegovina, signed the cessation of
hostilities but refused to sign anything else.23 Eventually, the Bosnian Serb
delegation headed by Radovan Karadzic signed the package in full on
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May 2 but that success proved short-lived as the validity of the signature
was called into question by a referendum among the Bosnian Serbs, who
rejected the plan. The US, Britain and France could have decided to start
implementing the plan on the basis of the Bosnian Serb delegation’s sig-
nature of May 2 but refused to do so for fear of continued Bosnian Serb
opposition.
Owen later accused the Netherlands of not having given its full support to
the VOPP in the first months of 1993 and that of all the EU member
states the Netherlands had been the most critical.24 He also argued that
the Netherlands had ‘created very large problems for the Vance-Owen
peace plan’, had influenced ‘some attitudes’ of the first Clinton adminis-
tration – which had refused to support the plan – and that ‘the Nether-
lands played an important role in the torpedoing of the Vance-Owen
plan’. These remarks were greeted in the Dutch newspaper editorials with
an uneasy, somewhat bemused disbelief, perhaps because it challenged
the comforting self-image of the Netherlands as a morally righteous and
influential state, whose fault, however, it ultimately never was due to its
limited power. Also, the idea that ‘raw emotions’, ‘ignorance’ and ‘pseudo-
moralism’ had been the main domestic sources of Dutch opposition to
the plan was dismissed.25
One prominent Dutch politician was stirred into denying Owen’s criti-
cisms. Hans van den Broek, who had left his post as Minister of Foreign
Affairs in January 1993, to become the EU Commissioner for External
Affairs, let it be known through his spokesman in Brussels, that he ‘did
not remember the Dutch role this way’.26 That it was Van den Broek who
replied to Owen’s accusations seemed a bit strange, given that he had left
the Dutch Cabinet on January 2, 1993. While the peace package had
gradually developed during the preceding months, the official negotia-
tions had not started until that same day. In other words, the responsibil-
ity for formulating Dutch policy regarding the Vance Owen plan fell pri-
marily on the shoulders of Van den Broek’s successor rather than on Van
den Broek himself. It is unclear what motivated Van den Broek to
respond in this manner, but his continued sense of responsibility for
Dutch policy even after his departure from The Hague reflected the con-
tinuity of the ‘selective’ approach of which Van den Broek had been the
political architect.
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The only apparent discontinuity between Van den Broek and his succes-
sor, Professor Pieter Kooijmans, an eminent lawyer from the University of
Leiden who later became a judge at the International Court of Justice, was
that the latter had no problem admitting that he had opposed the Vance-
Owen Peace Plan. According to Kooijmans, ‘The Netherlands was very
critical towards the VOPP.’27 Senior diplomats confirmed that they too
had had serious objections to the plan. According to Hoekema, for
instance, he and his colleagues had shared a sense of ‘moral indignation’,
had been ‘very critical’ of the VOPP and had entertained ‘whole series of
objections’ against it.28 Dr Niek Biegman, who had become the Permanent
Representative at the United Nations in New York in September 1992 fol-
lowing a spell as Director-General for international cooperation, also
acknowledged that the Netherlands had been critical towards the VOPP.29
Ambassador Wijnaendts, who had returned to his post in Paris, posed a
critical question, in his case publicly and at a time when the VOPP was still
on the table: ‘Was it… wise’ he wrote in his own memoirs, ‘on the part of
Vance and Owen to want to impose a plan for the division of Bosnia-
Herzegovina on the Muslims, the main victims of the conflict?’30
There were two major reasons why the Netherlands opposed the VOPP: it
was considered unjust and it was thought that a better alternative could
be had. The plan was perceived to reward the Serbs for their ethnic
cleansing campaign by awarding them too much territory. The Bosnian
Muslims, the chief victims of the war, were felt to be hard done by. Sec-
ondly, it was hoped that something better could in practice be achieved.
‘We considered the VOPP a post-facto legitimisation of ethnic cleansing
and it conflicted with the principles of the London Conference. We did
not believe in a durable peace that did not contain the basic elements of
justice… The Bosnians opposed it and you have to listen to those who
have to live with it. We were in close contact with them.’31 In sum, accord-
ing to Kooijmans, the VOPP entailed a ‘premature capitulation before
ethnic cleansing’.32 Biegman too acknowledged that the Dutch had found
it difficult to reconcile their own principled stance with support for the
VOPP, saying that the plan had ‘contained too great an element of
rewarding Serbian aggression.’33
The main objections raised by the Dutch to the Vance-Owen plan were
thus of a moral nature, although it was also sometimes argued that 
the plan was difficult to implement. It is, in retrospect, difficult to raise
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principled objections against the intentions accompanying the Dutch
position. Nevertheless, objections can be raised regarding the attitude
underlying the Dutch stance and the lack of attention paid to the possi-
ble effects of the Dutch position for the situation on the ground in
Bosnia. One of the problems with the Dutch position was an underlying
attitude of moral arrogance. The Dutch professed to be frustrated by the
fact that theirs was a minority stance but at the same time they seemed
somehow to revel in it because it confirmed the home-made image of
their country as a haven of moral virtue.34 Kooijmans, for instance,
argued: ‘We made a clearer distinction between good and bad than most
of the others … that was perhaps our idealism.’35 This was not the first
time Kooijmans indicated that an emphasis on morality in foreign policy
set the Netherlands apart from other countries. In one interview, when
asked whether in international affairs the Dutch sometimes operated as
missionaries, Kooijmans replied: ‘I am proud of that. We care about
human civilisation. We care about the quality of international society.
The Netherlands often leads in this … It is correct that the Netherlands,
within the European Union, has made out a case for measures against
the Serbs. We also did so under my predecessor Van den Broek. But me
too, I feel that one cannot, on this point, adopt a purely pragmatic
approach. I just cannot bring myself to conduct Realpolitik in relation to
Yugoslavia. One cannot and may not think in terms of: what has the
Netherlands got to do with this? Where is our economic interest? … I
also think that the Dutch population and Parliament ask of me that I
openly protest against violations of human rights … I receive more par-
liamentary questions about human rights violations than most of my
foreign colleagues. That says something about the mentality of our coun-
try.’36 Biegman too emphasised the qualitative difference between the
Netherlands and other Western states, saying that ‘the Netherlands ful-
filled a role in New York and in EC policy by occupying the moral high-
ground and consistently pointed out who was the aggressor, who the vic-
tim and who committed most war crimes’.37
Even though it would depend on other countries to turn the principles
defended by the Netherlands into reality, the Dutch felt their criticisms of
the VOPP to be entirely justified because a better deal was not just a
moral obligation but a practical possibility. According to Biegman, ‘there
was a feeling that a better deal could be had for the Muslims’.38 All it
seemed to require was for the newly elected US administration, headed by
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president Bill Clinton, to show the kind of courage so conspicuously
absent in places like London, Paris and Bonn. As Kooijmans put it, ‘We
advocated military intervention as an alternative to the VOPP. The idea
was to involve the Americans but that did not succeed. We were saying to
the Americans: “Come in with your troops and help us improve the plan:
a better map, a better governmental structure, help us reintegrate the
country.”’39
As Kooijmans’s remark indicates, the Dutch policy of persuading the US
to use its military power to improve the lot of the Bosnian Muslims ulti-
mately failed. Nevertheless, in January and February 1993 the omens for
greater American involvement seemed good. Both during the transition
and following Clinton’s inauguration as President on 20 January 1993
senior figures in the new Administration aired critical comments about
the VOPP. The main message from Washington was that the plan reward-
ed ethnic cleansing and therefore was morally unacceptable. Thus, the US
Ambassador to the United Nations and later Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, said in a press conference on February 24, 1993 that the plan
amounted to ‘rewarding aggression and punishing the victims.’
While the US objections against the VOPP fell on receptive ears in the
Netherlands, the ensuing public disagreements between the ICFY co-
chairmen and the Clinton administration caused an acute conflict of loy-
alty for the Netherlands. So far, the Dutch had not made public their
objections to the VOPP in order not to undermine EC unity. According to
Kooijmans, it was ‘possible to show oneself to be very critical within a
closed front.’40 But the increasingly open conflict between the ICFY and
the US, in which the ICFY co-chairmen called upon the EC member states
to maintain a united front towards the US, embarrassed the Netherlands.
Uncomfortable with the ICFY’s approach, Kooijmans tried to convince
the Europeans that American support for the VOPP was going to be nec-
essary. In a meeting in The Hague on February 4 with the EC Ambas-
sadors to the Netherlands, Kooijmans said that he was worried about
‘Lord Owen’s criticisms of the US stance’, because he ‘considered close
cooperation with the US of greatest importance’ if implementation of the
plan was to succeed. Kooijmans also told the Ambassadors that he saw
four possible scenarios in relation to the American stance, ranging from
outright rejection to unconditional acceptance of the VOPP, neither of
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which he considered likely. There were two alternatives: the US might
accept the plan but distance itself from the implementation or might
demand changes to the plan which would make US support possible.
Kooijmans believed that the latter option was the ‘least unfavourable’ and
concluded his briefing by repeating that the Netherlands thought it of
‘essential importance’ that the US would be involved as closely as possible
in the implementation of the VOPP. Despite having been ambiguous
about the question of whether or not the Netherlands supported the
VOPP as it stood, experienced diplomats must have observed that the real
Dutch position boiled down to a hope that US involvement would lead to
a forceful implementation of an upgraded plan.
The Dutch awaited the first concrete American initiative regarding the
Bosnian conflict with great anticipation. On February 10, the new US
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, announced that the US would
take six steps to help solve the Bosnian conflict. He announced that the
US would ‘engage actively and directly in the Vance-Owen negotiations’
and called for a number of measures to ‘deter Serbia from widening the
war’. Crucially, however, he had qualified this apparently forceful US
engagement by adding that ‘the only way’ to end the conflict was through
‘negotiation’ and that ‘no settlement [could] be imposed on the parties.’41
In The Hague, Christopher’s speech was seen as a step in the right direc-
tion. In an analysis of the speech, DAV officials advised Kooijmans on
how to proceed after Christopher’s speech. The paper first encouraged
Kooijmans to think that the speech did indeed constitute an important
positive step. The American refusal to contemplate imposition on the
parties, so it was argued, would strengthen the position of the Bosnian
government in relation to the ICFY co-chairmen: ‘[T]he US has picked
up the thread where the negotiators had left it… Particularly Owen
seemed to believe that pressure on the Muslims would bring results…
From the fact that the Muslims are not really prepared to negotiate as
long as they are the victim of Serb attacks and ethnic cleansing, the Ameri-
cans draw a different conclusion than Owen and Vance, namely that the
Bosnian Serbs must be forced to make more concessions.’
The DAV memo also expressed the belief that the US was taking the time
necessary to achieve a ‘more acceptable settlement’. While fundamen-
tally positive about the new US involvement, DAV also warned that the
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American search for a better settlement, however much welcomed by the
Netherlands, would require additional time and that in the process a
‘vacuum could arise that endanger[s] the peace process’. American
involvement, it was added, should ‘not lead … to a deterioration of the
situation on the ground’. In order to prevent this from happening, Kooij-
mans was advised to encourage the Americans to indicate which specific
improvements to the plan they had in mind. This could be done at a forth-
coming gathering of NATO Ministers on February 26.
In Brussels on February 26, Kooijmans took up a position that was
strongly supportive of what he believed to be the American position.
Whereas his British and French colleagues made a case for supporting the
VOPP as it stood, Kooijmans argued that, since the plan had not yet been
accepted by all the belligerent parties, there should exist a willingness to
make improvements to the plan. Welcoming Christopher’s statement of
February 10, Kooijmans went on to request that the American Secretary
of State indicate more precisely which changes the US thought the VOPP
required. As the meeting wore on, however, it became painfully apparent
that the Dutch had misread the American attitude. American difficulties
with the VOPP, it turned out, were not so much that the plan was not
ambitious enough but that it was overly ambitious and regarded as a
European entrapment exercise. The US Secretary of State did not call for
changes to the VOPP at all. Instead he simply stated that it was up to the
Europeans to take the lead and increase their efforts.
It was now clear that American troops were no more likely to fight for the
Bosnian Muslims than were Dutch troops. The Dutch realised that the
better deal they had encouraged the Bosnians to hope for might, after all,
not be had. Worse, the political vacuum the DAV memorandum had
warned against was already coming about for there was no alternative
negotiating track available. The feared deterioration of the situation on
the ground now also constituted a harsh reality. Particularly in Eastern
Bosnia, Serb forces were overrunning the Bosnian Muslims, who had in
early January still controlled substantial amounts of territory. Most of the
VOPP’s province number seven, intended as a Muslim-majority pro-
vince, threatened to fall into Serb hands. By mid-April the last Muslim-
controlled territory around Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia was at risk of
falling to the Serbs. With Srebrenica gone so would be the last chance of
implementing the VOPP.
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Fortunately, it seemed, on May 2 the Bosnian Serb leadership finally
signed the VOPP but four days later the Bosnian Serb Parliament refused
to endorse their leaders’ signatures and announced a referendum, which
they knew would lead to a rejection of the plan. For the US, to whom
imposition of the plan on the Serbs was anathema, this signalled the
death of the VOPP. Britain and France subsequently arrived at the same
conclusion given that they were reluctant to implement the plan without
American military support.42 The Netherlands, which still did not have
any combat troops on the ground in Bosnia, went the other way. Seeing
that tripartition was now approaching fast, it became a staunch advocate
of the plan.
Two weeks before Karadzic signed the VOPP, the Security Council had
adopted resolution 819 (April 16), which demanded that Srebrenica and
its immediate surroundings be treated as a ‘safe area’. Given that Srebreni-
ca’s safe area status apparently helped the enclave to stay out of the hands
of the surrounding Serbs, Kooijmans felt that an expansion of the safe
area concept might be a good way of supporting the VOPP. ‘Our linking
of the VOPP with the safe areas can be explained by our concern that tri-
partition was approaching. Even in the VOPP, these areas were for the
Muslims. Our plea for safe areas was aimed to ensure that it would not get
even worse.’43 Having advocated safe areas at a General Affairs Council
(GAC) in Copenhagen on April 26, the next opportunity for Kooijmans
to make the case for safe areas constituted a meeting with Christopher on
May 7 at the Dutch embassy in Bonn.
The meeting with Christopher demonstrated how far apart the Nether-
lands and the US had moved regarding the VOPP. Christopher was tour-
ing Europe to rally support for a so-called ‘lift and strike’ policy. (‘Lift and
strike’ meant a lifting of the arms embargo and the launching of air
strikes in order to prevent the Serbs from overrunning the Muslims dur-
ing the period the latter would need to obtain more weapons once the
embargo had been lifted. The Europeans, whose troops would be caught
up in the ensuing escalation, refused to support it.) Before he met with
Kooijmans, Christopher had signalled in earlier meetings with the
British, Danish and Belgian members of the EC Troika and in a meeting
with Commissioner Van den Broek that he believed the VOPP was off the
table. Ironically, Christopher told Kooijmans that he believed that the US
and the Netherlands thought ‘along similar lines’. Christopher confided in
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Kooijmans that the US believed the VOPP for the time being should be
laid aside but that he had come under the impression in his consultations
with the EC-Troika the day before that they were still clinging to the plan.
However, according to Christopher, for the near future the plan was not
an implementable option. It was not dead but at the most something for
later. It must have come as a surprise to Christopher, given earlier Dutch
policy, that Kooijmans disagreed. Pointing out the potentially disastrous
humanitarian consequences of the US-proposed policy of ‘lift and strike’,
Kooijmans instead suggested the creation of safe areas, arguing that ‘it
protected the most vulnerable civilian population and in fact left the
VOPP intact, because it concerned areas that in [that plan] belong[ed] to
the “muslim provinces”.’ The two politicians parted after Christopher had
expressed serious doubts about the safe area concept (see chapter 5).
While the Netherlands had finally come round to supporting the VOPP,
even in the face of continued American opposition, Britain and France
moved in an opposite direction. Having consistently supported the
VOPP, they now decided they could not save the VOPP if there was not
even a basic American willingness to support it. The plan’s death sentence
was signed by the US, Russia, Britain, France and Spain on May 22 in the
so-called Joint Action Programme (JAP). The final negotiations for the
JAP had taken place during the previous weekend, outside the UN, ICFY
and EC frameworks, and the result constituted an intergovernmental
agreement between five governments united by their membership of the
Security Council. The JAP no longer spoke of the VOPP, referring to the
Vance-Owen ‘process’ instead. To soften the blow for international opin-
ion, heal transatlantic divisions and divert attention from the real prob-
lem, namely their unwillingness to fight the Serbs over the VOPP, the five
governments announced a number of ad-hoc measures, such as the cre-
ation of additional safe areas and the establishment of a war crimes tri-
bunal.
The Netherlands understood what was going on and protested in vain.
According to Kooijmans, ‘the JAP was to a certain degree even worse than
the VOPP. It was much more of a diktat than the VOPP and it was a
breaching of the EC by France and Britain. This caused irritation.’44 The
Dutch government protested: the US Ambassador was summoned to the
Ministry and in a sharp-toned telegram to his EC colleagues, Kooijmans
stated that there seemed to be a ‘discrepancy between the [JAP] of the 5
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[Security Council] members and the earlier positions of the Community
and its member states, particularly concerning the Vance-Owen Peace Plan
(VOPP).’ In conclusion, the telegram summed up the Dutch position:
The Netherlands is of the opinion that the VOPP should
remain the overall political framework for a solution of the
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that acceptance of the plan
by all the parties to the conflict remains the goal of the interna-
tional community.
The Dutch criticisms of the JAP were repeated in an uneasy telephone
conversation between Kooijmans and his French colleague Alain Juppé.
According to Kooijmans, the latter was ‘very defensive’ when Kooijmans
expressed his concern that the JAP might harm the VOPP. When Juppé
asked Kooijmans whether it was not the case that the Netherlands had
consistently championed safe areas, Kooijmans replied that this was true
but that the Dutch ‘had advocated safe areas within the context of the
VOPP and that they should never be allowed to develop into ghettos’.
When the Netherlands opposed the VOPP in January and February, it
had stood isolated. Now that it supported the plan, the country again
stood isolated.
To some degree the Netherlands had carried responsibility for the contin-
uation of war, the reduced solidarity between the EC member states and
the diminished credibility of the ICFY, developments that were not in a
smaller state’s interest. Dutch policy encouraged the Bosnian government
– with whom the Dutch were in constant touch – to refuse acceptance of
the VOPP at a stage where their hold on east Bosnian land was still con-
siderable. The Dutch attitude also awarded a degree of European legiti-
macy to the American opposition to the plan and helped to undermine
the credibility of the ICFY. The Dutch Foreign Ministry may not have
recognised this, pinning its hope on an American willingness to ‘improve’
the VOPP through the use of force. When the Dutch finally discovered
that American opposition to the VOPP was not primarily motivated by
principled objections, but by a self-interested but valid concern that the
plan’s implementation would be too costly in terms of American lives, the
damage had already been done. While the Dutch belatedly changed
course, so did the countries with combat troops already deployed as part
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of UNPROFOR, notably the UK, France and Spain. Although ready in
principle to implement the VOPP with American support, these coun-
tries’ enthusiasm had dwindled as each day of Bosnian/Dutch/American
opposition had strengthened the Bosnian Serb army's control over Bosn-
ian territory, making an imposition of the plan ever more costly in terms
of their own soldiers’ lives.
The Plan for a Union of Three Republics
The Netherlands had belatedly come to the aid of the VOPP because it
was recognised that a worse alternative was in the making. When the con-
tours of this alternative became known, initially the Foreign Ministry
refused to support it and for a while continued to cling on to the VOPP as
if it was still possible to reach agreement on that basis. In an internal For-
eign Ministry memorandum the deputy-director for European Affairs
wrote that the new plan, the precise contents of which were as yet unclear
but seemed to point towards tripartition, could be seen as the ‘fatal blow
to the VOPP’. He warned that ‘the Twelve should beware of exchanging a
non-perfect plan for a bad plan as a result of pressure from circumstances
or Lord Owen.’ It took several months for the Dutch to accept the new
plan as the basis for Western diplomacy.
According to Kooijmans, ‘idealism means that you cannot obtain the
agreement of the aggressor by forcing the victim to lie on his back.’45
Hence, idealism required opposition to the Union of Three Republics
because it was believed to do precisely that. Indeed, the plan was not ideal
from the Bosnian government’s point of view. Initially, the Serbian and
Croatian presidents had only offered 23 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
land to the Bosnian Muslims. Never before had the two presidents been
so open about their respective sponsorship of the Serbs and Croats in
Bosnia. In subsequent negotiations, Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, for-
mer Norwegian Foreign Minister and successor to Vance as UN special
representative and ICFY co-chairman, raised this percentage to 30 per
cent, an achievement that was announced on July 9.
Dutch public opinion was not ready for the direction in which the negotia-
tions were now going. Over the past weeks, the government had done
nothing to prepare it for what was happening, let alone made an attempt
to explain why. As a result, a storm of moral outrage erupted in Amsterdam
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and The Hague. Demands were made for the government to defend the
London principles and exert strong pressure on the villain of the piece,
Lord Owen, to either step down or to stick with the principles.46 This is
not to suggest that subsequent Dutch policy was driven by public opinion
for Kooijmans and his advisers all personally supported this line as well.
It does show that a shared sense of direction for Dutch foreign policy still
very much existed.
On July 29, Foreign Minister Kooijmans sent a letter to his Belgian col-
league protesting against the Union of Three Republics. The Dutch gov-
ernment was said to be ‘concerned that the negotiations in Geneva could
lead to a settlement, which would in many respects be at odds with the
basic principles subscribed to in London and Copenhagen.’ Neither EC
representative Lord Owen nor, it seems, most other EC member states
received copies since three weeks later the Dutch government felt it neces-
sary to point out in a separate telegram that partners ‘should be aware’
that this letter had been sent.
During a telegram exchange, it turned out that Germany shared the
Dutch position. On August 9 Germany let it be known that it had reserva-
tions about the negotiations being conducted in Geneva. The Germans
expressed scepticism as to whether the plan for a ‘Union of Three Repub-
lics’ could produce an outcome that was fair and equitable on the basis of
the London principles and reconcilable with the principle of territorial
integrity and sovereignty. The Dutch government on August 10 backed
up Germany, informing EC capitals that the Netherlands found ‘itself in
full agreement with the German position’. On August 11 the German and
Dutch messages were countered by Lord Owen, the Belgian EC Presiden-
cy, Britain, Spain and Portugal, all of whom argued that the ICFY was
pursuing the best possible settlement under the given circumstances and
needed full support.
Encouraged by the German criticisms, Kooijmans stepped up the pres-
sure on the ICFY to come up with a better deal. In a further development
of its position on August 19, The Hague pointed out the weaknesses 
in the plan’s constitutional proposals, which did indeed point towards 
tripartition but had been agreed to by all three of the conflicting parties
on July 30. As for the plan’s map, which was still under negotiation,
the Dutch telegram argued that because of the ‘extreme weakness’ of the
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Union of Three Republics, a ‘much larger territory than proposed by the
Serbs and the Croats’ was needed for the Bosnian Muslim republic. The
Dutch government therefore had ‘much sympathy for President Izetbe-
govic’s demands in this respect’. Finally, the telegram warned that there
was a chance that the Netherlands would not take part in the plan’s
implementation with ground troops, given the Dutch doubts that the
outcome of the negotiations would ‘indeed correspond to the notion of a
fair and viable settlement’.
Dutch and German ‘dissent’ over the Union of Three Republics put a
strain on EC unity. In order to address this problem, the ICFY co-chair-
men visited the German and Dutch Foreign Ministers on August 25. The
meetings showed that it was difficult for both Kinkel and Kooijmans to
accept the Union of Three Republics but that the Dutch attitude was
more uncompromising. Nevertheless, for the Dutch Foreign Ministry the
meeting constituted a sobering confrontation with reality and the begin-
ning of a fundamental break with the policies of the past few months.
Having visited Kinkel in Frankfurt, Owen and Stoltenberg arrived in The
Hague to meet Kooijmans. According to Hoekema, the prevailing mood
in the Foreign Ministry prior to the meeting was one of barely suppressed
hostility. The Dutch were determined that the two co-chairmen ‘would be
given a proper dressing-down’ and to impress upon them that if they
wanted the Netherlands to support their proposals, these would first have
to ‘pass the ethical test’.47 In one section of his speech notes for the meet-
ing, Kooijmans’ civil servants advised him to express his understanding
that the negotiators were no longer in a strong negotiating position vis-à-
vis the Serbs, since … ‘the world lost its nerve on the Vance Owen Peace
Plan’ (a reference to the Joint Action Programme). Nevertheless, Kooij-
mans was also urged to express Dutch concerns about the peace plan.
According to the notes, Kooijmans was to say that he was under the
impression that ‘the great emphasis on “realism” and “negotiability” [had]
caused the concept settlement now on the table to be determined to a
large extent by the military superiority of the Serbs, to the detriment of a
number of important principles, as established in London and Copen-
hagen.’
In another section of his speech notes, Kooijmans was advised to point
out towards the end of the meeting that, since Owen and Stoltenberg
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negotiated on the basis of a mandate given by the European Community,
the Dutch government would also be accountable for its joint responsi-
bility for the end result of Owen’s and Stoltenberg’s negotiations. This
responsibility existed ‘towards those whose future was at stake in the first
place’ but also towards the Dutch Parliament and public opinion, both of
whom were following the Geneva negotiations with ‘intense and often
critical and concerned attention’.
As a Dutch report of the meeting shows, Kooijmans closely followed his
speech notes. During the meeting he asked Owen and Stoltenberg
whether there was not a risk that the international community would
conclude in a few years time that they had been ‘fools’ to commit them-
selves to this agreement and take on the responsibility for its implementa-
tion. As both the Dutch and Owen’s reports state, the ICFY co-chairmen
explicitly admitted that they shared many of the Dutch concerns. Both
reports also show that Owen subsequently posed the question of whether,
in the absence of a better alternative, one was not forced to take what was
on offer. Touching upon this dilemma, the Owen report made an interest-
ing comparison between the attitudes of Kooijmans and Kinkel and
revealed a crucial difference between the two. Both Ministers were ‘scepti-
cal’ about the proposal. They were both ‘concerned in general’ about the
viability and durability of the proposed settlement and ‘concerned that
the Muslims, as the weaker party, were basically being forced into accept-
ing this solution’. Both Kinkel and Kooijmans ‘worried about parliamen-
tary and public reactions’ and, finally, ‘admitted they could offer no alter-
native proposal’. In thinking through the consequences of this admission,
the two Foreign Ministers, however, had parted company:
Kinkel seemed convinced that for all its perceived faults, the
proposal on the table at least offered the best way of getting
peace. Kooijmans, however, did not seem to accept that the
alternative, continued and intensified war, justified acceptance
of the proposal.48
According to several officials and by his own admission, Kooijmans had
strong opinions about the Yugoslav crisis. The ‘Kooijmans factor’ is said
to have been all-important. His idealism gradually began to ‘provoke
bureaucratic resistance’.49 Kooijmans, while admitting that he did have
strong views about the Bosnian war, later argued that there were other
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Cabinet members with even stronger views: ‘Don’t forget that within the
Cabinet I was still a dove’.50 Kooijmans’ remark raises the question of
whether the Yugoslav crisis featured a lot in Cabinet meetings. Both Relus
Ter Beek and Voorhoeve lamented that during their respective terms as
Defence Minister – which include the years 1990-1995 – Dutch policy
regarding the Yugoslav crisis was not the subject of an in-depth discus-
sion in the Cabinet even once and that, instead, the Foreign Minister pos-
sessed a large degree of autonomy. 51 It would seem, therefore, that
Kooijmans’ primarily meant his immediate colleague the Minister for De-
velopment Cooperation, who articulated strong views at times.
The meeting with the ICFY co-chairmen seems to have brought home for
the first time the uncomfortable truth that a failure of the plan was
unlikely to lead to a better deal for the Bosnian Muslims. A memorandum
signed by Frank Majoor, Van Eenennaam’s successor as director of DAV,
laid out the options one by one. Its careful phrasing suggests that it was
felt that the implications of the message would take time to sink in with
Kooijmans. According to the DAV memorandum, if the Bosnian govern-
ment rejected the plan it would end up being greatly disappointed. The
Bosnian government would probably reject it in the expectation of three
alternative measures being taken in isolation or together: air strikes, a
strengthening of the international military presence on the ground and a
lifting of the arms embargo. DAV feared, however, that none of the three
measures would be implemented and that in the absence of a settlement
there was a great risk that ‘the situation for the Muslims [would] quickly
deteriorate.’ In what was essentially a call for Kooijmans to add water to
the principled Dutch wine, the paper argued that none of the options
open to the Netherlands in the case of a Bosnian Muslim rejection of the
plan (ranging from a call for nominating new negotiators to a plea to lift
the arms embargo) could prevent the outcome that the amount of Mus-
lim-held territory would ‘probably be less than what [was] now on offer.’
While it would have been impossible for Kooijmans to openly admit it,
given the fierce public criticisms in the Dutch media of Owen, the For-
eign Ministry changed tack. The London principles were abandoned as
the fundamental yardstick by which to measure whether a peace plan
deserved Dutch support. Instead, the Netherlands began to focus on the
need for a ‘fair and viable settlement’, a definition internationally accept-
ed and broad enough to allow negotiations to go in various directions.
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According to Kooijmans, the change in Dutch policy was motivated by
‘the acceptance of the inevitability of tripartition. You must learn to live
with it. You must not close your eyes.’52 In addition to the meeting with
Owen and Stoltenberg, what had possibly helped change the minds of
Kooijmans and his officials was a remarkable publication in the June edi-
tion of the Internationale Spectator, the Clingendael Institute’s interna-
tional relations monthly. It had been written by three of the institute’s
most senior experts, including Joris Voorhoeve, who was to become the
Minister of Defence less than a year later. They had offered six options for
peace in Bosnia, two of which came with rough maps that so obviously
conflicted with the London principles and required such additional
amounts of (voluntary) ethnic cleansing that no international negotiator
could have proposed them without inviting immediate calls for his resig-
nation. The article concluded in favour of a combination of safe havens and
complete tripartition: ‘New negotiations must be opened with all three of
the parties in order to realise a tripartition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which
will finally stop the war and create a Bosnian buffer state between Serbia
and Croatia.’53
No longer challenging the principle of tripartition, the Dutch govern-
ment focused on how to obtain an additional 4 per cent of territory for
the Bosnian Muslims. In doing so, the Netherlands, together with Ger-
many and the US, backed a demand to that effect by Bosnian President
Izetbegovic. Eventually, at the end of September, the Bosnian (Muslim)
assembly in Sarajevo rejected the Union of Three Republics. While the
cycle of escalating demands had not been broken yet, the Netherlands
was now working within, rather than against, the established political
framework for peace. With the changed German and Dutch positions
came an opportunity for the EC to throw its collective weight behind the
ICFY and its plan. Interventions by Dutch officials within the framework
of EPC revealed the degree to which the Netherlands had changed
course. On September 6, in a meeting of the committee on Yugoslavia
(Coyug), a Dutch official said that ‘given the very weak position of the
Union in the constitutional set-up, the division of the territory between
the three republics [was] all the more important in the search for a “fair
and viable” settlement.’ The official subsequently backed up Bosnian
government’s demand for nearly 4 per cent of additional territory, which
included access to the sea and a wider corridor to the East Bosnian
enclaves than envisaged in the plan. In the CoPo meeting of September 7
    
opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:13  Pagina 166
and 8, the new Director-General for Political Affairs, Joris Vos, took up
the same position. Vos repeated the call for access to the sea and corri-
dors to the enclaves so that the Bosnian Muslim territory would indeed
be ‘viable’. In both meetings Germany had taken up a similar position
and it seemed the internal European division was beginning to disap-
pear, given that the discussion of the political directors ‘lacked the sharp
and bitter tone that [had] so marked the exchanges of thoughts on this
point during the past year’.
To summarise, between June and September 1993, the Dutch Foreign
Ministry went through the same motions over the so-called Union of
Three Republics as it had over the VOPP. The primary reaction was one of
outright hostility and moral indignation. Subsequently, when the Foreign
Ministry was forced to admit that a better deal could not be had, the
Union of Three Republics was supported as the only plan available. Mea-
sured in terms of Dutch interests, the damage had been substantial. The
Netherlands had alienated itself from important European partners, the
credibility of the ICFY regime had been further undermined, and the
Bosnian government had been encouraged to continue a war that had
been characterised for months by military stalemate.
During October, following the refusal of the Bosnian government to
accept the Union of Three Republics plan as it stood, the EC nevertheless
continued to support the plan, believing it possible to obtain all-party
agreement if more territory could be found for the Bosnian government.
Eventually, the hitherto solely German-Dutch position of support for
additional territory became the EC’s formal approach after Germany had
found France prepared to present it as a German-French initiative. The
plan, which essentially remained the same but formalised the need to give
the Bosnian Muslims one-third of Bosnia’s territory, became known as
the EU Action Plan.
The EU Action Plan
The Netherlands was very happy with the content of a letter from Ger-
man and French Foreign Ministers Kinkel and Juppé to the Belgian 
EC Presidency on November 7, 1993. One of the key points in the letter
was a demand that the Muslim-majority republic would get an extra 3
per cent of territory, bringing its total percentage up to one-third of
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following a further elaboration of the French-
German letter by the Belgian Presidency, the initiative came to be known
as the EU Action Plan.
Dutch policy towards the EU Action Plan was one of loyal support. That
the Netherlands should be so supportive cannot simply be attributed to
the moral quality of the peace plan. For that, the plan resembled the
Union of Three Republics too closely and, while it would be easier to
implement than the VOPP, in moral terms it constituted the tripartition
the Dutch had so long regarded as the outcome to be avoided. The For-
eign Ministry’s support for the EU Action plan was in part motivated by
the same consideration that had led it to support the Union of Three
Republics from September onwards. This was recognition of the fact that
opposition to a bad plan did not necessarily translate into an ability to
offer something better.
Dutch support for the EU Action Plan constituted more than a grudging
acceptance of the inevitable. There was a remarkable enthusiasm about
the plan and an eagerness for the Bosnian government to accept it and
thereby end the war. Two additional reasons help to explain this new-
found Dutch emphasis on the need for a rapid settlement. First of all,
there was a belated recognition of the threat of international isolation.
The fact that Germany co-sponsored the EU Action Plan required the
Netherlands to support it or else risk complete isolation within what was
now officially the European Union. In Kooijmans’ words, ‘you must, of
course, avoid becoming isolated.’54 Moreover, given that the plan took
account of the American-backed demand by the Bosnian government for
one-third of the country, it seemed that the US would support the plan as
well. As Kooijmans put it, the EU Action Plan seemed to possess ‘a greater
viability [than its predecessors] because of possible US involvement.’55 On
the basis of this assessment of American attitudes, for the Dutch to
oppose the EU Action Plan would have lifted the Netherlands out of what
seemed an Atlantic – not just European – consensus.
While a minority of senior officials in the Foreign Ministry continued to
argue as late as mid-November that the EU Action Plan was morally
unacceptable and did not deserve Dutch support, Kooijmans, the Direc-
tor-General for Political Affairs and the director of DAV agreed that 
the plan should have full Dutch backing. At a GAC on November 22,
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Kooijmans told his colleagues that it was with a heavy heart that he had to
accept that the London principles could no longer guide international
diplomacy. He acknowledged that they had ‘disappeared from sight’ and
that it would make the plan ‘schizophrenic’ if they were to be included in
the package. Moreover, he said that ‘in view of the looming humanitarian
disaster, a peace settlement … was now necessary’. Kooijmans even ac-
cepted that the suspension of international sanctions against Serbia and
Montenegro was a price that had to be paid if peace could thereby be ob-
tained.
Having come out in support of the plan, Kooijmans immediately went an
important step further in focusing all of the Dutch energy on obtaining
concrete American support. In contacts between Joris Vos and an Ame-
rican official, Vos pointed out that without a settlement a humanitarian
disaster might take place during the coming winter. This meant that,
despite the plan’s weaknesses, an effort should be made to reach a settle-
ment on this basis before the winter. Vos formally requested the US
Administration’s ‘political support’ and ‘cooperation’ in the Security
Council for the ‘phased suspension of the sanctions’, as well as US ‘parti-
cipation’ in the implementation of the plan.
Despite an unequivocally negative response from the USA to the Dutch
overture, the Netherlands continued to try and engage Washington.
However, the USA let it be known that it did not want to exert any pres-
sure on the Bosnian government, opposed suspending sanctions and
would probably not take part in an implementation force. Another occa-
sion to try and influence American thinking occurred with a meeting
between Dutch Defence Minister Relus ter Beek and his US colleague Les
Aspin. They met on December 9 in the margins of a NATO Defence
Planning Council, which brought together all NATO member states’
defence Ministers. The key issue discussed by Ter Beek and Aspin was the
Bosnian government’s request for explicit NATO security guarantees if it
were to sign up to the EU Action Plan. What was in effect meant by
NATO security guarantees was US guarantees. So when Ter Beek met
Aspin he said that the Dutch government saw the safe area operation as
‘a temporary matter’ and hoped that there would soon be a general set-
tlement. ‘I said that, surely, the Americans could not be absent during its
implementation, whereby I mentioned Haiti, meaning our willingness to
contribute troops there. I proposed that US troops would make up half
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of the implementation force.’56 However, despite Ter Beek’s plea for a
military involvement on the part of the US, Aspin’s reply was non-com-
mittal. The American response was that the Bosnian demand for NATO
guarantees caused concern in Washington and that it would be difficult
to explain that such guarantees would be given to ‘the absurd rump-state
of Bosnia but not to Poland.’57 An additional American objection was
raised the next day in NATO, making it all too clear that the US did not
intend to support the EU Action Plan. A Dutch official had argued for
NATO contingency planning so as to enable the Bosnian government to
make peace but this was followed by a cold American rebuke. The Bos-
nian government and the ICFY were too quick in assuming, so ran the
American argument, that NATO should be the organisation to give guar-
antees. Since the negotiations took place under the aegis of the UN, the
Security Council was the more appropriate body to extend such guaran-
tees.
Such was the eagerness in the Foreign Ministry to see the EU Action Plan
succeed that some voices dared question the continued existence of the
safe areas. This sudden scepticism regarding the safe areas, aired in parti-
cular by the European Affairs Department, was motivated in part by a
growing feeling that the safe areas were an obstacle to peace, as well as by
hints from the Bosnian government that it was willing to discuss a terri-
torial trade-off.
Kooijmans later commented that his moral indignation did not prevent
him from understanding the dilemma that lay before him and his West-
ern colleagues: ‘the longer safe areas continue to exist, the more they
become an anomaly; you have to embed them in a plan.’58 Surprisingly, it
was the Netherlands of all EU member states that raised the issue in the
context of European Political Cooperation. The new-found Dutch prag-
matism was motivated in part by a message received from the Bosnian
government. In a conversation with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris 
Silajdzic on November 30, 1993 Kooijmans was told that the Netherlands
was the Bosnian government’s ‘friend’ and ‘most important ally’ in the
EU. Silajdzic added that, despite the Bosnian government’s critical public
stance, ‘the Netherlands should know that the Bosnian government was
prepared to fall back on a settlement that awarded them one-third of the
territory.’ The Dutch Foreign Minister understood the significance of
these remarks and asked Silajdzic whether the Bosnian government
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‘would be prepared to exchange the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia for territory
around Sarajevo’, something ‘Lord Owen [had] mentioned as a possibili-
ty’. To this, Silajdzic replied that it was ‘very difficult’, but that the Bosnian
government did ‘not totally say no to that’.
Silajdzic’s reply and the subsequent problems for the Netherlands in
doing something useful with this interesting message showed the degree
to which the safe area policy had become counter-productive. For even if
there was silent agreement among the Bosnian government and its West-
ern supporters that ultimately the eastern enclaves would have to be given
up as part of a territorial settlement, who would be the first to say so pub-
licly? The answer was ‘nobody’ for no Western politician would have
dared to begin explaining such a moral defeat to his or her domestic
audience. This was also true for Dutch politicians whose rhetoric had
been among the most explicit. Clearly, the Security Council’s half-hearted
but very public commitment to the Bosnian safe areas foreclosed the
option of a withdrawal, while the option of defending the safe areas was
seen as too potentially costly to be credible. To complicate matters, more-
over, Silajdzic had mentioned that the Serbs were not prepared to give
something in return for the enclaves, while the Bosnian government
refused to contemplate the population exchange envisaged by the Serbs.
In sum, the message from the Bosnian government was the kind of infor-
mation that was crucial and useless at the same time. It was crucial
because it was the clearest possible indication of the outcome one could
see looming on the horizon. It was useless because this outcome was so
clearly unacceptable to Western audiences that no credible political fol-
low-up existed.
Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry with its interest –although not articu-
lated – in reaching a settlement before the troop commitment to the safe
areas was to materialise, raised the issue of a territorial exchange in the
context of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. If the EU could
be mobilised against the odds to support the idea of a territorial ex-
change, then perhaps a settlement could be reached fairly quickly. Hence,
in the Committee of Political Directors in the margins of a General
Affairs Council on December 6, 1993 the Netherlands expressed its ‘con-
cern’ about the wish of the Bosnian government to ‘draw in’ the East-
Bosnian enclaves into its future republic. The creation of such a territori-
al ‘link-up’ of ‘Muslim-territories’ would result in a ‘Serb enclave’, which
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would in turn ‘guarantee an unworkable situation’. The explicit and 
uncharacteristic Dutch intervention seems not to have triggered a mean-
ingful response. Rather, on December 11 the EU once more declared that
it regarded as legitimate the Bosnian government’s demands for one-
third of the country and access to the sea, a message Kooijmans repeated
during a visit to Sarajevo on Tuesday December 14, 1993.
By the end of December 1993, American officials were openly saying that
the EU Action plan had reached a dead end. Despite this depressingly
negative stance on the part of the US, the Netherlands refused to give up.
On December 29, Foreign Ministers Kooijmans and Kinkel sent a letter to
Bosnian President Izetbegovic, the tone of which showed that Dutch
patience with the Bosnian government was wearing thin. Kooijmans and
Kinkel informed Izetbegovic that ‘reports of a Muslim offensive against
Croat settlements in central Bosnia’ were causing them ‘great concern’.
The two Foreign Ministers continued:
The European Union has called on the Serb side to stop the
shelling of Sarajevo and other Bosnian cities. We are urging the
Croats to show moderation. But we would also wish to appeal
urgently to your side in the interests of your long-suffering
people to avoid any action that could extinguish the present
chances of peace. Peace can only be achieved at the negotiating
table.
For the Netherlands to exert this kind of pressure on the Bosnian govern-
ment was unprecedented and showed the degree to which the Nether-
lands wanted the EU Action Plan to succeed, but it was to no avail. Fol-
lowing another round of failed talks, there was widespread agreement by
the end of January 1994 that the EU Action Plan was indeed dead.
Kooijmans still refused to give up and he implored his European and
American colleagues not do so either. In a long letter to his European col-
leagues, dated January 26, 1994, Kooijmans called on them to continue
the humanitarian mission in Bosnia. As for the peace negotiations, he
suggested that the EU should try to ‘promote actively a better relationship
between Croats and Muslims’ and ‘to try to involve the US and the Rus-
sian Federation as much as possible in efforts to bring the peace negotia-
tions forward’.58 The letter to his European colleagues was followed by a
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letter to US Secretary of State Christopher: ‘My feeling is that we have
reached a crucial stage in the process and that, if we join our efforts, it
might be possible to obtain a settlement which would meet the justified
Muslim demands. Now that the French as well seem to be moving in that
direction, I would strongly urge the US to associate itself more closely
with the political process and become more actively involved in devising
and promoting a settlement which [could] be accepted by the Muslims.’
The letters reflected an understandable discomfort with the idea that the
plan would fail and Dutch troops would become part of the anomaly
which in Kooijmans’ words the safe areas had now become. Also, the
plan’s imminent failure seemed to testify to the weakened ability to man-
age crises of some of the collective mechanisms the Dutch had placed
their faith in, in particular the EU. For the first time since August 1992 the
Netherlands had rediscovered its interest in promoting European cohe-
sion. However, from the more powerful member states’ perspective, these
collective institutions had already failed to deliver and it was time for a
new concept that would bind them together without the lumber of small-
er players with strong opinions and little of substance to offer. This new
concept was the Contact Group, founded in April 1994.
The Contact Group consisted of the US, Russia, France, Britain and Ger-
many, as well as the European Commission and the EU Presidency. Italy
joined at a later stage. From April 1994 until the end of 1995 the Contact
Group dominated the international community’s Yugoslavia diplomacy.
With the establishment of the Contact Group, the ability of a middle-
ranking EU member state to influence the international diplomatic and
humanitarian/military intervention in the former Yugoslavia was
reduced. At the same time, the Contact Group’s ability to deliver a diplo-
matic result was hampered considerably by the stalemate on the ground
in Bosnia. In particular the presence of safe areas with lightly armed UN
troops in them, hampered the peacemaking ability of the Contact Group.
Irony had it that Dutch troops were deployed in the most sensitive safe
area of all in February 1994, a safe area that was impossible to defend
from a military point of view but impossible to abandon politically.
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Conclusion
The position of the Netherlands during the period 1992-1995 was funda-
mentally different from the one occupied in 1990 and 1991 due to exter-
nal and domestic factors. On the external level, the most important
development was the gradual loss of influence by the European Commu-
nity, renamed European Union in 1993. Lacking a military capability of
its own, the EU lost influence as a collective actor in relation to other
national and collective actors, notably the US, France, Britain, the Rus-
sian Federation and the UN. The Europeans had given a demonstration
of their collective political power in 1991 over the recognition issue,
which had presented the US with a fait-accompli that was impossible to
ignore. But having played the card of recognition, Europe possessed few
other means with which to exert a credible influence on the Yugoslav cri-
sis. The US, alarmed by the sudden assertiveness of a reunited Germany,
began to play a growing role in determining the political agenda of inter-
national intervention, despite remaining on the sidelines militarily.
As a regime, the EU also grew weaker internally. Germany’s tactics regar-
ding the recognition issue in 1991 had been widely interpreted as a viola-
tion, albeit in spirit rather than formally, of the established norms and
principles guiding European foreign policy. With the German precedent
set, the other EU member states, including the Netherlands, no longer
regarded the cohesion of the EU as a fundamentally important foreign
policy interest in itself.
While the ICFY temporarily functioned as the new forum for collective
Yugoslavia diplomacy, it exercised fewer and looser constraints on each of
the participating states than had the EC. As a norm-setter the 1992 Lon-
don Conference had been successful, but the collective political will to
enforce these norms upon parties in the Bosnian conflict was absent.
Gradually, the ICFY began to be replaced by intergovernmental, ad hoc
coalitions, which more accurately reflected the limited political will and
military means with which the leading states in the international com-
munity approached the Yugoslav crisis. Early evidence of this transforma-
tion was provided by the intergovernmental preparation and announce-
ment of the Joint Action Programme which, in the words of one senior
Dutch official was ‘very annoying’, because ‘we were not part of it’.60 The
subsequent creation of the Contact Group confirmed the trend.
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On the domestic level, a number of changes occurred too. First of all, the
interest in European cohesion, an ‘objective’ national interest that had
functioned as a corset on Dutch Yugoslavia policy in 1991, no longer
played an important role. Instead, the Netherlands began to be driven by
something that is best described as moral indignation. The impact of
principled beliefs on Dutch policy limited the number of acceptable poli-
cy options to those that were rooted in the intention to support the ‘good’
side in the conflict, the Bosnian (Muslim) government, against the ‘bad’
side, the Bosnian Serbs – with the Bosnian Croats somehow escaping the
Dutch attention, given that most people were uncertain in which camp to
put them.
Clearly, the Netherlands did exert influence on international Yugoslavia
policy during the years under discussion, despite the changes in the inter-
national environment and despite the fact that Dutch policy was driven by
moral indignation. During the 1992 London Conference, the Netherlands
played an important role in the formulation of the principles a Bosnian
settlement would have to honour. In the first months of 1993, the Nether-
lands was the only EC member state not to support the VOPP, arguing that
the plan did not honour these principles and that the main victims of the
war, the Bosnian Muslims, were entitled to a better deal. Applying a combi-
nation of ‘moral guidance’, ‘demonstration politics’, ‘public criticism’ and a
‘small-state alliance’ with the Bosnian government, the Netherlands effec-
tively broke ranks with the other EU member states, in the process legit-
imising Bosnian and American opposition to the plan. Bosnian-Dutch-
American opposition proved the death knell for the VOPP. During the
summer months the Netherlands, together with Germany, successfully
helped to block the plan for a Union of Three Republics, encouraging the
Bosnian government to make additional territorial demands. When the
French government too accepted the need for an additional three percent
of territory, the Dutch government could claim to have been one of the co-
architects of the third plan, the EU Action Plan, which awarded the Bos-
nian government an exact one-third of Bosnian territory. Finally, the
Netherlands had been an advocate of a formalised UN safe area policy,
which was indeed created in May and June 1993.
Unfortunately, influence does not necessarily translate into the achieve-
ment of desired policy goals. Having felt morally obliged to oppose the
VOPP, the Dutch to their dismay saw the VOPP being replaced by a plan

opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:13  Pagina 175
that seemed to honour the London principles even less. The Netherlands
initially blocked it for the same moral reasons. However, towards the
autumn of 1993 the Foreign Ministry changed tack and became more
supportive of the international diplomatic efforts, going as far as to pro-
pose a territorial exchange involving the East Bosnian enclaves, including
Srebrenica. There were two reasons for this about-turn, the first being the
recognition of the collective refusal to upgrade the peacekeeping opera-
tion into a real military intervention aimed at the imposition of a settle-
ment. Secondly, the Foreign Ministry became concerned lest the absence
of an agreed settlement would make the UN’s safe area policy – which the
Netherlands had so staunchly advocated and to which Dutch troops had
already been committed – an ‘anomaly’, as Foreign Minister Kooijmans
put it. By the time the Foreign Ministry recognised the approaching
entrapment for what it was, however, there was no indication that the col-
lective implementation of a settlement would indeed make the safe area
operation redundant.
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5 Military Entrapment 
The Commitment to Srebrenica
On July 11, 1995, the safe area of Srebrenica was taken by (Bosnian) Serb
forces. In the immediate aftermath the Serbs killed over seventhousand
Muslim men. The great majority of these men were not killed in battle
but murdered after having been taken prisoner.1 It had taken the Serbs a
week to conquer and ethnically cleanse the safe area and it had proved to
be a relatively easy task. There had been little resistance from the four-
thousand Muslim soldiers in the enclave, the fourhundred Dutch peace-
keepers deployed there, or from UNPROFOR as a whole.
Dutch military entrapment in the Bosnian conflict began on June 22,
1993, became concrete in February 1994 and was completed in February
1995. On June 22, 1993, the Dutch government committed itself interna-
tionally to an additional military contribution for the specific purpose of
implementing the UN Security Council’s safe area policy. In February
1994, the first Dutch troop contingent entered the Srebrenica enclave as
hostages to their environment. One year later, the Bosnian Serb army
stopped all but the most essential goods from entering the enclave of Sre-
brenica, thereby fully shutting the trap. As became painfully evident, the
trap could not be reopened from within nor from outside.
In retrospect it would, perhaps, have been better for everyone had the
Dutch government refused to go to Srebrenica – at least at this stage. This
much was suggested by the very UNPROFOR commander who eventual-
ly assigned the Srebrenica mission to the Dutch troops, Belgian Lt. Gener-
al Francis Briquemont. ‘In November 1993 all countries refused to deploy
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troops in Srebrenica … I then informed both supreme Commander Cot
and the UN authorities that I thought about giving up Srebrenica. The
answer from New York came quickly: “Impossible. Do something, gener-
al.” At that point, after all, the Dutch accepted the mission. But given that
by late 1993 I was facing increasingly difficult negotiations with the Serb
commander Mladic, perhaps I should have stuck to my original posi-
tion… If the Dutch government had taken on the same attitude as many
other states, a deep crisis would have erupted between the military com-
mand of UNPROFOR and the UN leadership. Such a crisis might have
been salutary.’2
While one cannot be certain, saying ‘no’ at this point in time might have
had the sobering effect of forcing the Security Council to choose between
a credible implementation and an early admittance of failure. Instead, the
Dutch government’s readiness to deploy troops in Srebrenica helped to
legitimise and prolong the Security Council’s ‘strategy of non-decision’
regarding the safe areas. As history would show, the Dutch military
entrapment symbolised and exacerbated the international community’s
entrapment in the Bosnian war that resulted from the UN Security Coun-
cil’s half-hearted safe area resolutions. Gow describes the international
safe area predicament as follows: ‘What was in any case certain was that
without secure logistics lines and a large UN presence the isolated
enclaves in eastern Bosnia would be indefensible. They would therefore
be no more than symbolically “safe” at the same time as they were
hostages to fortune. This placed the UN on a hook for a variety of rea-
sons. First, the Security Council had made a commitment to protecting
these areas; second, UNPROFOR was genuinely unable to deter attacks
purely by a presence in the “safe areas”; third, deterrence relied on the
threat of using close air support to defend the troops, or possibly air
strikes, in response to bombardment of the areas; and fourthly, the threat
of using air power was neutralised by the vulnerability of the troops on
the ground in those areas, deployed in small pockets and cut off from the
main force.’3
Why did the Netherlands consciously and willingly entrap itself in one of
these isolated pockets? In order to be able to answer this important ques-
tion, one really needs to divide it into two separate questions. The first
would be why the Netherlands committed additional troops to a safe area
policy that was conceptually flawed and not accompanied by firm troop
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offers from those who had sponsored the policy. Secondly, why did the
Netherlands decide to take on the Srebrenica mission, by itself, when
other countries so conspicuously avoided that destination?
The most important step towards military entrapment, the lone Dutch
military commitment to the UN Security Council’s safe area policy, was
the result of the same factors that had caused the Dutch moral and politi-
cal entrapment. Externally, there was a steady decrease in international
solidarity and a correspondingly weaker international position for the
Netherlands. The JAP of May 22, 1993 had been the first indication of the
great powers’ impatience with the existing multilateral frameworks.4 The
creation of the Contact Group in April 1994 by Britain, France, Germany,
Russia and the US further reduced the strategic-political role of an EU
member state like the Netherlands.
In terms of actual Dutch foreign policy, support for the safe areas was an
integral component of the trusted approach of anti-Serbian – and pro-
Bosnian – selectiveness. The Dutch felt morally obliged to support the safe
areas with a troop contribution, just as they had felt morally obliged to
oppose the VOPP and the Union of Three Republics. Once the commit-
ment had been made in front of international leaders, such was the politi-
cal entrapment that even if the conclusion was reached privately by some
policy makers that it was better not to deploy troops in Srebrenica, there
seemed no longer to be a way back without an unacceptable loss of face.
The second question is more complicated and requires scrutiny of the
role played by the Ministry of Defence. While the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs remained the lead actor regarding the general Dutch policy of
support for the safe areas, the Ministry of Defence’s hostility against
infantry deployments gave way to a gradual acceptance of, even support
for, the assignment. As early as August 1992, the country’s most senior
officer had spoken out publicly against the safe area concept.5 But in
August 1993, following constant pressure from Parliament, the press and
the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defence switched tack. It was recog-
nised that the domestic-political process and the subsequent internation-
al commitments made by the government had created a reality of its own,
which the senior officers had to respect even if their military judgment
told them not to.
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The Srebrenica mission as it was finally implemented not only differed
from, but was more ambitious than what most policy-makers had intend-
ed the Dutch military role to be. If we look at the domestic decision-mak-
ing process leading up to the actual deployment, a process of ‘coalition
logrolling’ seems to have taken place, with the Ministry of Defence sup-
porting deployment of the airmobile battalion in Srebrenica in return for
its key bureaucratic-political interests being served.
We will first describe briefly what the military entrapment of February
1994 - July 1995 looked like from the perspective of the policy makers
and decision makers back in The Hague. Subsequently, we will trace the
steps taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament which led
the Netherlands to support the safe area concept with a troop contribu-
tion. We will then address the question of why the Ministry of Defence
agreed to make available, despite strong reservations, a battalion of the
airmobile brigade for the UN safe areas. Finally, how did ‘coalition
logrolling’ influence the safe area mission? 
Military Entrapment
Events have proven just how deadly a trap the safe area was for the Bos-
nian Muslim inhabitants and how deadly it might have been for the Dutch
soldiers – and in the case of private Raviv van Renssen was. In terms of
policy too, Srebrenica constituted a trap. Western governments had com-
mitted themselves politically and morally to the safe areas without com-
mitting themselves militarily, but then found they were stuck with them.
For the Dutch government, entrapment was, however, much more acute
given that its lightly armed troops were actually stationed in one of the
two most vulnerable eastern enclaves. While the Dutch government’s will-
ingness to fight for the enclaves was by no means greater than that of other
governments, its token military commitment to Srebrenica forced the
government to keep up the pretence publicly that the mission was being
carried out successfully. In reality, as soon as the Dutch peacekeepers had
entered the enclave the main concern back in The Hague became how to
get them out again.
An early indication that there was a gap between rhetoric and reality
came even before the mission had started. In a press conference for the
family of the peacekeepers about to be deployed, their commander, Lt.
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Colonel Chris Vermeulen sought primarily to encourage the audience.
His task, he said, would be ‘to ensure that Srebrenica … continues to
exist’ and if fired upon he would ‘shoot back’. His unit was well-equipped
and well-prepared for the limited assignment. In reality Vermeulen was
much more pessimistic, but had been urged by the Defence Ministry’s
department of information not to say so in public. In an interview fol-
lowing the press conference, Vermeulen revealed some of his pessimism:
‘A massive attack by the Serbs for instance? No, the unit is not suited to
withstand that. But then you get close air support … and must trust the
intelligence systems.’6
It is often argued in defence of the Dutch decision to deploy troops in
Srebrenica that the Canadian government had done the same in April
1993. Such an argument overlooks two important facts. First, British, not
Canadian, troops were the first to be deployed in Srebrenica. When in
March 1993, the French UNPROFOR Commander, Lt.General Philippe
Morillon entered the enclave, he was accompanied by a contingent of
British troops in armoured personnel carriers commanded by Major
Abrams. When Morillon left the enclave, he ordered Abrams and his men
to stay. Nevertheless, the British subsequently quietly left the enclave, hav-
ing been ordered by the Ministry of Defence in London to do so with the
argument that these troops were overstretched. Secondly, the Canadian
government responded to a crisis situation where speed was of the
essence. It should also be noted that the Canadians and the British came
to a bilateral agreement providing for close air support by British planes
if the Canadian peacekeepers were to come under attack. Subsequently,
the Canadian government was only interested in one thing: getting the
Canadians out of Srebrenica. The Netherlands, in contrast, had had
ample time to study what was now an institutionalised safe area policy
and to learn from the Canadian precedent. Moreover, a Dutch United
Nations Military Observer (UNMO), Colonel Van Dijk, had been part of
the team accompanying Morillon in 1993. In late 1993 he gave a briefing
at the Ministry of Defence – attended also by a Foreign Ministry official –
in which he explicitly warned against deployment in the east-Bosnian
safe areas.
Adding to the sense of entrapment were the fruitless attempts by the
Dutch government to break out of it. Soon after the understrength Dutch
battalion had been deployed in the enclave, on March 3, 1994, key Dutch
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decision-makers recognised that they and their troops were in a mess.
During a visit to the Srebrenica on May 12 Minister of Defence Ter Beek
concluded that the Dutch troops had ended up in a ‘triple prison’. He was
forced to agree with a Dutch Major’s summary of the contingent’s
predicament: ‘The Muslim leaders here control the Muslim refugees, we
guard all the Muslims and take a lot of work out of the hands of the
Serbs. The Serbs guard us.’7 When Joris Voorhoeve, who succeeded Ter
Beek as Minister of Defence on August 22, 1994, visited the enclave ten
days into his new job he reached a similar conclusion. ‘I saw immediately
how extremely vulnerable the enclave was to attacks by Serb troops. How
exposed our soldiers were. It gave me an enormous fright and for me it
was clear a solution had to be found as quickly as possible.’8
Policy makers initially focused on possible ways of evacuating the Dutch
battalion if the need were to arise. (Voorhoeve later explained that in
1994, when discussing his possible new job as Defence Minister, ‘Sre-
brenica’ had been discussed. At that time he believed that the safe area
had in actual fact already succumbed to Serb forces in 1993. He never-
theless accepted the post, because he thought that ‘international negotia-
tions would lead to a solution for the population [in Srebrenica]’.)9 Dur-
ing the winter months of 1994 this was the single most important
question occupying the Minister of Defence as well as the Second Cham-
ber’s permanent Committees for Foreign Affairs and Defence.10 On Octo-
ber 18 the Committees were, for instance, briefed by the army’s deputy
director of operations, Brigadier-General Ton Kolsteren, about the possi-
bilities for evacuation. Unfortunately Kolsteren was forced to tell them
that the withdrawal plans being worked out by UNPROFOR and NATO
all pointed to the impossibility of withdrawing the Dutch troops from
Srebrenica in a ‘hostile environment’.11 Were the Serbs to block their exit
from the enclave, the Dutch would have to regroup and ‘take up defensive
positions within the enclave’. If a fighting withdrawal nonetheless became
inevitable there were two options, both of which would certainly cost
lives: a ‘fly-out’ and a ‘drive-out’. In the first option, there was a real possi-
bility that one or more helicopters would be lost due to hostile fire. Given
that these helicopters would have to be provided by other countries, it
was doubtful that such an operation would ever be undertaken. In the
‘drive-out’ option, the Dutch battalion would have to fight its way out,
either to Serbia proper (ten kilometres), or to central Bosnia (eighty kilo-
metres). To reach central Bosnia, the assistance of NATO forces would be
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required. Kolsteren concluded that there was only one realistic option:
‘permission from the warring parties to leave in a safe way.’ Kolsteren’s
presentation had brought home the uncomfortable truth that the blue-
helmeted peacekeepers were in effect hostages.
If an evacuation from Srebrenica was not possible, the next best thing
seemed to be for another country to share the Dutch plight. Predictably,
the same countries that had refused to go into Srebrenica in 1993 refused
again in 1994 and 1995, although it should in fairness be pointed out that
a small section of British SAS soldiers (Forward Air Controllers) were
with the Dutch in Srebrenica. Defence Minister Voorhoeve nevertheless
put great effort into an attempt to internationalise the military presence
in Srebrenica with six or seven countries. ‘We asked the Poles, the Jordan-
ians, the Argentineans and several East-European countries, but nobody
wanted it.’12 The NATO countries were not enthusiastic either about
Voorhoeve’s proposal, made at a NATO meeting in Seville, Spain, for an
‘exchange of units’. The idea was that other NATO countries would
deploy troops together with the remaining Dutch in Srebrenica. The gaps
in their ranks would then be filled by Dutch troops taken out of Srebreni-
ca. Voorhoeve recalled: ‘The response from our allies was: “Sorry, but we
have enough on our plates already.”’13 Although in June 1995 a bilateral
agreement was reached with Ukraine for the replacement of the entire
Dutch contingent, this commitment was largely theoretical, given the
Serb blockade of the safe area.
As the situation in Srebrenica steadily deteriorated, Voorhoeve saw one
option after another come to nothing. In February 1995 the Serbs shut
the trap: they stopped allowing fuel to come into the enclave and began to
interfere with food convoys as well as with the rotations by Dutch person-
nel into and out of the enclave. Voorhoeve then ‘defended internationally’
what he called a ‘West-Berlin strategy’, by which was meant an air corri-
dor to supply the contingents in the eastern enclaves with fuel. As Kol-
steren had earlier explained to parliamentarians, a helicopter operation
came with daunting problems. Voorhoeve quickly discovered that the
‘political will’ among the other troop contributing countries to risk their
helicopters being shot down ‘was absent’.14
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Another option defended by Voorhoeve constituted a preventive evacua-
tion of the Dutch battalion and the population. However, as in 1993, this
option was fiercely opposed by the Bosnian government, to whom the
forty-thousand refugees stuck in dangerous Srebrenica served as a valuable
object of pressure for international military intervention. ‘I discussed a
preventive evacuation with Ambassador Mohammed Sacirbey in October
1994, but he resolutely rejected it.’15 The two men discussed evacuation
again in June 1995, but again Sacirbey would hear none of it.16 Asked
whether Voorhoeve had been ready for the Dutch government not just to
ask politely but to put real pressure on the Bosnian government to agree to
an evacuation, he explained: ‘I asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs [Hans
van Mierlo] to place this option on the international agenda. I never
received a written reply. In an oral reply the Minister of Foreign Affairs said
that the option had been discussed before and was not politically feasible.’17
The Serbs continued to play cat-and-mouse until they went in for the kill.
Fortunately for the Dutch soldiers and their leaders, when the Serb attack
came, the Serbs judged it wiser strategically to avoid direct combat with
the Dutch UN peacekeepers and to focus instead on the elimination of
the Bosnian Muslim men. Once that task had been accomplished, the
Serbs released the peacekeepers from their prison, and the Dutch entrap-
ment finally ended.
For the politicians, diplomats and generals in The Hague the experience
of entrapment had been an unpleasant one – an experience they were
adamant should not be repeated. The ‘feelings of powerlessness’ as the
enclave was slowly strangled to death had turned into utter panic when
the attack came: ‘Whatever we thought of, there was no solution. Militari-
ly there was nothing we could do against the Serbs. The Dutch were in the
valley without cover, while above on the hilltops, the Serbian artillery and
tanks stood ready. If any kind of action was undertaken, these could
shoot and flatten whatever they wanted. They could easily destroy in a
single blow the factory that housed the Dutch battalion. The number of
victims would have been enormous. We did not stand a single chance.’18
This remark came from Lt. General Hans Couzy, who as the Commander
of Land Forces had been intimately involved in the decision to deploy the
airmobile brigade in the safe area of Srebrenica.
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The feverish search for a way out of entrapment and the domestic
anguish after the fall of the enclave reinforce the case for examining why
the Dutch had allowed themselves to get trapped in the first place. Why
had there been such an eagerness to support the Security Council’s safe
area resolutions with a troop commitment? Why had there been no fear
of deploying a Dutch infantry battalion in what Sun Tzu would have
termed ‘entrapping terrain’?19
The Foreign Ministry and Safe Areas
In his appearance before the TCBU parliamentary investigation committee
on May 25, 2000, former Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers stated that the
Foreign Ministry had been the ‘driving force’ behind Dutch troop deploy-
ments in former Yugoslavia. Indeed, Kooijmans insisted two years after
the fall of Srebrenica that ‘Srebrenica was not the wrong area [for the
Dutch troops to be in], because our policy had, after all, precisely been
aimed at the creation of that kind of area. The Netherlands had made a
strong case for the safe areas; if it then comes to their protection, you have
to take part. If you do not, you lose face.’20 Clearly, Kooijmans believed
that a military commitment to the safe areas was a moral and political
obligation.
Military entrapment thus resulted from moral and political entrapment.
The decision-making process was driven by principled beliefs concerning
morality and was far removed from the rational actor decision-making
model.21 The decision-making process followed the same pattern as
Dutch policy regarding the ICFY peace plans, with the moral judgment
often coming before the assessment. This is not just an observation made
with the wisdom of hindsight, witness the warnings that were issued by a
few prescient commentators at the time. When in August 1992 Minister
Pronk and other politicians had called for Dutch contributions to a mili-
tary intervention, Jerôme Heldring had warned that they were creating a
‘climate in which irresponsible decisions are taken’.22 Pointing out that
despite the ‘brave words’ of Ministers and MPs the Netherlands could
offer ‘absolutely nothing meaningful’, the commentator argued that ‘we
should at least adapt our words to that’.
The advice to moderate the Dutch rhetoric was – as we have seen –
ignored. Precisely the opposite happened. A combination of personal
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ethics and domestic-political calculation tempted many politicians and
officials into increasing the pressure on the only reluctant actor, the Min-
istry of Defence, to underpin the Dutch rhetoric with a credible contribu-
tion to the UN peacekeeping operation in the Balkans. Between August
1992 and November 1993, the number of Dutch troops deployed in and
around former Yugoslavia steadily mounted to a total of 2084 soldiers.
The Navy was taking part in the combined WEU/NATO blockade in the
Adriatic Sea, while the Air force had deployed eighteen F16s to supervise
the UN-imposed ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Army was
represented with a signal battalion and a transport battalion.23
All these contributions had in common that they still did not seem suffi-
cient to legitimise the Dutch opposition to the ICFY peace plans and the
continual advocacy of military intervention. Deploying signal and trans-
port units were judged to be low-profile and relatively risk-free opera-
tions – although four Dutch soldiers died and a substantial number were
wounded while carrying them out – and not suited to increase the in-
ternational credibility and visibility of Dutch policy. Caught in their
rhetoric, there seemed only one way out for interventionist politicians,
officials, journalists and academics alike: the deployment of a real combat
unit on a ‘serious’ mission in Bosnia. Put bluntly, the credibility of the
foreign policy elite’s claims to moral virtue could only be sustained if oth-
ers were willing to risk their lives. Hence the endless calls by the Foreign
Ministry and by Parliament – supported by a majority of Cabinet Minis-
ters – for additional deployments, of assembled volunteer units if neces-
sary. ‘Tank units, mechanised infantry battalions, artillery units, every-
thing was reviewed.’24 Clearly, therefore, there was always going to be
great domestic pressure in favour of deploying the airmobile brigade’s
first operational battalion when its training would be completed.
When in May 1993 the UN Security Council formulated an expanded
safe area policy, the Foreign Ministry and the Second Chamber put an
end to the perceived procrastination by the Defence Ministry. On May 6,
the same day the Security Council adopted resolution 824, thereby
expanding the safe area policy to include a total of six Bosnian towns, the
parliamentary Committees for Foreign Affairs and Defence discussed
Bosnia with Kooijmans and Ter Beek. In his statement, Kooijmans told
the Second Chamber that he wanted to ‘promote the creation of safe
areas’, which he believed could be ‘interpreted as a sign of international
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political will’, even though there were as yet ‘insufficient troops’ present 
in Bosnia for the protection of these areas.25 These words constituted 
an open invitation to the Second Chamber to put pressure on the Min-
istry of Defence. The invitation was accepted. Following Kooijmans’
statement, all the major parties requested that the government ‘contribute
to a solution of the conflict in Bosnia through a speedy contribution of
military units or – if that were not possible – to alleviate humanitarian
suffering with military means.’26 All the parties supported safe areas.
There was a multi-party demand for an additional training to be given to
the first soon-to-be-ready battalion of the airmobile brigade so that the
Dutch could participate in their protection.27 Less than two weeks later,
the Second Chamber unanimously adopted a joint Labour/Christian-
Democrat motion, which called on the government ‘to also prepare the
airmobile brigade for action in anticipated UN operations by giving
operational battalions as quickly as possible adequate training with heav-
ier equipment, such as armoured vehicles.’28 The late Maarten van Traa
(PvdA), a co-sponsor of the motion, said he believed that, despite the
international reluctance to get involved, the contribution of a Dutch bat-
talion with relief capacity should be seen as ‘politically … sufficiently
important to win countries over’.29
Had the Dutch government been more reluctant to raise such high
expectations domestically and had it not continuously ‘lectured’ other
countries on military intervention, it would have possessed at least two
legitimate arguments for not contributing troops to the safe areas. The
first would have been that the concept as formulated by the Security
Council was flawed, even by the standards of a safe area supporter like
the Netherlands. The second and most important argument against a
Dutch troop contribution was the subsequent lack of material interna-
tional support for the Security Council’s safe area policy.
The resolutions being drafted in New York were ‘a masterpiece of diplo-
matic drafting, but largely unimplementable as an operational directive.’30
These resolutions created the very ghettos Kooijmans had warned his
French colleague Juppé about and certainly did not intend the safe areas to
function as starting points for a phased implementation of the VOPP or
any other plan. Nevertheless, by its decision to contribute troops to the
safe area operation, the Netherlands had ‘also effectively commit[ted]
itself to the policy set out in the [Security] Council’s resolutions.’31 The
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Dutch enthusiasm for the safe area policy being formulated in New York is
all the more remarkable if set against the Bosnian government’s more
gloomy assessment. The Dutch government’s frequent guest, Ambassador
Sacirbey, summarised Bosnian feelings as follows: ‘If you remember, the
Bosnian government actually opposed the idea of the safe areas. They
were artificial creations and part of the refusal to go along with the Vance
Owen Plan. They served as an excuse for not intervening militarily.’32
If the inherently contradictory nature of the safe area resolutions 819
(April 16, 1993), 824 (May 6, 1993) and 836 (June 4,1993) were not suffi-
cient justification for staying far from the safe areas, then surely the subse-
quent absence of concrete military commitments should have set the
alarm bells ringing? It would have been legitimate for the Netherlands to
withdraw the offer if the government had decided thereafter that the man-
date was unattainable. Such a move would not have been without prece-
dent: in 1985 the Netherlands withdrew its contingent from Lebanon,
mainly because the government and the Second Chamber judged the
mandate no longer possible to fulfil – and the dangers to the Dutch peace-
keepers unacceptably high (four Dutch soldiers died within the space of
several months, with the total number of fatal casualties eventually rising
to nine). Admittedly, the Lebanon-situation differed in that the Nether-
lands through participation in UNIFIL actually experienced that the
peacekeeping mandate could not be fulfilled, whereas a withdrawal of the
safe area troop offer would have been based, not on experience but on
prior assessment. Turning this argument round, one wonders whether
soldiers first have to die before a decision to withdraw a troop commit-
ment to a peacekeeping operation becomes a legitimate one.
The question of who was going to implement the Security Council’s safe
area policy had become a prisoner’s dilemma even before the policy had
been fully formulated. In resolution 844 (June 18, 1993) the Security
Council had decided on a so-called light option which required some
7600 additional troops for the safe areas. The UN Secretariat asked a great
number of UN member states for troop contributions. Most member
states either flatly refused or expressed a very cautious preliminary inter-
est, the follow-up to which depended on the contributions other coun-
tries would make. Not even the five sponsors of the resolution, Russia,
Spain, Britain, France and the USA, offered additional troops: an impor-
tant indication that they did not believe in their own policy.33
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The Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs knew weeks before the Dutch
troop offer was made that the US, the country that could make or break
the safe area policy, refused to take part in their protection with ground
troops. At their meeting on May 7 in the Netherlands Embassy in Bonn,
Christopher had confronted Kooijmans with the question of whether it
was wise to put soldiers in threatened cities and offer them nothing but
air cover. It may have been tempting for Kooijmans to believe that the US
would come round to supporting the safe areas eventually. After all, the
US had just voted in favour of resolution 824 which expanded the safe
area formula to six Bosnian towns. This was perhaps one of the reasons
why Kooijmans, when faced with Christopher’s scepticism about safe
areas during their meeting in Bonn, had confidently stated that ‘this
option was successful in Srebrenica and thereby had proved to be a real-
istic approach that could be built upon’. Nevertheless, how much more
explicit could Christopher have been when he warned Kooijmans that
the US military thought that the option of safe areas was not militarily
sound and refused to participate with ground troops? As if to underscore
the point, President Clinton a few days later stated that he would not
send US troops ‘into a shooting gallery.’34 However, clearly neither Minis-
ter Kooijmans nor his advisors were interested in such an option, with
the UN Affairs Department in particular a keen supporter of a Dutch
infantry contribution to UNPROFOR.35
The Dutch government continued embracing the safe area resolutions. It
had simply invested too much moral and political capital in military
intervention and safe areas to be able to sell a public withdrawal from the
concept. Moreover, with the adoption of resolution 824 on May 6 the
Netherlands seemed to have scored a major point, for the policy it had
long advocated had actually been accepted and formalised by the Security
Council. Here was an opportunity to put the Netherlands on the map.
The safe area resolutions, it was decided, should be capitalised upon to
improve the ‘visibility’ of Dutch foreign policy.36
The Dutch troop commitment to the safe areas was formalised in June.
On June 16, 1993, two days before the adoption of resolution 844 (when
it became clear that the Security Council had opted for the ‘light
option’), an important instruction was sent to the permanent representa-
tions at the UN in New York and at NATO in Brussels. Both representa-
tions were instructed to ‘announce’ that the Netherlands was ‘prepared in
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principle’ to make an ‘additional’ troop contribution ‘for the safe areas’.
The specific contribution the Dutch government had in mind would be a
‘maintenance unit’ as part of a multinational ‘logistical unit’. Also, they
were to announce that the Netherlands ‘kept open the option’ to have the
first battalion of the airmobile brigade ‘ready for a possible deployment
in Bosnia-Herzegovina from early 1994 onwards.’ This offer was to be
qualified with a statement that the safe areas were ‘explicitly not’ the bat-
talion’s envisaged assignment. Instead, they were meant for the imple-
mentation of a negotiated settlement ‘on the basis of the principles of the
Vance-Owen Plan’. While the troop offers were ‘conditional’, the inten-
tion behind them, so the instruction read, was to obtain ‘maximum
political effect’. The goal, as the official instruction to the Dutch Ambas-
sadors at NATO and the UN make clear, was not just to make Dutch calls
on other countries to contribute troops ‘credible by setting the example
oneself, but also to serve as a catalyst’. The specific offer of the airmobile
brigade’s first battalion was intended, moreover, ‘to break the impasse’
surrounding the implementation of a peace settlement. Later, when it
became clear that the Dutch troop offer had failed to achieve these objec-
tives, the Dutch government could do little else but express its ‘serious
disappointment about the lukewarm response by the EC partners’.37
The fact that it had agreed to the contents of the message was a sign that
the pressure on the Defence Ministry from the Foreign Ministry and the
Second Chamber was having an effect. The troop offers were a direct
result of the two parliamentary debates in May in which Defence Minister
Ter Beek had felt obliged to offer a tailor made logistical unit for the safe
areas and had agreed to make the airmobile brigade ready for operations.
At the same time, the fact that safe areas were excluded as an option for
the airmobile brigade demonstrated that the views of Ter Beek and advis-
ers had been taken into account. As one Defence Ministry official put it,
Ter Beek’s specific offer for the safe areas was made because it was seen as
a relatively secure bet, since ‘a logistical unit was unlikely to end up in the
front-line.’38
In one remarkable paragraph, the instruction stated that for practical
reasons it would not be possible to deploy both the logistical unit and
the first airmobile battalion at the same time. This qualification made
the rest of the message seem rather curious. For if it was not practically
possible to deploy both battalions at the same time, then why were the
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permanent representations instructed to mention them both? The two
Ministries each seem to have thought that this qualification fitted their
policy preferences, in which case the Foreign Ministry was one step
ahead. Unlike the officials in the Defence Ministry, the diplomats knew
that the chance was small that the peace initiatives currently being dis-
cussed would reach the implementation phase. Part of the reason was
that the Foreign Ministry itself was helping to obstruct progress with
regard to the ICFY’s plan for a Union of Three Republics. Hence, from
the Foreign Ministry’s perspective, the link between the implementation
of a settlement and the deployment of the airmobile battalion seemed
largely fictitious. Given that the deployment of a logistical unit was
unlikely to increase the visibility of Dutch foreign policy, the conclusion
appears justified that the Foreign Ministry counted on the deployment of
the airmobile battalion in the framework of the UN safe area policy.
For the people in the Defence Ministry, on the other hand, the ‘topic
“Foreign Ministry and the peace plans” played miles away.’ The Foreign
Ministry’s stance regarding the various peace plans ‘was impossible to
extract’.39 Somehow an excessive optimism took root in the Ministry of
Defence in the summer of 1993. As Ter Beek put it, ‘Everywhere, the idea
existed that the warring parties were battle-weary and would give prefer-
ence to a compromise at the negotiating table above a second winter of
war.’40 As the summer wore on, the Minister, the generals and his civilian
advisers convinced themselves that the UN’s safe areas would be ‘embed-
ded in the approaching broader peace agreement’.41 This optimism lasted
until the second week of September, when it became known that the
Bosnian government had refused to accept the plan for a Union of Three
Republics. Had the Defence Ministry been fully aware of the Foreign
Ministry’s opposition to this peace plan and the one before it, the critical
line regarding infantry deployments set out by Chief of Defence Staff
General Arie van der Vlis might well have remained the dominant one
(see below).
One week after the instruction of June 16, the Dutch readiness for a troop
offer was articulated publicly by the Cabinet itself. On June 22 Prime Min-
ister Lubbers and Foreign Minister Kooijmans attended a European
Council meeting in Copenhagen. There, Kooijmans was given a ‘free hand’
by Prime Minister Lubbers and announced that the Netherlands was ready
to commit a logistical unit to support the UN’s safe area policy.42 Through
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this commitment, the Dutch troop offer had been set in stone. As Ter Beek
later put it, there now existed a potential ‘loss of face’ in case the Nether-
lands proved unable or unwilling to fulfil its promise.43
With the commitment of June 22, 1993 the Netherlands had entered the
first stage of military entrapment for it was difficult to envisage how the
Netherlands could still withdraw the offer, even though it had been made
in relative isolation. Kooijmans and some officials later claimed that the
Dutch troop commitment had been accompanied by explicit commit-
ments by other EU member states.44 The European Council as a whole, it
was argued, had agreed to assemble all of the 7600 troops needed for the
safe areas. Moreover, French President François Mitterrand was said to
have explicitly promised that additional French troops would take part in
the implementation of the safe area policy. When the French government
later withdrew the French troops from the safe area of Bihac and concen-
trated them in Sarajevo, the Dutch realised they had misinterpreted Mit-
terrand.45 Given that Sarajevo was a safe area, the French were formally
still helping to implement the policy but had not deployed the additional
numbers of troops Kooijmans and Lubbers believed Mitterrand had
promised.
A serious look around the table in Copenhagen should have been suffi-
cient to make one realise that it was unlikely that the Europeans would be
able to assemble 7600 additional troops. Germany, Italy and Greece could
or would not contribute any troops on historical and constitutional
grounds. If the Netherlands had reached its limit with an additional logis-
tical unit, then similar personnel constraints could be expected to exist in
troop contributing countries like Belgium, Spain, Portugal and the
Nordic countries, not to mention countries like Ireland and Luxembourg
who had few, or no troops on the ground at all. Apart from the French,
this left the British whose capabilities were, however, also stretched. Con-
siderations such as these did not play a role, because the problem was
approached the other way around; rather than assess what other coun-
tries would do, it was hoped that the Netherlands would serve as a cata-
lyst. In Copenhagen ‘Ruud [Lubbers] and Peter [Kooijmans] wanted to
set an example.’46
To summarise, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could claim a victory
with the commitment of June 1993, the Ministry of Defence still seemed
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to be playing its hand intelligently for it had refused to be committed to
the combination ‘airmobile battalion and isolated safe areas’. However,
between June and August 1993, as pressure on the Ministry of Defence
increased further, its resistance to deploying the airmobile batallion in the
safe area context gradually weakened and eventually gave way to half-
hearted support.
The Defence Ministry’s ‘Switch’
In August 1993, the Defence Ministry ‘switched’ its troop offer for the safe
areas from the tailor made logistical unit into an airmobile battalion. The
switch seemed to imply that the Defence Ministry’s attitude regarding
infantry deployments and safe areas had developed from opposition to
support. However, the senior officers’ reservations regarding the UN’s
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia had not subsided. Rather, the switch
was motivated by both the domestic political pressure in favour of
deployment and the bureaucratic interests of the Army. According to H.J.
Schoo, the editor-in-chief of Elsevier Magazine, what really caused opin-
ion in army circles to sway in the summer of 1993 was the desire to ‘justi-
fy the creation of the airmobile brigade’.47
It is crucial to recognise that the Ministry of Defence was not a monolith-
ic actor if one is to understand its changing role regarding troop deploy-
ments in Bosnia. In comparison to the Foreign Ministry, where shared
beliefs had cemented various groups around a single pro-intervention
perspective (albeit with differing views on the modalities of such an
intervention), the Ministry of Defence was less cohesive. This was partly
due to the age-old rivalry between the three armed services for as large a
bite of the budgetary cake as possible. The Foreign Ministry used the
divisions within the Defence Ministry to push for greater military contri-
butions. From the perspective of a senior Foreign Ministry official 'there
existed three factors at the Defence Ministry that had to be taken into
account: DAB, the chief of the Defence Staff and the Commander of Land
Forces. The military initially were reluctant but later changed their
minds. As for Ter Beek, he too seemed to feel the need for the Netherlands
to contribute something internationally. Ter Beek, like Kooijmans,
appeared driven by ethics and morality.’48

opmaak Both/definitief  02-08-2000  15:14  Pagina 197
In terms of internal cohesion, the Defence Ministry went through three
stages. Between August 1992 and May 1993, there was a general reluctance
within the Ministry to become deeply involved in the Yugoslav crisis.
Against the pressure to deploy infantry troops the Defence Ministry ini-
tially maintained a united front. However, as the pressure continued to
rise and the legitimacy of the Army budget began to be questioned, the
Army leadership in particular became attracted to deployment. Once
deployment began to be regarded as inevitable, the Defence Ministry’s
generals and civilian officials united around a shared wish to exercise as
much control as possible over the actual deployment and take on a more
assertive posture vis-à-vis the Foreign Ministry.
Between August 1992 and May 1993 Minister Ter Beek played a moderat-
ing role in the Dutch domestic political arena. He warned that Dutch
possibilities were limited and raised practical military objections to calls
for Dutch infantry contributions. He flatly refused, for instance, the idea
of deploying conscripts in other than supportive roles, which made it
hard to assemble complete combat units. As a consequence, Ter Beek was
able to neutralise the demands for a greater Dutch military involvement
by offering non-combat troops who would play a supporting role in
UNPROFOR. Hence, all Ter Beek offered during the emotional exchanges
of August 1992 was a unit of 400 soldiers for a joint Belgian-Dutch trans-
port battalion (in addition to a substantial contribution by the Navy to
the WEU/NATO mission in the Adriatic Sea). Given that this was double
the number he had offered earlier in the year and that a signal unit was
already active in Bosnia and Croatia, he could claim to be heeding the
Second Chamber’s calls for greater involvement. The transport battalion
left for Bosnia on November 3, 1992.
The downside to Ter Beek’s tactics was that nothing of what he offered
could take away the widespread feeling that the Netherlands was not
doing enough to help the Bosnian Muslims. Every time events in Bosnia-
Herzegovina seemed to warrant action, calls were made for greater Dutch
military contributions. In late 1992 Ter Beek deflected pressure from Lub-
bers and Van den Broek to do more by offering a squadron of F16s for the
implementation of the No-Fly Zone. The next occasion at which the
Defence Ministry came under fire was a parliamentary debate in March
1993. In the run-up to that debate Foreign Minister Kooijmans had pre-
sented Ter Beek with a fait-accompli by publicly promising additional
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Dutch troops for the eventual implementation of the VOPP. Ter Beek had
not been consulted and later commented wryly that Kooijmans had
‘automatically assumed that he was also speaking completely in my
spirit’.49 During the actual debate, to which Ter Beek had not been invited,
one MP after another came up with suggestions on how all-volunteer
combat units could be assembled. Ideas that were floated included mov-
ing the Marines from the UN operation in Cambodia to Bosnia as well as
the creation of a mechanised infantry battalion of volunteers drawn from
different units. Kooijmans refused to commit himself but promised to
review all options in a meeting with Ter Beek the day after the debate.50
Kooijmans arrived at the Ministry of Defence the next day in the compa-
ny of Peter van Walsum, the Director-General for Political Affairs, and
Boudewijn van Eenennaam, the director of DAV. Ter Beek awaited the
delegation in the company of General Van der Vlis and Dirk Barth, the
director of the General Affairs Department (DAB). Various possibilities
for deploying combat units were reviewed. But Ter Beek did not commit
himself and proposed instead that Van der Vlis would produce an inven-
tory of all possible options. Van der Vlis presented his inventory on
March 17, which mentioned a variety of options but clearly favoured
deployment of a logistical unit of some fourhundred men.51
During a parliamentary debate on May 6,1993, when the safe area con-
cept again stood at the centre of attention, Ter Beek pointed out that the
Dutch were already making a respectable contribution to the UN opera-
tion in Bosnia, with their signal and transport battalions. He argued that
there was no room for a mechanised infantry battalion. As for the first
battalion of the airmobile brigade, its training would not be completed
until November. ‘If the necessity existed,’ Ter Beek concluded, a ‘tailor-
made’ logistical unit was what the Netherlands could contribute.52 But
the pressure did not subside. During another debate, on May 19, he was
faced with a Labour/Christian-Democrat motion calling upon the gov-
ernment to prepare the airmobile brigade for operations in Bosnia. No
wonder then that Ter Beek felt increasingly isolated.
A fundamental scepticism regarding the UN intervention in former
Yugoslavia on the part of the senior military underpinned Ter Beek’s
opposition until May 1993. In addition, Ter Beek himself was concerned
lest he take decisions under pressure from the ‘do something’ lobby that
would later be judged irresponsible.53 Ter Beek’s most senior adviser,
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General Van der Vlis, regarded the conflict as a potential quagmire. The
nature of the conflict appeared to be complex, while the actual terrain
was unfavourable to regular armies. Van der Vlis issued private and pub-
lic warnings that the kind of military intervention which so many people
in the Netherlands seemed to favour would be more costly than was
generally suggested. He appeared, for instance, on television as early as
November 1992, when safe areas were first being advocated in the
Netherlands, to criticise the safe area concept and the idea of stationing
peacekeepers within them. Finally, Van der Vlis feared that it would still
take several years before the ethos of a true professional army would take
root in the Dutch army.54 For a country whose military capability was
limited it seemed, therefore, wise to adopt a low profile internationally
and to keep Dutch military contributions modest.55
Apart from military arguments such as the ones voiced by the chief of the
Defence Staff, bureaucratic concerns had motivated opposition to
deploying infantry. Van der Vlis and Couzy, who later claimed to have
been ‘a little less attached to this argument’, feared that participation by
the airmobile brigade in the safe area operation would compromise
equipment plans.56 ‘What went through my mind,’ Van der Vlis later
explained, ‘was the question: will this not mean the end of the airmobile
brigade? Because people would perhaps start saying: “See, they can work
very well with armour. We don’t need those helicopters.”’57 The airmobile
brigade was due to receive some sixty new combat and transport heli-
copters, an additional investment worth some two billion guilders. With-
out combat helicopters, the brigade would be reduced to an air-trans-
portable infantry brigade whose added value to the Army would be
questionable at best. Hence, the military became extremely concerned
when in May 1993 some MPs began to hint that they might consider
blocking part of the acquisition.58
Van der Vlis found himself increasingly isolated as the pressure to deploy
combat troops began to fall on receptive ears within the Ministry. Two
groups of players saw merit in the deployment. First, Minister Ter Beek
and his civilian advisers in DAB were concerned about the political isola-
tion in which Ter Beek found himself as a result of the barrage of parlia-
mentary statements and motions in favour of deploying combat units.
Within the Cabinet, Ter Beek later explained, ‘I was virtually the only
Minister trying to dissuade somewhat… Slowly a steel ring of advocates
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of an extra Dutch military contribution was closing in on me.’59 Ter Beek
also found himself isolated within his own party, given the strong sup-
port within the PvdA for deploying combat troops. In addition, Ter Beek,
who as a socialist youth had helped to build the highway of brotherhood
and unity in Tito’s Yugoslavia, was touched by the same principled beliefs
that motivated many other Dutch politicians, as he later acknowledged.60
Finally, the creation of the airmobile brigade had cost some six billion
guilders, a sum Ter Beek had usually justified by stressing the brigade’s
capacity to operate in peacekeeping environments. As such he too was
sensitive to calls for the brigade to show its worth.61
A second group attracted by the idea of deploying the airmobile brigade
consisted of the so-called young turks. ‘To his surprise’, Couzy discovered
that a group of officers in his own Army staff favoured additional troop
contributions for the safe areas. According to Couzy, ‘their argument was
that it would be good for the image and presentation of the Royal Nether-
lands Army to carry out such a difficult assignment.’62 The ‘young turks’
were senior generals who believed in the need for an all-volunteer army.
This made them influential, given that Ter Beek needed such modernisers
to carry through the ambitious defence reforms he was overseeing. 63 At
the same time, they were very sensitive to parliamentary and public calls
for the new brigade to show its worth.64 Their sensitivity was enhanced by
the rivalry between the three armed services.65
The generals’ preoccupation with the Army’s and the airmobile brigade’s
legitimacy showed in their remarks to the press. According to Lieutenant-
General Maarten Schouten, the Commander of the First Army Corps and
in 1996 successor to Couzy as the Commander of Land Forces, it would
be ‘very bad’ for the airmobile brigade if, two and a half years after its
creation it would have got ‘no further than Ossendrecht heath and a little
exercise in Greece.’66 Another of the officers favouring the deployment of
the airmobile brigade was its second successive commanding officer,
Brigadier-General Jan Willem Brinkman, who told journalists that the
army should do something to demonstrate that the brigade ‘deserved’ the
yet-to-be-bought combat helicopters.67 Such was the eagerness for action
among the brigade itself that Brinkman’s predecessor had prepared a
reconnaissance mission to Cambodia in the hope that his brigade would
be ordered to replace the Marines there. When Ter Beek ordered the mis-
sion to be cancelled, the ‘disappointment … was great’.68
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The likelihood that the airmobile brigade would be deployed in the safe
area context and not in the framework of a general settlement increased
dramatically in July and early August 1993 for two additional reasons.
The first was an internal assessment that a deployment of the logistical
unit would cause manpower problems. In July, General Schouten’s First
Corps let it be known that it had miscounted its personnel, as a conse-
quence of which it was uncertain whether sufficient numbers could be
found to make up the ‘tailor made’ logistical unit offered for the safe
areas. What was certain was that deployment of the logistical unit would
consume so many resources that it would no longer be possible to offer
the airmobile battalion its own logistical unit. Ter Beek now risked being
held responsible for a failure by the Netherlands to live up to its military
commitment to the safe areas. Switching the two battalions presented
itself as a politically expedient way out of this dilemma.
The second development triggering the switch was a humiliating message
from the UN Secretariat in New York. On the morning of August 10, the
Defence Ministry received a message from the UN that the intended
assignment for the fourhundred-men strong logistical unit was the main-
tenance of former East-German equipment to be used by a Pakistani bat-
talion in UNPROFOR. If the UN Secretariat’s intention was to encourage
the Dutch Ministry of Defence to come up with something better than a
logistical unit, it could not have devised a more effective approach. For
the Dutch military and their Minister, the envisaged assignment consti-
tuted an ‘impossible’ one.69 It was time to come up with a ‘much better
offer’.70
The ‘switch’ was formally proposed to Ter Beek by senior military and
civilian advisers on August 17, 1993. Upon his return from holiday the
Minister found on his desk a paper which described the problems that
had arisen with regard to the deployment of the logistical unit in the
framework of the safe areas. The paper proposed that the solution to
these problems was to replace the tailor made logistical unit with an air-
mobile battalion and its own logistical support unit.
The paper’s conclusions were the fruit of discussions between senior gen-
erals and civilian officials which had not, however, involved the main
opponent to deployment, General Van der Vlis, who was still on holiday.
In the absence of Van der Vlis, the document had been signed by his
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deputy, Lt. General Henk van der Breemen, and by Dirk Barth, the Direc-
tor of DAB. Van den Breemen and Barth explained that the idea for a
switch had been discussed in the regular staff meeting and that detailed
consultations had been held with Lt. General Couzy and Major-General
Ruurd Reitsma (the Director of Operations). While Couzy had expressed
reservations, he had not rejected the proposal. Reitsma had indicated that
he saw great advantages in such a switch. Upon his return, Van der Vlis
was presented with a fait-accompli that was supported by everyone else
with an interest. He went along with the decision grudgingly.71
In the document, Barth and Van den Breemen explained the reasons why
a switch seemed the optimal decision to take. The Dutch offer of a tailor
made logistical unit had run into even greater manpower problems than
were known to exist before. In addition, the date for the deployment of
such a unit would narrowly approach the moment when the airmobile
brigade would be ready to deploy its first battalion. The problems
described, the document continued, were sensitive both domestically and
internationally. On the domestic side, Parliament still assumed that both
battalions could be deployed. On the international level, it was clear that
the Dutch political prestige had been put on the line through the Cabi-
net’s explicit commitment in Copenhagen in June. Given that the UN
Secretary-General had formally accepted the troop offer, clearly the Min-
istry of Defence had to come up with something. Ter Beek was given the
following advice: ‘Against this background we suggest you combine the
offer of a logistical unit and the Dutch option of deployment of the first
airmobile battalion into a new, larger Dutch offer: an airmobile battalion
with its own logistical component, totalling ninehundred to thousand
men. Such a battalion, equipped with YPRs [armoured vehicles] can be
ready for deployment early 1994.’72
There can be no doubt that the switch was made with the safe area opera-
tion in mind. Towards the end of the document, the two authors men-
tioned the possibility that the UN’s entire safe area operation might
change due to – or be overtaken by – the implementation of a settlement.
‘This’, the paper continued, ‘inevitably brings uncertainty about the exact
assignment of the extra Dutch troops to be deployed early next year.’
Clearly, in this document, the safe area operation was treated as a given,
and the implementation of a settlement as a possibility.
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When the ever-sceptical General Van der Vlis returned from holiday, the
Defence Ministry made a final, but fruitless attempt to place the proposed
switch in the context of a settlement and thereby avoid the safe areas.
Minister Ter Beek was to present the new, improved offer at UN Head-
quarters in New York on September 7 in a meeting with UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali. He was also to meet with senior members of the
US Administration in Washington D.C. In preparation for the visit, his
officials drafted a letter from Ter Beek to Boutros-Ghali, dated August 31,
1993, which reflected the unrealistic assumption that the safe area opera-
tion would be overtaken by the implementation of a peace settlement.
The letter did not mention the ‘safe areas’ anywhere and instead argued
that the new Dutch troop offer could not be ‘a blanc cheque’.73 The letter
was handed to Jan Hoekema’s UN Affairs Department in the Foreign
Ministry with the request to pass it on to the permanent representation in
New York, who could then pass it on to the UN Secretariat. However, the
letter never reached its intended destination. Foreign Minister Kooijmans
and his staff found the letter unacceptable, because it created the impres-
sion that the Netherlands was reneging on its troop contribution to the
safe area operation. Defence Ministry officials were informed that the let-
ter should be replaced by a joint instruction from both Ministries to the
permanent representation in New York. The Defence Ministry caved in
and agreed to a joint instruction that was sent on September 2. The
telegram reminded the UN Secretariat of the commitment made in
Copenhagen in June to take part in the safe area operation with a logisti-
cal unit and stated that the new offer was made with the implementation
of safe area resolution 836 specifically in mind. In sum, the Foreign Min-
istry had kept the Defence Ministry firmly in check and had thereby
determined the framework in which Ter Beek’s meeting in New York
would take place.
In light of what had just happened, Ter Beek could not have vetoed the
safe area operation in his talks with Boutros-Ghali, had he wanted to do
so: ‘I very specifically committed the reinforced battalion to the imple-
mentation force but I did not explicitly say: “It is not meant for the safe
areas.”’74 It came as a relief when he found that Boutros-Ghali was opti-
mistic about the likelihood of a political agreement being reached soon.
In this case troops would be needed for an implementation force, rather
than for a safe area operation in a war environment. More optimism
came Ter Beek’s way when he met US National Security Adviser Anthony
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Lake and Deputy Secretary of Defence William Perry in Washington.
Lake indicated that additional European troop offers might help the US
administration win over Congress for a more active involvement in the
Bosnian crisis, including ground troops.75 Influenced by the optimism of
his interlocutors, Ter Beek returned to the Netherlands fairly confident
that the safe area operation would slip into the background as time
passed by. When the Bosnian government did not accept the plan for a
Union of Three Republics, it still seemed unlikely that the UN would con-
tinue the safe area operation, precisely because the UN had not been able
to assemble the required number of troops. By October the Army staff
had, moreover, concluded that it had a ‘strong preference’ for deployment
in the ‘area of Zenica’ in central Bosnia which was close to the Dutch
transport battalion’s area of operation. The option Srebrenica/Zepa
would pose ‘great logistical problems’.76 It therefore came as an unpleas-
ant surprise when on 22 October 1993 UN Secretary-General formally
requested the Netherlands to contribute the airmobile battalion to the
safe area operation. According to Ter Beek,‘the absence of a peace settle-
ment meant that the extra Dutch unit would be faced with a very differ-
ent task than the one initially envisaged for it.’77
The Road to Srebrenica
The UN’s request for the airmobile battalion to be made available for the
safe area operation suddenly brought home the implications of the safe
area policy. The enthusiasm for the safe areas that had so marked the
rhetoric in the Foreign Ministry and the Second Chamber disappeared
like snow before the sun with the former going so far as to suggest that
there was a need for territorial exchanges involving the isolated safe areas
in eastern Bosnia (see chapter 4). As for the Second Chamber, when the
UN’s request was made public on November 4, 1993, Christian-Demo-
crat MP Ton de Kok telephoned the Ministry of Defence to express his
concerns. De Kok indicated that he had quite a few reservations regarding
the protection of the safe areas. He said he had doubts ‘about the utility’
of the presence of the Dutch troops inside the safe areas. He added that he
was under the impression that the Dutch offer had been intended ‘exclu-
sively’ for the implementation of a peace settlement. When the Defence
Ministry spokesman reminded De Kok of the debates of May, 6 and 19
during which his party had strongly supported deployment of the airmo-
bile brigade in the safe area framework, De Kok was forced to admit that
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‘Parliament had perhaps somewhat very enthusiastically demanded for
the preparation of the airmobile brigade’.78
Another MP to voice concern was Maarten van Traa, the PvdA spokes-
man for Foreign Affairs and one of the sponsors of the pro-deployment
motion of May 19. Already in early October, following a visit to Bosnia,
he had begun to backtrack. Van Traa told de Volkskrant: ‘I have always
stood in front in pleading for Dutch involvement but I now also have the
responsibility to place question marks.’79 Van Traa advised his fellow
party-member Gerrit Valk, the spokesman for defence affairs, to make a
formal reservation during the final debate on deployment on November
16, 1993 regarding the precise destination of the airmobile brigade. This
Valk did, explaining that he wanted another debate when the precise loca-
tion would be known. While Valk was the only one to make a formal
reservation, most members of the permanent committees for Foreign
Affairs and defence expressed a preference for ‘stationing the battalion in
a contiguous area in central Bosnia’, rather than in a safe area.80 Ter Beek
replied that ‘he had not made an absolute condition of the choice of loca-
tion’ and could not exclude the possibility that the Dutch troops would be
deployed in Srebrenica, although this was not his preferred choice, given
the ‘great logistical problems’ involved.81
Given the Foreign Ministry’s and Second Chamber’s belated questioning
of the safe area concept, it seems curious that the Ministry of Defence 
– rather than treating the final destination as an inevitability that was
coming about by no fault of its own – did not seek to exploit the brief
domestic momentum by promoting a last-ditch national effort to claim
the operation in central Bosnia. Such an approach could in theory have
culminated in a domestic political constellation similar to the one that
had arisen in Scandinavia, where Sweden, Denmark and Norway had
made available a joint ‘Nordic’ battalion for the safe area operation. These
countries’ respective parliaments opposed deployment in Srebrenica and
were ready only to authorise deployment in Tuzla, a well-defended Bos-
nian town with a territorial link to Muslim-held central Bosnia. With the
Scandinavian parliaments having taken up this position, the Swedish For-
eign Minister could let it be known to the UNPROFOR Commanders that
the Nordic governments opposed deployment of their battalion in Sre-
brenica.82 Nevertheless, the question of whether the Dutch Defence Min-
istry could have mobilised domestic opinion against deployment in an
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isolated safe area is not only hypothetical, but should probably be
answered in the negative. The few individual expressions of doubt by MPs
came too late and were too weak to resemble anything like parliamentary
opposition. Ultimately, for most people the precise location and nature of
the airmobile battalion’s future assignment were of secondary impor-
tance. What mattered was the deployment itself. This was true for Minis-
ters, parliamentarians, officials, officers and journalists alike. Hence, when
the airmobile battalion’s definitive destination became known at the end
of the year, all the major parties including the PvdA supported deploy-
ment in Srebrenica.
Ter Beek sent a mission to Bosnia less than a week after the receipt by the
Defence Ministry of the UN Secretary-General’s request for the airmobile
battalion to be made available for the safe areas. The mission was led by
the commander of the airmobile brigade, Brigadier-General Jan Willem
Brinkman, and included a colonel from the Defence Staff, a colonel from
the Army staff and a DAB official. Brinkman was one of the ‘young turks’:
eager supporters of deploying the airmobile brigade. The appointment of
a mission leader who would have accepted most any assignment for the
airmobile brigade confirmed that his superiors did not foresee tough
negotations with the UNPROFOR commanders on the battalion’s assign-
ment, but rather that any assignment would be acceptable. Given that the
UNPROFOR commanders were being confronted by an otherwise total
refusal to deploy troops in Srebrenica, this complacent attitude on the
part of the Dutch Defence Ministry increased the likelihood of Dutch sol-
diers ending up in an enclave that would soon be described by Ter Beek as
a triple prison.
On November 9, Ter Beek and General Couzy met up with General
Brinkman’s delegation in Zagreb, Croatia. Brinkman told them that the
UNPROFOR commanders were thinking of two options. Under the first
option the battalion would be deployed in central Bosnia in the triangle
Vares-Zenica-Kakanj, which was close to where the Belgian-Dutch trans-
port battalion was based. In this case, the Nordic battalion stationed in
Tuzla would also take on Srebrenica (an option that was not, as we have
seen, acceptable to the Scandinavians). The second option entailed split-
ting the battalion into two. One half would operate in central Bosnia, the
other in the Srebrenica/Zepa area, two safe areas that were considered as
a single area of operation.83 Brinkman explained that UNPROFOR had a
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preference for option one. This was a relief to Ter Beek and Couzy.84
Ominously, however, Brinkman added that he considered the second
option as acceptable too, which suggested that he had not raised objec-
tions to this option in his consultations with UNPROFOR. The planned
meeting between Ter Beek and Lt. General Briquemont, UNPROFOR’s
Bosnia-Herzegovina commander, did not take place as Briquemont had
gone on leave instead, thereby making it impossible for Ter Beek to ex-
press face to face his ‘preference for one location in one contiguous
area’.85 Back in the Netherlands, nobody argued that the final decision on
deployment should be postponed until Ter Beek had personally had a
chance to talk to Briquemont, so on November 12 the government for-
mally decided to deploy the airmobile brigade. Discussion in the Cabinet
focused on the question of how to finance the deployment. As Ter Beek
later put it, ‘the missionary had decided “let’s go” but then the merchant
asked “who is going to pay for it?”.’
Despite, or rather precisely because of, the uncritical support for deploy-
ment, the Dutch were still in the dark about their battalion’s assignment.
At the same time, the Dutch attitude helped the UNPROFOR generals in
their difficult decision about which country’s troops would be deployed
in Srebrenica. For Cot and Briquemont a complex problem was being
solved before their very eyes by a third party: if all troop contributing
countries refused to deploy troops in the safe area of Srebrenica while the
Netherlands did not, then Dutch troops it would be.86 Hence, when Gen-
eral Reitsma was sent on a reconnaissance mission to Bosnia to find out
what would be the battalion’s destination, the outcome had become pre-
dictable.
General Reitsma was sent to former Yugoslavia in late November with the
aim of discussing the battalion’s mission with General Cot in Zagreb and
with General Briquemont in Kiseljak near Sarajevo. Due to bad weather,
however, Reitsma was forced to stay in Zagreb and discuss the matter
with Briquemont over the phone. Reitsma was told that the two options
discussed with General Brinkman earlier in November had been can-
celled. Instead the Dutch battalion would have to take on the safe areas of
Srebrenica and Zepa. Reitsma took little convincing. Not only did he per-
sonally support deployment, but the formal decision-making process in
the Netherlands had left him without any credible argument to oppose
the decision by UNPROFOR. On the night of December 1 and 2, 1993,
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therefore, Reitsma faxed his report and recommendation to his immedi-
ate superior, General Couzy, who in turn forwarded it to the Defence Staff
the following morning without any comment. Reitsma’s message read:
The option Srebrenica and Zepa is an honourable, difficult,
but do-able task for the Royal Netherlands Army and fits with-
in the demands of the government and the wishes of Parlia-
ment. It is expected that this option will require several addi-
tional measures which are, however, not insurmountable. It is
recommended to agree to this option, to inform Parliament
about it and to instruct the Royal Netherlands Army to carry
out this option. In order to avoid unnecessary speculations
about Dutchbat’s location(s) in the press and with personnel,
speedy decision-making is desirable.87
The Second Chamber was informed of the location on December 3, 1993
in a letter by Ter Beek. The Second Chamber was reminded of the unani-
mous support they had given to the deployment decision in the debate on
November 16. According to the letter there was no need for great concern
for the ‘military situation in both Srebrenica and Zepa [had been] quiet
for some time’ and the Dutch battalion could be expected to be capable of
fulfilling its assignment ‘well and responsibly’.88 On February 1, 1994, the
Second Chamber’s permanent committees for Foreign Affairs and
Defence explicitly reconfirmed their consent to deployment of the airmo-
bile battalion, whereby the national decision-making process had come to
an end.
The Defence Ministry Sets a Price
While it is unlikely that a more critical attitude on the part of the Min-
istry of Defence could have altered the outcome, by November 1993 such
was the level of acceptance within it that no serious attempt was under-
taken to influence UNPROFOR’s decision-making. This is not to suggest
that the senior military had suddenly lost all sense of military judgment.
Rather, they had come to accept that in the domestic debate on interven-
tion, military considerations could not effectively counter political and
moral considerations. Having come this far it proved impossible to avoid
the temptation to go one step further and use the deployment of the air-
mobile battalion as a political tool. The Army leadership in particular
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began to regard the safe area mission as a costly but necessary investment,
for it had identified a number of (bureaucratic) political interests such a
mission could serve.
An important return on this investment, it was hoped, would be an
enhanced domestic legitimacy of the Army. Given that in the Yugoslav
crisis the Dutch Navy and Air force seemed to be making more impor-
tant and more visible contributions than the Army, its generals became
concerned that the Army’s long-term financial prospects were weaken-
ing. The airmobile brigade symbolised and exacerbated the Army’s
predicament. The Second Chamber had only grudgingly approved its
creation in 1991 and had insisted that the Minister of Defence would
‘report regularly’ on the progress of this expensive new unit.89 By 1993,
with the Bosnian war at its height, the credibility of the new all volunteer
army was at stake. The argument used traditionally by successive defence
Ministers to avoid budget cuts – the real and perceived obligations to
NATO – no longer worked. What the media, the Second Chamber and
the Foreign Ministry made clear they wanted was for the Army and the
airmobile brigade to show their worth. To reinforce the message, as we
have seen, some parliamentarians went so far as to threaten blocking the
funds required for the acquisition of helicopters for the airmobile
brigade.90 Hence, the Army generals concluded that ‘participation’ in the
Bosnian operation with combat troops could act as a ‘buffer against fur-
ther budget cuts.’91 According to Ter Beek, one general was ‘absolutely’
certain that Parliament would quickly come to understand the need for
helicopters once the brigade’s first operational battalion had been de-
ployed in Bosnia.92
Unfortunately, by setting such a political objective, the Army leadership
invited suspicion of having replaced the traditional definition of a ‘suc-
cessful mission’ by the airmobile battalion in Bosnia by an alternative,
perverse interpretation. After all, what would be a more effective demon-
stration of the battalion’s need for helicopters than its ‘imprisonment’ in
a surrounded enclave? While Van der Vlis had long opposed deployment
of Dutch infantry in Bosnia, he now shared the Army’s concern that
deployment of the airmobile brigade in Srebrenica, where its battalion
would be forced to operate as a mechanised infantry battalion, would
compromise equipment plans. When it turned out that the Army leader-
ship and Chief of the Defence Staff Van der Vlis advised Ter Beek to equip
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the battalion as a classic, lightly armed peacekeeping unit, some Foreign
Ministry officials voiced concern. They warned their superiors that the
YPR armed personnel carriers the airmobile battalion would make use of
in Srebrenica, were not equipped with 25 mm gun turrets, but only with
manually-operated .50 calibre machine guns. The official explanation,
they argued, was that the airmobile brigade had not been trained for
mechanised warfare and that the YPRs were only to be used as battlefield
taxis. The Foreign Ministry officials, however, had also come across the
argument that the Army leadership was afraid that using YPRs with 25
mm guns would raise further doubts in Parliament with regard to the
procurement of armed helicopters.93
While it is doubtful that the Bosnian Serbs would have allowed the more
heavily armed version of the YPR to enter Srebrenica, it seems that the
Army leadership eventually came to regard entrapment in an isolated safe
area as a means to an end. In any case, the entrapment of the airmobile
battalion in the safe area of Srebrenica helped to ensure the airmobile
brigade’s survival as an integral unit. Soon after the deployment in Sre-
brenica, parliamentary approval was given for the acquisition of trans-
port and combat helicopters for the airmobile brigade, with D66 (opposi-
tion) leader and future Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo commenting in
May 1994 that the airmobile brigade was the only large project the gov-
ernment had successfully completed.94
The Defence Ministry set an additional price for its support for deploy-
ment, namely a greater say in the formulation of Dutch policy in so far as
this affected the security of Dutch forces in theatre. Despite the conscious
decision to equip the airmobile battalion as lightly armed peacekeepers,
by no means did the Minister and the generals contemplate risking the
lives of Dutch soldiers in hopeless battles for what their military judg-
ment told them was an indefensible enclave. On the contrary, as Van der
Vlis later publicly explained, the Defence Ministry had gone along with
the deployment on the basis of an understanding that the Dutch soldiers
would operate ‘in a humanitarian mission, on the basis of impartiality’
and that this ‘mission would be considered terminated if the conflicting
parties ceased to respect the status of the safe area and the mandate of the
Dutch blue helmets’.95 Ter Beek later confirmed this view: ‘It was a peace-
keeping operation, because we were there with the consent of the Serbs.’96
To underscore the impartiality of the Dutch troops, they did not make an
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attempt to enter the enclave until written permission had been received
from the political leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic.
Already in August 1993, a Defence Ministry steering group had conclud-
ed that the security of the Dutch forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina required
that ‘with every escalatory step, maximum political control must be guar-
anteed.’97 Later, with Dutch troops stationed in Srebrenica, this meant
ensuring that the use of air power would not lead to retaliation against
the Dutch troops, a concern shared by other countries whose troops were
placed in vulnerable positions, most notably Canada during the period
that its troops had been deployed in Srebrenica.98 The responsibility for
protecting the security of the Dutch troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina could
not be entrusted to the Foreign Ministry, given that this concern did not
seem to feature high on the Foreign Ministry’s agenda. In fact, during the
preceding months relations between the two Ministries had steadily dete-
riorated. Diplomats had come to regard the military as immoral cowards,
while the military had ceased to take seriously the perceived utopians in
the Foreign Ministry.99 Clearly, from the Defence Ministry’s perspective, if
the security of Dutch forces was to be given a central place in Dutch poli-
cy then the Defence Ministry needed to assert itself. Ter Beek later con-
firmed that the Defence Ministry did indeed play a more important role
in the formulation of Dutch Bosnia policy following the deployment of
the airmobile battalion in Srebrenica: ‘Yes, oh yes, with our troops
deployed in Srebrenica, our views mattered.’100
The most important consequence of the Defence Ministry’s new-found
assertiveness was the evolution of Dutch attitudes regarding the use of air
power from enthusiasm to caution. Back in June 1993, UN Security
Council resolution 836 had authorised member states to take ‘all neces-
sary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in
the performance of its mandate’. Eventually the differences of views
between cautious troop contributing countries like the UK, France,
Canada, Spain and – following deployment in Srebrenica – the Nether-
lands, on the one hand, and the more hawkish US on the other, led to a
so-called dual key arrangement. This meant, in short, that NATO could
not use air power without the specific permission of the UNPROFOR
commanders and the UN Secretary-General or his Special Representative
for former Yugoslavia.
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Before the decision to deploy troops in Srebrenica, the Dutch position
regarding the use of air power had reflected the tough interventionist
approach in general. The Netherlands generally favoured the use of NATO
air power against the Bosnian Serbs. Thus, when there was a discussion in
NATO in early August 1993 on an American proposal to threaten air
strikes against Serb forces on Mount Igman near Sarajevo, the Nether-
lands was ‘very sympathetic’ towards the American proposals. Sarajevo
and other safe areas ‘needed to be liberated from the Serbian stranglehold’.
Moreover, it was argued that the ‘presence of UNPROFOR should not by
itself be allowed to be an argument to exclude tougher measures by defin-
ition.’101 Similarly, during a ministerial North Atlantic Council on January
11, 1994 Kooijmans and Lubbers had called for a strongly worded para-
graph on air strikes. Clearly, at this stage, the Netherlands did not yet need
to fear retaliation against its own peacekeepers.
In February 1994, NATO air strikes were again threatened, this time in
response to a mortar attack against Sarajevo, which had turned the town’s
central marketplace into a ‘human abattoir’.102 While the Netherlands sup-
ported issuing a tough-sounding ultimatum to the Serbs, backed up by the
threat of air strikes, it did not escape attentive journalists that the govern-
ment also believed that the NATO ultimatum should be embedded in cer-
tain ‘safeguards’. These safeguards entailed that no air strikes could take
place without a specific request to NATO by the UNPROFOR command
and the UN. De Volkskrant accurately observed : ‘Kooijmans opts for cau-
tion.’103 The newspaper also commented that the new ‘more balanced’ Dutch
policy had everything to do with the deployment of the airmobile battalion
‘in Serb-controlled territory’. Fortunately, the issue dissipated as Russian
intervention led to the departure of the Serb forces from Mount Igman.
One can pinpoint the moment when the Defence Ministry became more
influential as an actor with regard to the use of air power. On January 19,
1994 a meeting was held in The Hague between UN Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali and Dutch Cabinet Ministers led by Prime Minister Lub-
bers. Air power constituted the main topic for discussion. However, Ter
Beek entered the meeting with a different interest in mind than Kooij-
mans and Lubbers. While Ter Beek’s interest was in receiving guarantees
that air power would not endanger the security of the Dutch troops,
Kooijmans wanted to secure a promise from the UN Secretary-General
that a decision to use air power could be taken swiftly. ‘I remember,’
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Kooijmans later explained, ‘that I exchanged detailed views with the
Secretary-General about air power, whereby I made clear that there was
no need for a separate decision from the Security Council to conduct air
strikes. According to the Secretary-General it was necessary. That caused
confusion. Lubbers agreed with me.’104
One of the reasons why Kooijmans and Lubbers seem to have been con-
fused was that they had not made a clear distinction between ‘close air
support’ and ‘air strikes’. In the UNPROFOR environment, the distinction
was nonetheless extremely important, particularly in the context of safe
areas. Close air support was meant as a protective measure to be taken if
UNPROFOR troops found themselves being targeted. In such a case, air
power could be used to attack the actual guns threatening the UNPRO-
FOR troops (the ‘smoking gun’ principle). Air strikes on the other hand
were meant as a pre-emptive or punitive measure, aimed not only against
tactical targets but also against such strategic targets like bridges, com-
mand centres and ammunition dumps.
In contrast to Kooijmans, Ter Beek was satisfied by the outcome of the
meeting.105 The essence that he had distilled from Boutros-Ghali’s words
was that ‘close air support’ could be given on short notice, while ‘air
strikes’ would require a more lengthy decision-making procedure.106 Ter
Beek’s understanding of the meeting’s conclusion was confirmed in a let-
ter from Boutros-Ghali to the President of the Security Council, dated 28
January 1994. In the letter the UN Secretary General explained that the
authority to invoke close air support would be delegated to his Special
Representative for the former Yugoslavia, Yasushi Akashi. Air strikes, on
the other hand, would require his personal approval.107
In the ensuing days, the Foreign Ministry continued to blur the distinc-
tion between the two kinds of air power while the Defence Ministry
accentuated it.108 Hence, in a written exchange with the Foreign Ministry,
Defence Ministry officials made clear that the blue-helmeted peacekeep-
ers in Bosnia were not in a position to satisfy the precondition that ‘an
attack from the air must be finished on the ground.’109 On 27 January
1994, when the first Dutch units departed for Srebrenica, General Couzy
spoke out publicly against air strikes in a radio interview. Minister 
Ter Beek later stated that he saw the dual key arrangement as a safety valve
one should cherish rather than tamper with.110 The Foreign Ministry
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eventually caved in. Acceptance of the dual key was, as one senior 
DAV official put it, a ‘concession by the Foreign Ministry to the Defence
Ministry’ (as if this was a national question).111 In fact, within the Foreign
Ministry, the UN Affairs Department, as opposed to DAV, could live with
the new constellation, which gave primacy to continuation of the UN’s
humanitarian operation over the use of NATO air power.
When in April 1994 five Dutch military observers were taken hostage by
the Serbs in retaliation for the use of NATO ‘close air support’ over the
safe area of Gorazde, the Dutch enthusiasm for the more offensive air
strikes diminished further. With the hostage crisis of May 1995, when
Serb forces took hundreds of UNPROFOR soldiers hostage in retaliation
for air strikes against their ammunition dumps in Pale, further evidence
had been provided that the combination air power and vulnerable peace-
keepers in isolated enclaves was not an effective one.
Paradoxically, the Defence Ministry’s cautious approach to the use of air
power was supported by the parliamentarians whose primary concern
now constituted the security of the very troops they had urged the
Defence Ministry to deploy. Parliament's changed attitude reflected the
growing doubts among the Dutch public with regard to the role of the
Dutch forces in former Yugoslavia. Three opinion polls conducted
between December 1993 and June 1995 demonstrated that the percentage
of those in favour of Dutch participation in UNPROFOR had decreased
from an absolute majority of 68 per cent in December 1993 and 53 per
cent in December 1994 to 41 per cent in June 1995, albeit that the per-
centage of outright opponents had not substantially increased (from 14
per cent in 1993, to 26 per cent in both 1994 and 1995).112 With the initial
enthusiasm for participation in UNPROFOR having waned, by June
1995, clearly the domestic balance of power had shifted in favour of the
Ministry of Defence. Fatefully, by then the attempts to get the Dutch sol-
diers out of Srebrenica or to reinforce them had come to nothing.
Conclusion
We have argued here that Dutch entrapment in the Bosnian conflict was
completed with Dutch troops being deployed as effective hostages in the
enclave of Srebrenica. From then on, there was no way into and no way
out of the enclave without the permission of the surrounding Serb forces.
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We have described what entrapment looked like from the perspective 
of the policy makers back home. Clearly, the entrapment of the Dutch
troops in Srebrenica caused great concern in Dutch policy-making circles
and desperate attempts were made to either free the troops from their
predicament or at least to reinforce them with additional equipment or
other countries’ troops.
The fact that entrapment was perceived at the time for what it was begs
the question of what had allowed this situation to arise in the first place.
Clearly, the eventual mission for the airmobile brigade had been a more
ambitious undertaking than any of the players involved in the decision-
making had originally intended. In order to understand what led the
Netherlands to offer lightly armed peacekeepers for Srebrenica one needs
to separate two issues. The first would be the question of why the
Netherlands supported the safe area concept as it was formulated by the
Security Council. The second question is why the Netherlands agreed to
the Srebrenica mission. As for the answer to the first question, it was
argued that the military commitment flowed from the same moral and
political considerations that had motivated the Dutch opposition to the
ICFY peace plans in the first half of 1993. Having long advocated a more
forceful military intervention and supported the safe area concept, the
Dutch government felt morally obliged to underpin its rhetoric with
deeds. Otherwise, the high moral reputation and the corresponding self-
image which the Dutch government had construed since August 1992
risked being exposed as hollow. This notion is supported by other
observers. According to Koen Koch, for example, Dutch interventionism
in Bosnia derived in part from such pragmatic considerations as the
‘enlargement of national prestige’, ‘national pride’ and the ‘strengthening
of the national self-image’.113
The second question requires scrutiny of the role played by the Ministry
of Defence. There can be no doubt that until August 1993, the Defence
Ministry stood isolated in its opposition to deploying Dutch infantry in
the Bosnian theatre. In the face of growing domestic pressure in favour
of safe areas and in favour of deploying the airmobile battalion, the
Defence Ministry’s position gradually shifted so that by November 1993
domestic support for deploying troops in the framework of the UN safe
area policy was ‘100 per cent’.114 Apart from a sense of inevitability which
the constant domestic pressure had caused, the change of policy was also
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motivated by the bureaucratic and political self-interest of the Army lead-
ership. The main interest the Army generals sought to secure was
enhanced domestic legitimacy for the Army, in particular for the expen-
sive new airmobile brigade, which was expected to receive some sixty
combat and transport helicopters. In addition, the Ministry of Defence
wanted a bigger say in Dutch policy regarding the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, particularly in so far as this affected the security of Dutch
peacekeepers on the ground. This then was the implicit deal the Ministry
of Defence offered to Parliament and the Foreign Ministry: it would go
along with deployment of an airmobile battalion in the safe area frame-
work in exchange for parliamentary approval of the acquisition of the
helicopters and a greater emphasis on the security of the Dutch forces in
Dutch policy towards the Yugoslav crisis. The Defence Ministry seems to
have successfully protected these interests. Soon after the deployment of
the airmobile battalion in Srebrencia, the acquisition of helicopters for
the airmobile brigade was approved by the Second Chamber. Also, the
Defence Ministry succeeded in modifying the Dutch stance regarding the
use of air power over Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the Foreign Ministry
having to accept a greater emphasis being put on the security of the
peacekeepers. However, in their eagerness to secure these interests, the
Army generals had overlooked an important point. While the Defence
Ministry’s official line was that the mission would be regarded as termi-
nated were the parties to the conflict to violate Srebrenica’s safe area sta-
tus, both the Bosnian Muslim people in the enclave as well as the Dutch
and international audience really believed that the Dutch peacekeepers
could be depended upon to actually protect the Bosnian Muslims against
the Serbs. In reality the peacekeepers in Srebrenica could not provide this
kind of protection as anyone who had studied the UN safe area resolu-
tions and had monitored the situation closely understood. Nevertheless,
the perceived failure to protect the people in Srebrenica rebounded mer-
cilessly on the Army and served to undermine the very legitimacy its
generals had sought to secure domestically. Moreover, the Army’s inter-
national reputation had suffered a huge blow.
The Srebrenica mission thus was a more ambitious mission than anyone
involved in the policy-making process had intended it to be. None of the
key actors apparently took into account the ‘triple prison’ constellation
that arose when the implementation began, with General Van der Vlis as 
a possible exception who solved his dilemma by equipping the Dutch
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peacekeepers as lightly as possible so as to stress their peacekeeping,
instead of warfighting, role. The Foreign Ministry’s primary focus lay on
the ‘moral imperative’ of an infantry contribution to the safe area opera-
tion and the ‘visibility’ this would bring. The Defence Ministry responded
to the domestic pressure by gradually abandoning military criteria in
favour of (bureaucratic) political criteria. The one strategic and moral
consideration which should have stood at the centre of the decision-
making process – but was never seriously addressed – was whether the
Dutch peacekeepers would actually be in a position to afford protection
to the civilian Muslim population inside the safe area.
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Conclusion
This book has provided an analysis of Dutch foreign policy regarding the
Yugoslav crisis from 1990 until 1995. Its main conclusion is that the
Netherlands was an important and influential player in the international
community’s intervention in the former Yugoslavia during this period.
This is a significant conclusion if one bears in mind that the Netherlands
is a smaller state, or ‘pocket-sized medium power’, and that mainstream
Realist International Relations theory assumes that smaller states have no
serious role of their own to play in international affairs. A second conclu-
sion is that the Netherlands was particularly influential during its term as
EC Presidency in 1991, which suggests that it is easier for a smaller state
to have an impact when its external environment is marked by a shared
desire to cooperate and by respect for shared norms and rules. Third,
despite the constraints imposed on the Netherlands by its external envi-
ronment, domestic factors played an important, sometimes even decisive,
role in determining the foreign policy behaviour of the Netherlands. In
particular between August 1992 and late 1993, shared ideas and beliefs
among the civilian elements of the Dutch foreign policy elite, as well as a
domestic (bureaucratic) political conflict centering on the Defence Min-
istry’s reluctance to deploy infantry in Bosnia-Herzegovina, had a deci-
sive impact on Dutch policy. Finally, this book has highlighted the impor-
tance of distinguishing between ‘influence’ and ‘success’: between August
1992 and July 1995 the Netherlands, while influential, entrapped itself in
the Bosnian war and was severely punished for it, almost as if it had vio-
lated Waltz’s ‘law of gravitation’.
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Dutch Influence
No evidence was found to support a claim that the Netherlands was an
influential player during the period of July 1990 until June 1991, when
the Yugoslav crisis had not yet descended into armed conflict. However,
the question of whether the Netherlands was influential at this stage
proved to be an irrelevant one for the Yugoslav crisis simply did not con-
stitute a foreign policy concern for the international decision makers.
The situation was altogether different during the second half of 1991.
Between July and December 1991 the Netherlands was at its most influ-
ential, which is not to say that the Dutch EC Presidency made no mistakes
or at times failed to exert influence. What matters is that a number of spe-
cific occasions can be identified during which the Dutch Presidency
played a crucial role in the formulation of EC policy. On July 7, 1991, for
instance, Foreign Minister Van den Broek negotiated the Brioni decla-
ration with the various Yugoslav sides. The declaration included a three-
month ‘moratorium’ on the Croatian and Slovenian declarations of inde-
pendence, an agreement on access for an EC Monitoring Mission
(ECMM) to Slovenia (soon thereafter extended to Croatia). Several
authors, notably Silber and Little, and Meier, argue that Van den Broek
had dominated the scene in Brioni. The Dutch Presidency subsequently
mobilised manpower and financial resources for ECMM and had the
mission deployed in Slovenia less than a month after the Brioni declara-
tion. Interestingly, ECMM exists to this day in most of the former
Yugoslavia and Albania and is currently being restructured to become a
veritable common foreign policy instrument of the European Union.
It is often argued that it is much more difficult to exert ‘positive’ influence
than it is to influence by obstruction. An example of the Netherlands
influencing European policy through obstruction constituted the rejec-
tion of a French proposal in July 1991 to send a WEU-force to Croatia.
Both the Netherlands and the UK argued that such a move would under-
mine NATO unity. (When in September that same year the Netherlands
itself proposed deploying a WEU-force, it discovered that it was easier to
obstruct such a proposal than to assemble sufficient support for it.)
Another important occasion on which Dutch policy impacted on the direc-
tion of the EC’s approach to the Yugoslav crisis constituted the ministerial
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declaration of August 27/28, 1991. Although the draft (which had been
put together by Van den Broek and Van Walsum) had been even tougher
than the declaration that was eventually issued, their reference to the fait-
accompli policy of Serbia and the Yugoslav army remained. This was the
first time the EC member states had used such explicitly anti-Serbian lan-
guage and it had the effect of strengthening the position of Croatia and
Slovenia. Having referred to Serbia’s fait-accompli policy, it was going to
be difficult for the member states to revert back to an even-handed or
neutral position.
One of the most influential actions by the Netherlands during the entire
period discussed in this book, constituted the announcement on October
10, 1991 of a two-month deadline for the negotiations between the con-
flicting Yugoslav republics on an overall settlement. If by December 10,
1991 no agreement was reached, the EC member states would have to
take a decision on a recognition of individual Yugoslav republics that
wished to become independent states. Little noted at the time, this dead-
line nonetheless became a crucial factor in uniting the EC around a pro-
recognition policy. Van den Broek had presented it as a means to achieve
some sort of political outcome before the end of the Dutch term as EC
Presidency. While the precise nature of that outcome constituted a matter
of secondary importance, Van den Broek and his advisers realised that the
deadline’s practical effect was to reinforce Germany’s advocacy of a
speedy recognition of Croatia’s and Slovenia’s independence.
The deadline-ultimatum was underpinned by EC policies that again
showed the Netherlands to have been influential. The two-month dead-
line had been intended as a means of pressure on the Serbs. To add to this
pressure and increase the likelihood of a political outcome before the end
of the year, the Foreign Ministry employed a tactic which had originally
been devised as part of the above-mentioned Dutch draft declaration of
August 28. At the time it had been rejected as too imbalanced (read: anti-
Serbian). The idea was to distinguish between ‘cooperative’ and ‘non-
cooperative’ republics and, subsequently, to exclude the ‘non-cooperative’
republics (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) from the all-party negotiations
that were being conducted under the aegis of the EC Peace Conference
chaired by the former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington. Howev-
er, in order to be able to exclude Serbia and Montenegro from the talks,
they first needed to be identified as ‘non-cooperative’. The procedure
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through which this aim was achieved was based on a precise instruction,
dated October 24, 1991, from Van den Broek, via Van Walsum, to Wij-
naendts who served as Carrington’s deputy. If Serbia and Montenegro
refused Carrington’s draft-settlement as it stood, then they would have
identified themselves as ‘non-cooperative’ and would henceforth be
excluded from the talks. Once that had happened, the Presidency would
call together a meeting of EC Foreign Ministers and propose punitive
measures against the ‘non-cooperative’ republics. The implication was
clear: the EC would for the first time be able to discriminate between the
republics with sanctions and, eventually, move for a recognition of the
republics that wished to become independent. Everything went according
to plan: Serbia and Montenegro refused to accept Carrington’s draft.
Then, on October 28, a declaration was adopted by the EC Foreign Minis-
ters which clearly distinguished between ‘cooperative’ and ‘non-coopera-
tive’ and threatened the latter with ‘restrictive measures'. The measures
were listed in a ministerial declaration on November 8. Positive compen-
satory measures for the ‘cooperative’ republics were announced on
December 2. On December 12, four days before the final debate on recog-
nition, the Netherlands distributed a telegram among its EC partners
arguing that the EC member states should go ahead with recognition.
By mid-December 1991 a narrow majority of EC member states had
come round to supporting a position that had been defended by Ger-
many and Denmark from the outset. The primary impact of Dutch policy
had been to serve as the glue that kept the EC more or less united around
a common approach. The Netherlands had helped to prevent a German
Alleingang by gradually steering the anti-recognition camp in the EC
towards a more ‘selective’, anti-Serbian approach. While Dutch policy was
not perceived to have impacted on the EC Peace Conference, it was
through Dutch policy that a ‘legitimate’ basis was found on which to oust
Serbia and Montenegro from these talks and proceed with recognition of
the other republics.
The end of the Dutch term as EC Presidency did not bring to a complete
halt the ability of the Netherlands as a smaller state to influence interna-
tional policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis. The crisis itself developed into
a new phase when in March/April 1992 war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina. The next occasion at which the Netherlands influenced the direction
of the international community’s involvement in that crisis constituted
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the London Conference of August 26-27, 1992, jointly chaired by the
British EC Presidency and the UN. The tough interventionist speech
made by Van den Broek at this conference achieved international fame,
with Silber and Little claiming that it was the threat of the Dutch and
Bosnian delegations to walk out that made the Conference adopt a decla-
ration ‘lambasting’ the Serbs. Van den Broek’s speech contained elements
that were taken up in the Conference’s ‘Statement of Principles’ by which
any peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina would have to abide.
From the Dutch point of view, the peace plan that was put on the table in
early 1993, the Vance Owen Peace Plan (VOPP), did not sufficiently
respect the principles the Netherlands had helped to formulate at the
London conference. Hence the Netherlands began to criticise and oppose
it. According to one of the plan’s co-authors, Lord Owen, the Dutch criti-
cisms certainly had an impact. He argued that the Netherlands ‘created
very large problems for the Vance-Owen Peace Plan’ and influenced the
new US Administration’s attitudes towards the plan. Clearly, within the
EC, the Netherlands was the most critical of the VOPP. Given that the
Bosnian government regarded the Netherlands as its ally and closest
friend within the EU, it is likely that the Netherlands encouraged the
Bosnian government not to accept the VOPP and instead to hold out for a
better deal. In the process, the division caused within the EC by the Dutch
stance legitimised US opposition to the plan. It seems that, apart from
Bosnian Serb obstinacy which could have been overcome through impo-
sition of the plan, it was the Bosnian-Dutch-American axis which led to
the VOPP’s demise.
The next peace plan on the table, the plan for a Union of Three Republics,
drew a similar response from the Netherlands, which regarded as unac-
ceptable the three-way carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina that was taking
place. Together with Germany and the US, the Netherlands encouraged
the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government to demand additional ter-
ritory. Within the EU the Netherlands was the first to specifically demand
four percent of additional territory to bring the total amount of territo-
ry directly under control of the Bosnian Muslims to exactly one third of
the country. When France was subsequently found prepared to propose
changes to this effect in a joint German-French letter to the Belgian Pres-
idency, the Netherlands could nonetheless claim to have been one of the
architects of the plan’s successor, the EU Action Plan. While the EU Action
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Plan too failed, the territorial division envisaged in it, with 49 per cent of
territory going to the Bosnian Serbs and the remaining 51 per cent to
Croats and Muslims, was to remain the basis for the eventual settlement
agreed in Dayton, Ohio in late 1995.
Another example of the Netherlands influencing the nature and direction
of international Yugoslavia diplomacy involved the expansion of the UN
safe area policy. The Netherlands belonged to the most vocal advocates of
the safe area concept. Hence when in April 1993 Srebrenica was declared
a safe area by the UN Security Council, the Dutch Foreign Ministry in
particular felt vindicated. Subsequently, Foreign Minister Kooijmans
pushed for an expansion of the safe area formula to other towns in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite being warned by US Secretary of State
Christopher that the US military did not believe in the concept. When the
safe area concept was nevertheless further formalised and expanded by
the Security Council, the Netherlands was considered instrumental in its
coming about, as French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé indicated in a tele-
phone conversation with Kooijmans in May 1993.
Through its military commitment to the isolated UN safe area of Sre-
brenica, finally, the Netherlands exerted influence. Apart from the fact
that this move freed up Canadian troops, it is hard to deny that the Dutch
commitment did indeed increase the international visibility of the
Netherlands as the Foreign Ministry had envisaged. In addition, the
Dutch commitment kept the safe area concept alive for the time being.
But the Dutch influence was that of a double-edged sword; by keeping
alive the safe area concept and its ‘light option’ implementation, the
Netherlands helped legitimise a strategy of non-decision on the part of
the Security Council, which otherwise might have been forced to serious-
ly readdress its policy in one way or another.
The External Environment:
Caught between Cooperation and Competition
During the period of July 1990-June 1991 the Netherlands was a loyal
member of various international ‘regimes’, in particular the EC, NATO
and the OSCE. Nevertheless, this regime-dominance in the external envi-
ronment was no guarantee for the Netherlands as a smaller state to exert
influence on international Yugoslavia-diplomacy. This observation would
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seem to contradict the hypothesis that a smaller state is particularly well
placed to be influential when the external environment is benign and
cooperative. However, the evidence shows that during this period the
external environment was not only benign, but also disinterested. While
the early warning system functioned, as evidence regarding both the US
and Dutch policy-making process demonstrates, Western governments
had other problems on their minds and regarded the emerging Yugoslav
crisis as an issue of secondary importance. Had the potential of the
Yugoslav crisis for causing international instability been recognised at the
political level at this early stage, perhaps a more decisive response would
have been given. In such a case, it would have been interesting to see
whether the Netherlands would have been able to play a meaningful role.
What we are left with is an impression that the Dutch government all too
easily settled for the middle ground in the EC, but that this criticism
would be valid for most any EC member state at this juncture, given the
shared wish among EC Foreign Ministers to stick to a common policy of
non-interference, essentially for the sake of sticking to a common policy.
Although the US regularly called upon the Europeans to do more, the US
Administration too was distracted, while State Department officials
found it difficult to explain what the ‘more’ should consist of.
The external environment in which the Netherlands formulated its
Yugoslavia policy changed with the declarations of independence by
Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991 in that the Yugoslav crisis came to
be seen as important by most Western governments. The ambition of
European governments in particular grew, even though the political will
to pay the military costs associated with the growing diplomatic involve-
ment was to remain absent for years to come (prompting Gow to refer to
Western diplomacy as the ‘triumph of the lack of will’). From the per-
spective of the Netherlands the period July 1991 until May 1993 was
marked by a relatively benign and cooperative international environ-
ment. In particular during the period of July-December 1991, when the
Netherlands held the EC Presidency, circumstances external to the Dutch
foreign policy process favoured the Netherlands. It was the EC, the inter-
national regime with the most elaborate shared rules and procedures,
which took the lead in devising an international response to the Yugoslav
crisis, while the US kept its distance. The EC’s prominence in itself was no
guarantee that a medium-powered EC member state would be able to
make its mark. However, as a matter of coincidence, within the EC it was
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the Netherlands which occupied the Presidency. The combination of a
prominent position within a prominent regime prepared the ground for
the Netherlands to exert influence. As we have seen, the Netherlands
made ample use of this opportunity. The position as Presidency not only
gave the Netherlands an information advantage it would not normally
have had, but obliged policy makers and decision makers to think of poli-
cies not only in terms of what was desirable from the Dutch point of view
but in terms of what would be the level of acceptance among the EC part-
ners. On occasions where insufficient attention was paid to positions of
other regime-members, such as when the Netherlands proposed in July
1991 to focus on border changes, the response was immediate and harsh.
Learning by doing, the Netherlands became increasingly adept at steering
EC policy.
The fact that it required the ‘position power’ inherent in holding the Presi-
dency for the Netherlands to be influential would seem to point to a need
to seriously qualify the conclusion that a smaller state like the Nether-
lands is particularly well placed to exert influence in international affairs
when the external environment is benign and cooperative. Of all the
instances at which the Dutch Presidency was influential none would like-
ly have occurred had the Netherlands not occupied the Presidency. It
seems that more is needed, namely a prominent position within a regime,
preferably one with tight rules and elaborate procedures like today’s
European Union. One could just as easily conclude, however, that it
would have been a lot less likely for the Netherlands to have been trusted
with the co-ordination of international policy in an international envi-
ronment marked by competition and adversarial behaviour. From this
point of view, a regime-dominated, cooperative international environ-
ment is more likely than an adversarial environment to allow for a small-
er state to occupy a position of prominence.
The Netherlands still managed to exert influence in 1992 and 1993. Ini-
tially, through the EC and the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia (ICFY), established during the above-mentioned London
Conference as successor to the EC Peace Conference, the international
environment remained regime-based. However, as the leading powers
began to grow impatient with the established multilateral frameworks,
the international environment became more multi-polar and adversarial.
The growing preference for ad hoc, intergovernmental approaches to
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dealing with the Yugoslav crisis led to the announcement on May 22,
1993 by five countries of the ‘Joint Action Programme’ (JAP). The five
JAP signatories included three EC member states, Spain, Britain and
France, who had excluded the other EC member states from the process.
The tendency to work through intergovernmental structures eventually
culminated in the creation of the so-called Contact Group in April 1994,
consisting of the US, Russia, Britain, France, Germany and, at a later
stage, Italy. Other states, the Netherlands included, were thereby margin-
alised from the international policy process. While the development from
cooperation to competition was a gradual process and should not be
described in absolute terms, clearly the circumstances under which the
safe area concept was institutionalised by the UN Security Council
demonstrated that international solidarity had plummeted. For while the
creation of safe areas had been regarded by a variety of international
actors as a way to mend (mainly transatlantic) divisions, the subsequent
question of who would provide troops for the implementation of the
Security Council’s safe area resolutions constituted a veritable prisoner’s
dilemma, with most governments inclined to pass the buck.
In this increasingly adversarial environment the Netherlands would
inevitably find it ever harder to exert international influence. The reason
why the Netherlands nevertheless succeeded in doing so on a number of
important occasions lay in the new, highly visible role it had adopted. No
longer the promotor of European consensus, the Netherlands took on a
classic small-state posture by becoming the guardian of morality and
international law. In the process many of the small-state strategies listed
in the introduction were employed, in particular those with a ‘normative’
character. The Dutch performance at the London Conference of August
1992 and Dutch obstruction over the VOPP and the plan for a Union of
Three Republics during the first half of 1993 constituted classic cases of
‘demonstration politics’ and ‘(public) criticism’. The decision to commit
troops to the UN’s safe area policy in the hope that the Netherlands
would serve as a catalyst was a clear-cut example of ‘moral guidance’.
Internal factors; bureaucratic politics and principled ideas
One cannot understand Dutch Yugoslavia policy during the period 1990-
1995 by treating it merely as a derivative of the external constraints
imposed on the Netherlands by its external environment. Domestic factors
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too were important and at times even decisive determinants. Initially,
external constraints exercised by the EC and CSCE regimes were so tight
that Dutch Yugoslavia policy indeed was little more than a derivative. In
the Netherlands only the Foreign Ministry was oriented to a degree to
what was going on in Yugoslavia, a handful of prescient academics and
journalists (like NRC-Handelsblad’s Eastern Europe expert, Peter
Michielsen) excepted. Within the Foreign Ministry the early warning sys-
tem functioned adequately. Both the embassy in Belgrade and the Eastern
Europe Division in The Hague warned their superiors that Yugoslavia’s
disintegration was imminent. Later the Director-General for Political
Affairs became concerned and called into question the existing European
policy of non-interference. However, for a long time, the Minister of For-
eign Affairs was not interested in the matter, essentially because his Euro-
pean colleagues were not either. When the interest in the topic rose, the
Dutch government felt comfortable with a position at the centre of the
Euro-Atlantic consensus on the need to maintain Yugoslavia’s territorial
integrity.
During the Dutch EC Presidency of July-December 1991, the Foreign
Ministry remained the dominant domestic actor. As before, neither
bureaucratic politics nor principled beliefs played a dominant role in the
formulation of Dutch policy. In contrast to the preceding period howev-
er, this was due not only to external constraints but also to domestic con-
straints in the shape of a number of national interests, in particular the
interest in continued EC-cohesion. The perceived need to maintain and
promote EC-cohesion served as an exceptionally ‘objective’ yardstick by
which Dutch Yugoslavia policy was measured. This is not to suggest that
Dutch Yugoslavia policy was value-free or devoid of any view on the crisis
itself, which would be inhuman, but that it was considered of paramount
importance to prevent already apparent strains over the Yugoslav crisis
from turning into public division. Inevitably, the existence of a relatively
objective constant excluded many policy options as unrealistic or unde-
sirable that might otherwise have gained domestic support. Only towards
the end of the term as Presidency did officials begin to feel that their prin-
cipled beliefs about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ were being challenged by the crisis,
and such beliefs began to emerge as semi-autonomous forces in the
Dutch foreign policy process. These principled beliefs did motivate some
policy proposals that might have risked creating division within the EC,
in particular the Dutch suggestion not to deploy a UN force in Croatia for
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fear that such a force would freeze Serbian territorial gains. However, this
proposal proved to be an exception to the rule as the issue quickly disap-
peared from the agenda. The overall focus of the Dutch Presidency con-
tinued to be on the question of how to keep the EC member states united
around a common position, which by the end of 1991 had crystallised
into support for the recognition of individual Yugoslav republics as inde-
pendent states.
With the end of the Dutch term as EC Presidency, the ‘objective’ interest
in EC cohesion disappeared as an important domestic input in Dutch
Yugoslavia policy. In its place came a widespread feeling of moral indig-
nation which, although not an exclusively Dutch phenomenon, had a
strong impact on Dutch policy. Principled beliefs about ‘good’ and ‘bad’,
as well as the perceived moral obligation to combat evil began to make a
mark on Dutch Yugoslavia policy, with public opinion, the press and Par-
liament as increasingly vocal actors. When confronted with the question
of whether parliamentarians had not all too easily allowed themselves to
be influenced by moral indignation, the late Maarten van Traa hinted at
how high emotions had run in the Netherlands: ‘It is easy to say in retro-
spect that parliamentarians should not be driven by public indignation
but the daily reality was that we were being bombarded by telephone calls
and letters from people asking us to do something.’1 The wish ‘to do
something’, no matter what it sometimes seemed, became the veritable
driving force of Dutch Yugoslavia policy. Principled beliefs about ‘good’
and ‘bad’ lay at the origin of the Dutch opposition to the VOPP and the
plan for a Union of Three Republics, the advocacy of the safe area con-
cept and the subsequent military commitment to the UN Security Coun-
cil’s safe area resolutions. Only when directly confronted with the conse-
quences, such as when the VOPP risked being replaced by a worse plan, or
a failure of the EU Action Plan implied the continued existence of safe
areas as ‘anomalies’, did the Dutch government abandon principled
beliefs as the key motivation. In fact, on such occasions the Nether-
lands sometimes made remarkable swings from ‘super-moralist’ to ‘super-
pragmatist’, for instance when it suggested to European partners that a
territorial exchange involving the east Bosnian safe areas might be neces-
sary.
Bureaucratic politics quite literally played a role in the decision-making
process regarding the deployment of the airmobile brigade in the safe
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area of Srebrenica. Initially the source of bureaucratic conflict, deploy-
ment of the airmobile battalion subsequently became part of a package
deal along the lines of the ‘coalition logrolling’ model. At the centre of the
initial domestic conflict stood the Ministry of Defence, the sole actor
opposing deployment of Dutch infantry in advanced positions in the UN
peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. Between August 1992 and August
1993, the Ministry of Defence successfully managed to resist the pressure
for deployment of combat troops emanating from a broad domestic
coalition spearheaded by the Foreign Ministry and the Second Chamber.
Relations between the Foreign and Defence Ministries soured to the
extent that an integrated civil-military perspective on the Dutch contri-
butions to UNPROFOR was no longer possible. Instead, the diplomats
focused exclusively on the moral imperative and political benefits of a
deployment, while the military regarded the Bosnian conflict as a quag-
mire the Netherlands should stay out of. Minister of Defence Relus ter
Beek cleverly bought time by regularly giving the parliamentarians some-
thing they had not asked for but dared not refuse, such as F16s, Navy
frigates, a transport battalion and a signals unit. However, the downside
to this tactic was that none of the commitments satisfied the advocates of
deploying combat units, so that in spite of the time Ter Beek seemed to be
buying, the pressure did not subside. Around the summer of 1993, Ter
Beek and his advisers began to feel that the pressure could no longer be
withstood without the Army’s legitimacy being undermined. In particu-
lar the fact that the expensive new airmobile brigade’s first operational
battalion would soon complete its training would make it hard to con-
tinue opposing the deployment of combat units.
Paradoxically, once the Defence Ministry had grudgingly accepted the
inevitability of deploying the airmobile brigade’s first ready battalion, it
appears that the Army in particular began to support the idea of deploy-
ment to the extent that its generals ceased to think critically about the
nature of the battalion’s mission. It seems that the generals, feeling forced
to do so by the domestic-political constellation that had arisen, began 
to give priority to bureaucratic-political considerations over military
judgment. Their change of attitude had nothing to do with a sudden
change in military views on the Bosnian conflict or the safe area concept.
Rather, it was primarily motivated by their concern for the domestic
legitimacy of the Army, the airmobile brigade in particular. As one com-
mentator put it, ‘The Army command has never really believed in the
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doctrine of military deployment in the service of human rights. But they
have never resisted the principle, because it constituted in the eyes of
many the most important justification of the continued existence of large
armed forces after the end of the Cold War.’2
The airmobile brigade was the jewel in the crown of the new all-volunteer
Army, but it was also a very expensive unit whose envisaged airmobile
tasks could not be fulfilled without helicopters. These helicopters were,
however, yet to be bought. When parliamentarians, frustrated by the
apparent obstinacy on the part of the Ministry of Defence, began to hint
that they might be forced to block the acquisition of the brigade’s heli-
copters, they struck a chord with the Army generals.
Apart from the Army’s interest in preserving domestic legitimacy, the
Defence Ministry’s new-found support for deploying its first ready battal-
ion was motivated by the view that deployment would enable the Defence
Ministry to obtain a bigger say in Dutch policy regarding the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly concerning policy affecting the security
of Dutch peacekeepers on the ground. Applying the coalition logrolling
model, this was the ‘deal’ struck by the Ministry of Defence with Parlia-
ment and the Foreign Ministry: in exchange for deployment of an airmo-
bile battalion, there was to be parliamentary approval of the acquisition
of the helicopters, while Dutch policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis would
henceforth be measured against its possible consequences for the security
of Dutch peacekeepers. This informal deal succeeded in so far as the heli-
copters were indeed bought and the Defence Ministry’s concern for the
security of Dutch forces did indeed become a central concern of Dutch
policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis. However, in the longer term the
Army’s international reputation and domestic legitimacy suffered a blow
because of the events of July 1995.
It is striking that at a time when the views of the Foreign Ministry and
Defence Ministry were so far apart, Cabinet meetings did not serve as 
a platform for harmonising civil and military views. Instead, it was
essentially left to the Foreign Minister to formulate overall Dutch
Yugoslavia policy and for him and his colleague the Minister of Defence
to sort out their differences of view regarding Dutch military contribu-
tions by themselves. This is not to suggest that other Cabinet members
never said anything. In fact, Christian Democrat Ministers and Social
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Democrat Ministers alike generally supported deployment, as Ter Beek
suggested with his comment that in the Cabinet a ‘ring of steel’ slowly
closed in on him. What is simply incomprehensible, however, is that until
the actual fall of Srebrenica in July 1995, the Cabinet never felt inclined to
discuss Dutch Yugoslavia policy in depth, as both Ter Beek and his succes-
sor Voorhoeve later lamented.
One wonders whether the civil-military dispute about the Dutch role in
UNPROFOR could have been avoided in another way. First of all, it
would have required a better integration of civil and military perspectives
through tighter joint policy-making and decision-making procedures 
–  for instance in the shape of a ‘War Cabinet’, or regular high-level meet-
ings between the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry, or regular
briefings by the Defence Ministry for parliamentarians (as was the case
during the Kosovo-crisis of 1999). Paradoxically, it seems that the best
way of preventing the civil-military dispute of 1992-1993 would have
been a very early deployment of Dutch combat troops as part of
UNPROFOR, say in August 1992 when UNPROFOR was mandated by
the Security Council to use force in order to ensure the delivery of
humanitarian aid (resolution 770). Had such an early deployment taken
place, it is possible that Dutch military views would have become an inte-
gral part of Dutch Yugoslavia policy at an early stage, akin to the situation
in France, Britain and Spain. This might have helped reduce the gap
between moral and political rhetoric and military reality that so obvious-
ly hampered Dutch Yugoslavia policy during this period.
As a reminder of the depth of division between the civil and the military
elements in the Dutch foreign policy making circles, one needs only to
look at a peculiar episode of Dutch Yugoslavia policy in the weeks follow-
ing the fall of Srebrenica. In late August 1995, Prime Minister Wim Kok
(who had been Minister of Finance in the preceding Cabinet) and For-
eign Minister Hans van Mierlo contemplated committing Dutch troops
to Gorazde, the only east-Bosnian safe area still intact.3 On August 28, the
last British troops (Welch Fusiliers) stationed there had been evacuated in
order to enable UNPROFOR and NATO to apply air power more freely.
As Chris Vernon, the UNPROFOR spokesman at the time, put it: ‘Goraz-
de will be defended by using the NATO airforce on a large scale on the
basis of a completely different concept than up until now.’4 However,
while the UNPROFOR commanders were frantically trying to evacuate
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all remaining isolated contingents of UN peacekeepers to Muslim-held
central Bosnia, so as to be finally able to use air power without the risk of
retaliation against these vulnerably placed troops, Prime Minister Kok
said he ‘absolutely could not place’ the decision to evacuate Gorazde in
the light of the agreement of a conference in London on June 21 to
defend Gorazde.5 Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo too believed that the
decision to evacuate the enclave ran counter to the goal of defending the
enclave. Both Kok and Van Mierlo apparently had not interpreted the
events of the past months as evidence that the combination ‘air power’
and ‘vulnerably placed troops’ did not work. Interestingly, an opinion poll
conducted in August 1995 demonstrated that the percentage of support-
ers for Dutch participation in military operations in the former Yugo-
slavia, having sunk to 41 per cent in June 1995, had bounced back to 62
per cent.6 However, having experienced Srebrenica, Defence Minister
Voorhoeve vehemently opposed the idea of stationing Dutch troops in
Gorazde, supported in Parliament by the VVD and the CDA. Fortunately
for the Netherlands, as UNPROFOR’s redeployment was completed and
the air campaign began to bear fruit, it became obvious that there was no
longer any point in deploying peacekeepers in Gorazde.
From Indifference to Entrapment
That one can be influential and unsuccessful at the same time was amply
demonstrated by the performance of the Netherlands in the Yugoslav cri-
sis between 1992 and 1995. In 1990, nothing yet pointed to the later
entrapment of the Netherlands. In fact the Dutch government remained
more or less indifferent towards the developing crisis until well into 1991.
Not until the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia on
June 25, 1991 did Van den Broek and his European and US colleagues
begin to take a greater interest in events in Yugoslavia. By contrast, during
the Dutch EC Presidency of July-December 1991 Van den Broek and his
senior advisers immersed themselves in the Yugoslav crisis. Nevertheless,
for most of this period, the Foreign Ministry and the Cabinet seem to have
kept a certain distance from the Yugoslav crisis in that it was always seen
against the background of European integration. Van den Broek and his
closest advisers cleverly steered clear of the Scylla of German pro-recogni-
tion pressure and the Charybdis of French/British opposition to recogni-
tion. The Netherlands successfully prevented a German Alleingang by
gradually moving from ‘even-handedness to ‘selectiveness’. While keeping
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Germany in check, it was important at the same time to avoid the impres-
sion of undermining attempts to reach an overall settlement. The way this
was eventually achieved was to impose a deadline by which time either a
settlement should have been reached or else a decision made to go ahead
with the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (the only ones that really
seemed to matter to the German government). With the deadline, the
Netherlands could credibly encourage Germany to be patient a little while
longer, while nobody could accuse the Netherlands of pre-empting a set-
tlement although the practical effect of a deadline was, of course, to make
such a settlement extremely unlikely (for there obviously no longer exist-
ed an interest for Slovenia and Croatia to make any kind of political con-
cession). Obliged to think on behalf of the EC as a whole and with the
interest in EC cohesion featuring prominently in Dutch policy, there exist-
ed little risk of the Netherlands entrapping itself in the Yugoslav crisis as
the result of principled beliefs at stake in the crisis or a parochial domestic
interest.
Things changed following the end of the Dutch Presidency. No longer
saddled with the responsibilities associated with the Presidency, the
Netherlands took up a role as guardian of international law. A lone ‘prin-
cipled’ actor in an increasingly adversarial environment, the Netherlands
gradually worked itself into a mess. On the road to the hell of Srebrenica,
three stages of entrapment could be detected. First came what may be
termed moral and political entrapment. Dutch politicians, diplomats and
journalists explicitly committed themselves to the defence of certain
moral principles through military means. Hence the Dutch call to arms at
the London Conference of August 1992; hence the Dutch opposition to
the VOPP; hence the opposition to the plan for a Union of Three
Republics; hence the support for an instutionalised UN safe area policy in
Bosnia-Herzegovina; hence the Dutch troop offer for the safe areas.
Throughout this period, the Dutch foreign policy elite had paid little
attention to the question of whether adequate Dutch military means were
available at a time when the Dutch Army was still in the process of chang-
ing from a conscript-based Army into an all-volunteer Army. They had
not paid attention to an even more important question either, namely
whether a willingness to pay the military costs associated with the protec-
tion of moral principles truly existed in the Netherlands. Having thus cre-
ated a gap between moral rhetoric and the reality of the Dutch military
role in UNPROFOR, the foreign policy elite were faced with the question
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of how to close the gap. Either the rhetoric had to be adapted to the
Dutch military role, or alternatively the Dutch military contribution
would have to be beefed up so as to bring it in line with the rhetoric. The
Dutch foreign policy elite opted for the latter, which explains the consis-
tent pressure on the Defence Ministry to come up with something better
than the F16s and the frigates, something better than the transport battal-
ion and something better than the signals unit.
Dutch military entrapment in the Yugoslav crisis took shape when on
June 22, 1993 the government committed itself internationally to an
additional military contribution for the specific purpose of implement-
ing the UN Security Council’s safe area policy. Having consistently occu-
pied the moral high ground internationally, to withdraw this commit-
ment would have meant the end of the Dutch role as guardian of
morality. In February 1994, a first Dutch troop contingent entered the
Srebrenica enclave, with the remainder of the (understrength) battalion
arriving in March. As soon as they were inside the enclave, the implica-
tions became clear. When parliamentarians were briefed by Dutch mili-
tary on the situation, they realised that the Dutch peacekeepers in Sre-
brenica were the hostages, if not prisoners, of the surrounding Serbs. The
domestic alliance between the Foreign Ministry and Parliament quickly
gave way to an understanding between the Defence Ministry and Parlia-
ment that the security of the Dutch forces was paramount and that the
use of NATO air power was not to result in retaliation against the vulner-
able Dutch peacekeepers. The Foreign Ministry only grudgingly accepted
the Defence Ministry’s leadership with regard to the question of air
power. The fall of Srebrenica was to trigger an anguished debate in the
Netherlands, with a lot of unfair scapegoating directed at the Dutch bat-
talion in Srebrenica and Defence Minister Voorhoeve. In reality, while
moral indignation was a huge driving force both before and after the fall
of Srebrenica, the decision-making process regarding the deployment of
the battalion had omitted to address the most important question of all,
namely whether the Dutch peacekeepers would be in a position to offer
effective protection to the Muslim population in the enclave and, if not,
what was the morality of deploying them.
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realiteit was dat we werden bestookt met telefoontjes en brieven van mensen die
wilden dat we iets deden.]: Maarten van Traa in public debate during book pre-
sentation Dick Leurdijk, Pulchri, The Hague, 1997.
2 Paul Scheffer, NRC-Handelsblad, September 4, 1995.
3 TK 1993-1994, 22 181, no. 119.
4 VN laten “veilige haven” Gorazde aan lot over’ (UN abandon ‘safe haven’
Gorazde to its fate), Trouw, August 26, 1995.
5 ‘Kok ontkent meningsverschil over Gorazde’ (Kok denies difference of opinion
over Gorazde), ANP, August 25, 1995.
6 Stichting Maatschappij en Krijgsmacht, Internet site: www.smk.nl.
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